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World Food Security in the 21st Century

Wednesday, April 30th, 2014

Talk, South Puget Sound Community College, April 28, 2014

 

 

World Food Security in the 21st Century

 

E. N. Anderson

Dept. of Anthropology

University of California, Riverside, CA 92507

gene@ucr.edu

www.krazykioti.com

 

 

The Problem
“DAVOS, 24 January 2014  Up to 849 million hectares of natural land – nearly the size of Brazil – may be degraded by 2050 should current trends of unsustainable land use continue, warns a report by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).  The need to feed a growing number of people globally has led to more land being converted to cropland at the expense of the world’s savannah, grassland and forests.  this has resulted in widespread environmental degradation and loss of biodiversity, affecting an estimated 23 per cent of global soil.  Agriculture currently consumes more than 30 per cent of the world’s land area, and cropland covers around 10 per cent of global land.”   (UNEP 2014b, citing UNEP 2014a.  The rest of the agricultural land is largely grazing.)

            World food security is entering a new and troubling era.  At present, the world has plenty of food.  The media sometimes point to the fact that there are stocks sufficient to carry the world for only a few months, but this is expectable and natural; there is little point in stockpiling world food beyond the next harvests.  The fact that three billion people are not eating well, with about one billion of them in serious want (Kuhnlein 2014:13, citing FAO figures), is disturbing, but is balanced out by the fact that about one-fourth of the world’s food is lost to rats, insect pests, spoilage, and waste.  Also, with 1.5 billion overweight or obese (Kuhnlein 2014:13), including almost one billion obese in developing countries (BBC 2014), there is unbalance in food consumption. 

Current world food problems are political, as pointed out often over the years by Amartya Sen (e.g. 1992, 1997, 2009).  Sen showed that famines for at least the last 70 years have been political: a government refuses to provide adequate resources to farmers, or refuses to provide adequate food aid, or fails to set up a food aid infrastructure in a timely manner.  As Sen puts it: “…no major famine has ever occurred in a functioning democracy with regular elections, opposition parties, basic freedom of speech and a relatively free media (even when the country is very poor and in a seriously adverse food situation)” (Sen 2009:342).  Sen shows convincingly that famine is a governmental choice, rendered possible by lack of accountability, rather than a natural disaster.

This is now well known in the international community.  The term “structural violence” was coined by Paul Farmer to refer to deliberate inaction leading to mass deaths (Farmer  2004).  A child dies of malnutrition every 10 seconds (Alexander 2013), but these deaths are due to failure of governments and agencies to provide livelihoods for the poor and medical and nutritional education and resources, not to any absolute lack.

In this case the problem is that the governments or agencies in question either do not care about the hungry, or actively want them to die, as in genocide cases (see Anderson and Anderson 2012).  The problem then becomes one of changing people’s minds about the worth and deservingness of the targeted group, and about the need for solidarity in the modern world—a world in which “we’re all in this together” and stand or fall together.  That, however, is somewhat outside the scope of the present paper (see, instead, the world’s religious scriptures).

The concept of “food security” was put in order by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 1974, and defined as “availability at all times of adequate world food supplies”(Kuhnlein 2014:14).  A summit in 1996 and subsequent reportrs have added “nutrition security” (FAO et al. 2013; Kunhlein 2014).  The definition has extended, and has recently been phrased as “when all people at all times have physical, social and economic access to food, which is safe and consumed in sufficient quantity and quality to meet their dietary needs and food preferences, and is supported by an environment of adequate sanitation, health services and care, allowing for an healthy and active life” (Committee on World Food Security 2012, as quoted by Kuhnlein 2014:14).  

Like many UN definitions, including the classic one of  perfect health (“the right to enjoy the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health,” again Kuhnlein 2014:15, quoting the World Health Organisation in this case), this final definition is clearly unachievable in the real world; it is an ideal to strive for.  It is what I call a process goal: a goal that is unachievable in full, but for which every step toward it is progress.  Other process goals include peace, safety, and ethnic and religious tolerance.  We will never have perfect food security, but every genuine step toward it helps countless people (see e.g. Pottier 1999).

 

Root Causes

 

            However, the future will be very different.  Problems are many and complex, and fall under several headings, both environmental and social (a good review is Lester Brown’s book, Full Planet, Empty Plates, 2012).

            Most obvious, but not by any means the most intractable, is population.  World population is now almost eight billion people.  World land area is 57.53 million square miles, or 36,800,000,000 acres (Dave Huckleberry, online, Yahoo answers, 2008).  That works out to about 5 acres per person.  Unfortunately, only 1/10 of land is arable and another one or two tenths can be successfully grazed.  The rest is city, desert, ice sheet, tundra, and mountain.  Thus we are being fed from about 1 ½ acres of land apiece.  This is about the size of a traditional Chinese or Vietnamese rice farm.

            Population is still growing fast.  One hears that population growth has stagnated, but this is true only in Europe and the urbanized parts of East Asia.  The US population is still growing at almost 1% per annum.  Africa and the Middle East are growing at 2% or more.  Egypt has grown from 80 million to 92 million in the last few years.  Egypt depends entirely on the Nile, whose waters are now coveted by Ethiopia and Sudan.  Egypt has succumbed to political instability and religious bigotry, thus making it  impossible for the country to deal at present with long-term problems of food and population.  Pakistan and several other countries are in similar risky situations.

The good news is that the demographic transition is working; people everywhere are having fewer children than their parents did.  I have seen this happen in the major places I have worked:  Hong Kong, Malaysia, and southeast Mexico.  Completed family size dropped from seven children to two just in the time I have been working in those areas.  The bad news is that the demographic transition is not happening, or is happening very slowly, in the areas that still have rapid growth.  The future is not very hopeful in those areas.  If we do not make a full range of health care and birth control and family planning options available, free, and if we do not make them a socially acceptable choice, the consequences in places like Egypt and Pakistan are horrible beyond imagining.  Fortunately, the demographic transition proceeds rapidly when comprehensive health planning and care are done.  The problem is getting such things into the African and Middle Eastern back country.

            More immediately menacing, and far less tractable, are the problems with current farming practices.  One classic problem, not new and not caused by industry but greatly exacerbated by modern water mismanagement, is salt buildup in farmland.  Irrigation without proper drainage is the cause.  Salt buildup has been going on since ancient times in Mesopotamia and Pakistan, and the Bible speaks of it as a familiar phenomenon.  It has vastly increased in the last hundred years, as more and more dams and irrigation works are constructed, often without proper attention to drainage and flushing out salts.  Such land can be used for salt-tolerant crops for a while, or reclaimed, but ultimately it is too far gone to save.  Many a productive wetland has been drained and cultivated, only to become a salt desert in a few decades.

            Other ancient problems that are now worse than ever are overgrazing and overcultivation leading to desertification.  Millions of acres are lost every year, especially in dryland Africa and interior China.  Soil erosion also continues unabated in much of the world, in spite of well-known remedies.   Over-application of those remedies has its own costs:  The United States and Egypt, among other countries, have now so thoroughly controlled soil erosion that natural replacement of delta lands by silt has been impaired, leading to loss of vast areas of fertile land in the Mississippi, Nile, and other deltas. 

            Another curse that is ancient but has recently become far more serious is urbanization.  Even Babylon and Nineveh sprawled onto cropland, but of course we now urbanize on a vaster scale.  At the rate California was urbanizing before the housing meltdown of 2008, California’s last farm would have gone under around 2050.   China loses almost a million hectares a year to urbanization.

Most current problems, however, are due to unsustainable industrial farming.  The current worldwide crash in honeybee populations is the first real global disaster that can be laid directly at the door of industrial farming.  There have been many local ones, especially in China (Anderson 2012, updated on my website).  Water pollution—river, ocean, and groundwater—by fertilizers and pesticides is the source of the worst local problems.   Even the soil can be too polluted to use.  

A worst-case situation is that of China.  China’s farmland peaked at over 160,000,000 ha in the 1970s.  China’s farmland is now down to 120,000,000 ha—the minimum the government believes it needs for food security.  Much of this land was barely usable and reverted to forest, but by far the major part of it has been lost to the above causes.  China has lost perhaps 12,000,000 ha of farmland to soil and water pollution alone (Anderson 2012 summarizes the sources).  Similar disastrous land loss is observed in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and other dryland countries. 

Into all of this comes climate change.  Global warming is rapidly heating and drying much of the world’s agricultural land, including California, to the point of disaster.  We in California are losing about 20% of our almond acreage this year, for example, and may lose almost 100% of it in the near future.  Worldwide, the effects of global warming will be much worse in future (Elliott et al. 2014).  Some 15% of humanity dwells in areas where water availability is already problematic and will be much more so (Haddeland et al. 2014; Schewe et al. 2014).  Agriculture will suffer enormously from water shortages and heat, with possible loss of 17% of world production (Nelson et al. 2014; Rosensweig et al. 2014).  Probably most of the world’s cropland will be negatively affected by global warming, especially the poorer areas of the world (Wheeler et al. 2013).  The Sahel, for instance, will desertify.  So will the southwestern United States.

The release of the greenhouse gases that cause much of global warming is to a great extent due to agriculture.  Deforestation, land degradation, burning, use of fossil fuels, and other pathologies of badly-done rural land management cause at least 20% and probably over 30% of greenhouse gas release—more than cars or heating, almost as much as power plants.  This wasteful mismanagement is almost entirely the result of large-scale plantation-style farming, especially the clearing of tropical forests for oil palm plantations and cattle ranches. 

One particularly ironic, and dangerous, effect of global warming is that it is selectively destroying the most environmentally fine-tuned farming systems.  They depend on tight adjustment to local soil, water and climate conditions.  They are increasingly losing out, as global warming destroys those conditions.  Large-scale industrial farming has one virtue: it is relatively buffered against such things.  Even so, it is dying in much of California today.

The other big problem for the future is the oil peak, long predicted but always pushed farther into the future by new discoveries and new technologies.  We are currently much more threatened by greenhouse gas buildup from fossil fuel combustion than by the danger of oil peaking.  However, the end must come some time, and the world will have to adapt.  Energy is no problem—wind and solar are already underselling oil on the (virtual) free market.  Oil remains competitive because of the hundreds of billions of dollars of direct and indirect subsidies poured into it by world governments, and the extreme political power of the oil lobby (Juhasz 2008; Oreskes and Conway 2010; Ross 2012).  The oil corporations have successfully fought efforts to move away from oil or to admit the climate-change effects of fossil fuels.  The problem if oil runs out, however, is not lack of energy: it is need for oil to produce fertilizer, pesticides, and most other agrochemicals.  What we will use as feedstock for these chemicals is an interesting problem.  Coal and agricultural wastes are possibilities, but the technology needs development.

The other worldwide curse today is monoculture (for this and much that follows, see Anderson 2013).  Large-scale monoculture is not new.  It was a creation of the royal estates and temple estates of ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia, apparently the latter in particular.  They grew wheat and barley and very little (if anything) else.  They were owned and run by the government, though necessarily worked on a small-farmer basis.  The giant monocrop estates led directly to the even larger, slave-worked estates of ancient Greece and Rome.   These were more often mixed, since wine and fruit production was important, but extensive fields of wheat or barley were still common.  Medieval Byzantium and the Islamic empires continued this tradition, and western Europe picked it up from them. 

The dreadful climax of monocrop plantations came with the sugar industry in the Caribbean and Brazil in the 18th century.  Some 15,000,000 enslaved Africans were imported to work sugar (and, later, rice and cotton, on a much more limited scale).  Each enslaved person landed in the New World meant another three to ten persons dead—in African slave-capturing battles, or from disease and horrible conditions on the way from Africa to the Americas.  One slaving captain, John Newton, was so horrified but what he saw—and did—that he entered a profound personal crisis, quit his career, and repented for years, finally feeling he had achieved some religious forgiveness, and immortalizing it with the hymn “Amazing Grace”—which became a favorite of African-Americans. 

Thus was born modern monocrop agriculture.  Today, slaves continue to provide a great deal of the work force, in many parts of the world.  More commonly, landless laborers are used.  They can be cheaper than slaves; slaves had to be fed, and had every incentive to shun work, since they were usually too valuable (after the first decades) to be allowed to die outright. 

Quite apart from the social pathologies, so well covered in a vast literature (e.g. Beckford 1972; Mintz 1985, 1996), monocrop agriculture is suicidal as a food production method.  One reason is that it drives out more and more of the old species and varieties.  The world is now fed by a tiny handful of varieties of a tiny handful of species of plants and animals.  Of tens of thousands of species that have been used by humans, only eight plants (wheat, rice, maize, white potatoes, manioc, sugar cane, soybeans and sorghum) and three animals (cow, pig, chicken) supply almost all the world’s calories and meat.  Diversity is collapsing.

Worldwide, the big three grains—wheat, rice, and maize—are spreading rapidly at the expense of  local crops.  Soybeans, potatoes, and barley are spreading too, but important local crops such as rye, sorghum, and manioc are not (Khoury et al. 2014; FAO data), and the underappreciated and local crops are going out.  Soybean acreage has expanded 284% since 1961, oil palm 180% (Kinver 2014).  Almost all this expansion has been at the expense of tropical forest, leading to huge increases in atmospheric carbon as well as the loss of all the diversity in the forests.  Cattle ranching has also increased at the expense of forest.  This is not the result of the market or of competitive economics; these crops are heavily subsidized.

Much of the expansion of oil crops is not for human food, but for animal fodder or biodiesel production.  Biodiesel also now takes a large percentage of the world’s corn and sugar production.  When the biodiesel boom began, there were predictions that it would set rich people’s SUV’s against poor people’s children.  This is exactly what has happened.  Prices of food grains have soared while availability drops.

The other reason is that diseases and pests build up to high population levels, and also to high levels of virulence.  The more individuals of any organism are crowded together, the more density-dependent mortality they will experience (other things being equal).  The more genetically similar they are, the less resistance they will have to a particular disease that targets their particular genetic strain.  Diseases evolve rapidly through natural selection.  The one that succeeds best in spreading like wildfire in a large, crowded population will naturally triumph.  We have seen this with humans, from the Black Death of 1346-48 to the annual flu epidemics of today.

The notorious case of monoculture making history was the great European potato famine of 1846-48.  It is known in the English-speaking world as the Irish potato famine, but actually far more people were involved in Germany, Poland and Russia.  The resulting unrest led to revolutions, and to the success of the Communist Manifesto (Marx and Engels, 1848).  Still, the effect on Ireland was bad enough: hundreds of thousands dead, and millions—over the next few decades—emigrating. 

What happened was that north Europe had come to rely on a very few varieties of potato, especially one known as the Lumper (on the famine, and potato history, see Reader 2008; Salaman 1949; Woodham-Smith 1962).  The reason was that the potato was originally a tropical mountain crop, and only a few strains could live in a climate with fluctuating seasons an day-length.  These varieties largely derived from Chiloe Island, Chile, where they had been developed by the Mapuche people.  Chiloe is still a sort of genetic material.  The few really high-yield, adaptable strains available in Europe were vulnerable to the potato blight, Phytophthora infestans, which was originally described as a fungus but is actually a brown alga.  The cold, wet summers of 1846 and 1847 were ideal for this wetness-loving plague.

More recently, in 1970, one third of the American maize crop was lost to a blight.  Today, a Ugandan wheat blight threatens the world’s wheat.  Several diseases are slowly wiping out the cacao plantations of Africa, and chocolate will soon be a thing of the past unless more is done.  Manioc is subject to buildup of diseases, though genetic engineering and ordinary selective breeding have saved it so far.  Bananas are now subject to Panama disease, strain 4, which is incurable and which has evolved to target the widely-planted existing varieties; it has devastated production in Asia and is now affecting Africa (Fresh Plaza 2013).  Other problems afflict bananas too (Turvill 2014).  Almost all commercial bananas are of the old Cavendish variety.  It has been around long enough to accumulate many diseases that target it.  Corn rootworms have now evolved resistance to Bacillus thuringensis genes engineered into maize (Gassmann et al. 2014), and weeds have evolved resistance to the herbicide glyphosphate (Roundup), so the major defenses of the US maize crop are giving out. 

The only hope in this world of monocultures is to preserve and encourage genetic diversity by any and all means possible.  The overwhelmingly most important thing to do is save all existing heirloom varieties, and landraces—the local varieties of crops that are preserved in small-scale and traditional agriculture.  This is being done, most famously in a vault in Spitsbergen, a place so cold that even projected global warming will not melt its deepfreeze.  Spitsbergen has other protection too:  the polar bears are so numerous and ferocious that people are not allowed outside the limits of the one tiny town unless they carry rifles. Other vast genetic resource banks exist, most notably the International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines, which preserves almost 500,000 varieties of rice.  Landraces of rice are still producing astonishing breakthroughs that can vastly increase world food production (Fujita et al. 2013).

Genetic engineering, meanwhile, can rapidly produce new varieties that are adapted to new diseases.  Genes for resistance to manioc diseases, for instance, have been engineered in from unrelated organisms, including in some cases the disease organisms themselves (Broach 2014).  This is where genetic engineering can come into its own.

 

Continuing Deterioration

 

Unfortunately, the world is not facing this crisis very well.  Agricultural research is being devastated by penny-pinching governments.  Now that most people worldwide live in cities, and farmers are down to 1 to 2% of the population in developed countries, agricultural research is simply not a political priority—though subsidies for agribusiness still are popular.  Agrarian and rural-based political parties tend to be conservative—more interested in saving tax dollars than in investing those dollars to save the world.  Annual growth in research and development in agriculture has declined steadily and sharply and is now less than 1% of research spending per year in the United States, as opposed nearly 4% over the 1950-70 period, the years of concern over the world food problem. 

Increase per year in crop yields and in labor and land productivity has tracked this amazingly closely (Alston et al. 2009)—it has slowed down greatly as research is cut. Moreover, research is increasingly related to the needs of industrial farming.  Little attention is paid to serious development of agriculture on small farms and in harsh or tropical environments.  NGO’s do a great deal of applied work in those areas, but little innovative research.  Some of the most important crops get strikingly little research.  Wheat yields have increased only 0.9% a year in the last decade, vs. maize 1.6%, because maize is more profitable to seed companies.  Governments no longer do much research on any crops (Nature 2014).  Even maize yield increase is not keeping up with world population increase.

Land productivity is 2.4 what it was in 1961, labor 1.7 times.  These figures imply that the Green Revolution has had less effect than it might; it increased the yields of major grains by up to 10 times.  Meanwhile, the giant seed and agribusiness corporations, especially Monsanto, have progressively cut back offerings, monopolized seed, and bulldozed the farm sector into cutting back on traditional varieties.  Often, Monsanto can persuade governments to give it and its seeds and chemicals special consideration (see e.g. Imhoff 2012).  The world is addicted to monocropping because of these uneconomic interferences with the market.  The UNEP report cited at the beginning of this paper gives many more details, especially on crop acreage, and many suggestions for fixing the world; unfortunately the suggestions are at a high level of generality.

We thus find ourselves, worldwide, poised on the brink of what could be a catastrophe of unimaginable proportions.  Diseases are waiting in the wings to take out wheat, rice, potatoes, and the other staple crops, as well as chocolate, bananas, coffee, and our other favorite indulgences.  Wiping out honeybees will eliminate almonds, alfalfa, and dozens of other crops that require honeybee pollination.  Moreover, other bees are just as susceptible to modern pesticides, and we are thus losing bumblebees, which pollinate clover and other crops, and squash bees, which are essential to pollinating squash, gourds and melons.  Pollinators in general have been in decline for decades, with disastrous effects on plants (Burkle et al. 2013).

            At least we do not have to worry as much about GMO crops as many are doing these days.  They are, so far, safe.  America has been a nation of guinea pigs, eating GMO crops for 20 years without reported damage.  The genetic engineering is a natural process, put to work by scientists (see e.g. interviews by Nagy and Bose with my colleagues Norman Ellstrand and Alan McHughen, 2014; unlike most sources, this one has the advantage of drawing on scientists who have studied the questions, rather than advocates with committed positions).  One problem so far has been overuse of pesticides with consequent devastating effects on wild plants and insects.  Possibly more serious for the future is increasing monopoly over seeds, not only of GMO’s but of conventional crops, by Monsanto—which has acted in a way that can only be described as predatory and amoral, as in suing farmers for growing patented seed when the seeds had apparently come up by accident in the farmers’ fields.  Neither of these problems is intrinsic to GMO’s and both are quite solvable. 

On the other hand, the golden promise of GMO’s has not come to pass.  They do not greatly increase yields.  They do not greatly decrease pesticide use (though they should).  They have brought no significant benefits to impoverished nations, though they surely would if proper research were done.  The debate on GMO’s is notably unedifying.  Both sides resort to extreme and flatly dishonest claims.  It is a depressing insight into human political activity.

            In short, many of the problems with food production today are the result of industrial monocrop plantation agriculture.  Industrial large-scale agriculture has several disadvantages. It relies on oil-fueled machinery instead of skilled labor.  It clears vast tracts of land and mismanages landscapes on a large scale.  It uses vast amounts of pesticides and inorganic fertilizers, again in place of skilled labor.  And it is a great lobbying force behind the run-down of aid and research for diversification, good management, and small-scale mixed farming.

Other, more general, problems include urbanization, pollution, population growth, and water shortages.  But they are not intractable, and recent writers on the world food situation are relatively upbeat and hopeful about the future (e.g. Evans 1998; Smil 2001).  For instance, livestock rearing, currently often unsustainable because it leads to tropical deforestation and competes with humans for grain and soybeans, could easily be made much more ecologically sound—though it would probably mean less meat per human.  Mark Eisler and Michael Lee (2014) point out that we could do a much better job.  This would involve choosing livestock for the land (instead of raising cows everywhere); doing a much better job with animal health and veterinary medicine; using feeds that are not human food and do not compete for cropping space; eating better quality meat (more expensive, to be sure); drawing on local cultures; and being more conscious of costs and benefits of various practices.

 

Small Farms: the Foundation of Hope

 

All the above may sound truly daunting, but the beginning of a remedy is simple, clear, and easily available.  Martin Luther, in his hymn “A Mighty Fortress Is Our God,” conjures up a terrifying image of Satan, but then reassures us that “one little word will slay him.”  The same is almost literally true of the world food problem.  The difference is that instead of the Word Made Flesh, our winner today is Small Mixed Farming. 

            There are currently 500 million family farms in the world, supporting 2 billion people (Katz 2014).  They dominate the production of many nutrient-rich crops.  The main problem with shifting toward small-scale farming is the mistaken belief that it is less efficient and productive than large-scale industrial farming.  A program on the banana problem on NPR recently held that people want cheap bananas, so must have monocrop plantations.  This could not be more wrong.  An enormous literature, usefully brought together and summarized (with references) by Robert Netting in Smallholders, Householders (1993) and by Michael Dove in The Banana Tree at the Gate (2011), has proved that intensive, skilled smallholder farming is virtually always more efficient and productive. 

All local systems have enormous resources of knowledge and skill (see e.g. Bicker et al. 2004; Gonzalez 2001; Laird 2002; Lansing 1991; Wilken 1987; many references therein).  Of course the world’s many small farms include many that are mere hobby or retirement farms, or are too desperately poor to function well, or are on marginal land.  But where there is straight-up competition, as in the areas I have done my own research in China, Malaysia and Mexico, well-managed, adequately capitalized small farms literally beat the plantations out of the field. 

In the Maya region I study in Mexico, for instance, no large-scale farming has ever succeeded in the hot, dry, pest-ridden environment.  But the Maya have been succeeding brilliantly for 3,000 years there.  The famous Maya collapse in the 9th-10th centuries A.D. was very likely due in part to their adopting something too much like large-scale monocrop agriculture (Diamond 2005, but his interpretation is somewhat preliminary and is debatable).  

            The belief that bigger is better has led to enormous subsidies, tax breaks, and special favors for agribusiness (Imhoff 2012 provides full details), and to targeting research to the needs of agribusiness—especially since much of the research is done by the corporations themselves.  Agribusiness controls whole nations and whole American states, or more often the agricultural policies of whole states, through heavy campaign donations to political candidates and through heavily funded lobbying.  American taxpayers subsidize agribusiness to the tune of tens of billions of dollars a year; that money is then used to influence legislators and legislation, to keep the money flowing and, sometimes, to keep small farmers suppressed (see e.g. Anderson 2014; Imhoff  2012; Nestle 2002).  Several American states actually have laws against criticizing large-scale agriculture.  (These are irreverently called “veggie libel laws,” though many actually focus on banning criticism of industrial animal rearing, which is often cruel to the animals.)  These are ruled unconstitutional whenever challenged in court, but survive because of servile media and high court costs to challengers.

            Recent studies of economic development have shown unequivocally that the best way is to work with people on the ground, which means ordinary people—not giant corporations, agribusiness firms, or millionaire absentee landlords (se e.g Ascher 1999; Bunker and Ciccantell 2005; Daly 1997; Dichter 2003; Easterly 2006; Ellerman 2005; Stiglitz 2003).

            Small farms have several advantages.  First and foremost is the presence on the ground of a highly skilled labor force.  Small farmers are usually the descendants of long lineages of small farmers, who have sharpened their skills dealing with a difficult world.   If they are the owners or have long leases, as is usually the case worldwide, they have every incentive to use every ounce of their skill in maximizing production over the long term.  By contrast, a tractor operator for a giant California agribusiness firm has no incentive beyond getting through the day without being fired.  Efficiency, to him, means only that he would take longer at a given job—to the annoyance of his boss.  Thus it is no surprise to find that about a third of tomatoes produced on California factory farms are lost by careless production and harvesting (a figure I can amply confirm from personal experience).   

Water management is a similar case.  A giant industrial farm is apt to use sprinkler irrigation or open-ditch irrigation.  A small closely-managed farm is more apt to find it economically compelling to move to drip irrigation and water-sparing practices and crops.  Another advantage of skill is knowing how to use “nature’s services” (Daily 1997).  Farmers know how to maximize the benefits of sun, water, and soil, and minimize the risks.  Small farms usually have diversified crops, but even if they do not, they are separated from other farms by at least some sort of field boundary.  If this is a hedgerow or brush or grass strip, it is a haven for pest-eating animals, and retards erosion.

There is no substitute for a skilled owner or long-lease-holder.  As the English proverb says, “the best dung for the land is the tread of the master’s foot.”  That is what is lost with absentee landlordism and giant corporations.  (A minor, but real, exception occurs when a corporation has enough sense to lease out farms and give the lessors control of the operation.)

            One qualification that has to be made, though, is that “small” is a relative term.  A small wheat farm is a couple of thousand acres.  A small ranch may be even larger, especially in desert lands.  A one-acre lavender farm is quite large, and vegetable farms of one-fourth or even one-sixth acre are often highly profitable.  The economics of cropping, especially labor needs, matter more than actual land area.

            The only solution to monocropping is not monocropping.  Small mixed farms can produce plantation commodities such as rubber and bananas more efficiently than plantations do (Dove 2011; my own research confirms this).  Epidemics cannot sweep so easily through the landscape.  Small farms conserve a rich mix of species and varieties.  There are countless banana varieties in Malaysian and Indonesian home gardens that resist Panama disease 4; they should be sought out and propagated. 

            As to global warming:  agriculture could easily turn from producing 20 to 30% of the world’s greenhouse gases to absorbing a much higher same amount.  This would require intensive tree cropping, reforestation, restoration of grasslands and brushlands, care of wetlands, polliution control, and, in short, farming such that the land is improved rather than devastated.  Healthy forests and grasslands are major carbon sinks.  (Claims to the contrary are wrong, and sometimes deliberately dishonest.  Trees increase their carbon takeup exponentially as they age; Stephenson et al. 2014.)  In fact, regrowth of foolishly cleared and subsequently abandoned land in Amazonia is now a substantial sink for atmospheric carbon.

Some of the most threatened and rapidly-vanishing forests are among the most extremely effective at blotting up carbon (e.g. Southeast Asia’s; Yu et al 2014).  If intensive tree cropping were practiced on small farms, with the wood of overaged trees being used for construction or the like and the slash being mulched, an increasingly large carbon sink would develop.  The wood would have to go into some long-term use or it would just rot or burn and release its carbon again.  My furniture-making great-grandfather drew on local aging orchards for his wood.  Today, overaged orchards are simply burned—a huge waste of good wood.

           

The Best Chance:  Small Farms and Gardens

 

            The best solution for food insecurity involves intensive small-scale field cropping coupled with home gardens.  In rural areas of the world, home gardens are a well-established tradition.  It has been my good fortune to work in areas of the world where homegardening was a fine art: Mexico and Southeast Asia (Anderson 1993a, 1993b).  Here, traditional households normally lived on lots that could range from a quarter acre to one or two acres.  These they gardened intensively, growing many fruit trees, bushes, herbs, grasses, perennials, and even algae. 

Gardens are typically layered, to take advantage of sunlight at multiple storeys, like a natural open forest.  In Southeast Asia, for instance, a high layer of coconuts shares a canopy layer of durian, mangosteen, rambutan, orange, avocado and other trees, which shades a perennial layer of papaya, bananas, and guavas, which shades a bottom layer of manioc, spices, herbs, and bushes.  Vegetables, however, need more sun, so they are planted separately or at the edgesof the treed area.  The high trees grow their branches over the houses, so that no air space is wasted.  From an airplane, in the old days, one saw only a vast expanse of fruit trees with only a few bits of roof poking through.  Yet the population on the ground could be urban in density.  Unfortunately, modernization naturally means lots of roads, parking lots, and shopping centers, even where they make no economic sense, and millions of acres of highly productive land have been sacrificed.

A garden could have up to 100 or more species of plants.  The record in Chunhuhub, the town I studied in Mexico, was 92 species in one garden.  Other gardens had as few as four or five, but the average was around 25-30 (Anderson 2003).  Gardens in other areas of Mexico, and other tropical countries, can have well over 100 species. 

            An interesting feature is that Southeast Asia and tropical America began to share dooryard garden plants with the very first Portuguese and Spanish voyages.  Today almost everything is shared except for a few hard-to-grow fruit trees.  The Thai lime, that characteristic citrus of Thailand, is essential to Yucatan cooking (Anderson 2013).  Tabasco parsley (Eryngium foetidum) is universal in even remote areas of Cambodia and Vietnam (personal observation), though how it got there I have no idea.

When I was doing research in Madagascar, I found the homegarden tradition to be poorly developed there.  I was there with some students who were going on to international aid work, and for them I wrote up a manual of tropical home gardening.  Unfortunately it has not found a publisher, but it is available online:  “The Tropical Food Security Garden,” at my website www.krazykioti.com.  It provides full directions for developing a tropical garden when one has limited space and virtually no money for inputs. 

Strangely, this sort of gardening guide is incredibly hard to find these days.  The best were the old Victory Garden manuals from World War II.  Find them if you can.  My friends Daniela Soleri and Dave Cleveland did a similar manual for dryland gardens, but they could find only a quite obscure publisher for it (Cleveland and Soleri 1991).  Fortunately, Gary Nabhan (2013) has now done a similar work for dry areas, and it is much more visible.

            The United States has its own problems, often following from loss of traditional farming and traditional farm varieties of plants.  These varieties were often hardier and more productive under difficult or special conditions than are modern varieties (though the converse is also often true).  A great deal of effort to salvage these old varieties and re-popularize them is going on now, especially in the southern United States, where old varieties are especially common and well liked (see e.g. Campbell 2014; Lockyer and Veteto 2013; Nabhan and Madison 2008).  The traditional conservatism of the south has social costs, but major dietary benefits.

            Even more effective, because widespread and targeting the very areas that most need good food, is urban gardening.  A particularly stunning program emerged from Houston, thanks to the work of Robert Randall since the early 1980s (Randall 2013).  Working tirelessly with inner-city residents, he has built up a huge program of vegetable and fruit growing.  The inner city people in question usually had had farming parents or grandparents, but had been raised in the city, with scant knowledge of how to grow food.  Other cities have their own programs; in Los Angeles, public gardens are well established, largely because of the city’s huge Latino and southeast Asian population, whose dedication to growing their favorite foods is unstoppable.  They have launched countless “guerrilla gardens” under power lines, in vacant lots, and in other neglected spaces—usually with the law looking the other way, sometimes with permission and encouragement, rarely with oppressive forced removal.  Seattle’s “P-Patch” program is famous and successful, as I know not only from observation but from many an hour spent working in P-patches. 

Home gardens not only produce a great deal of food; it is usually very nutritious.  Corn is usually the favorite vegetable to raise (Anderson et al. 1973), and it is not a great nutrition source, but the other regular plants—tomatoes, squash, greens, peppers and the like—are extremely valuable contributors to household nutrients. 

            It is possible to do urban gardening anywhere.  A memorable experience of my wife and myself was visiting the worst slums of Dhaka, Bangladesh, in 1999, and finding that healthy survival there depended on finding any tiny bit of soil where vegetables and trees could be grown.  Landlords usually made this expensive and difficult, but families who could manage to find bits of ground—sometimes only a square foot—could grow an astonishing amount of food.  They could, for instance, train squash vines over their huts, a practice I have seen all over Asia and Mexico.  I have also seen many a rooftop garden, in pots on the tops of high-rise buildings.  I have also seen perfectly productive, nutritious gardens grown in pots on the verandas of houses built on stilts over water. 

            The real virtue of urban gardens is the high nutritive value of the food.  One is not going to produce many calories, but one can get a full complement of vitamins and minerals from a very small garden, by careful planting.  The highest nutrient values in common vegetables are found in turnip greens and similar dark greens of the cabbage family; chile peppers; parsley and cilantro; and spinach.  Purslane (see below) is even higher.  Highest of all, probably, is the goji berry, a traditional Chinese food now popular in the United States.  It has been grown for thousands of years in China, for medicinal purposes that translate perfectly well into modern biomedicine: its berries and leaves are the richest common source of vitamins and minerals, and it is also rich in protective antioxidants.  It has long been grown in Chinese gardens in the US (personal observation, Los Angeles; observation by my coworkers Paul Buell and Christopher Muench, Seattle and Bellingham).  It is now commercially available from US nurseries.

            This being said, producing a lot of calories in a very small space is possible.  Sweet potatoes, winter squash, and manioc can do it.  Best of all is a trick developed by the Green Revolution workers in Latin America.  One plants potatoes in a normal bed.  Then when the potato plant is well grown, one puts an old worn-out tire around it, and fills the tire with dirt.  The potato grows upward, and also produces more tubers in the tire.  One can build a tower of three or four tires this way, and get a bushel of potatoes out of 30 square feet of land. 

            The area covered by lawns in the United States is estimated to be equal to the area of Pennsylvania (Jenkins 1994; see also Robbins 2007).  Most of this area could be vegetable garden or home orchard instead of useless, water-wasting, poison-drenched lawn.  Our studies showed that people keep lawns for social conformity, and refrain from gardening in them because of local peer pressure; one neighbor of a gardener remarked “He raises vegetables in his front yard.  He must be crazy.”  (Anderson et al. 1973; see also Anderson 1972).  Lawns are to mark status as a proper American and neighborhood citizen, not to be useful (Anderson 1972; Robbins 2007).  They should be converted to a less wasteful future.

            Most hopeful of all is the movement to get schools into vegetable gardening.  This is a very old agenda—it was often done in my childhood, and my friend David Goodward has been doing it in our local public schools for years.  But it became visible through Alice Waters, the great restauranteur who built Chez Panisse from a tiny hole-in-the-wall to the most famous restaurant in the western United States.  Alice Waters has worked with enthusiasm and charm, but has also fought with bulldog tenacity, for this cause; her book Edible Schoolyard: A Universal Idea (2008)is a must read for all aspiring food security workers.

            Weeds remain a very common and widespread source of food.  They are very often protected in gardens or even semi-cultivated.  They are often deliberately introduced to gardens, with farmers transplanting, trading, sharing, and propagating (see e.g. Anderson 2003; Cruz-Garcia and Price 2014).  They are particularly well known as a food resource in the Mediterranean, partly because of the beautiful literary treatment of Patience Gray (1997), whose accounts of gathering wild foods on remote islands of Greece were very widely read for their outstanding quality, but also for the persistent ethnobiological work of Andrea Pieroni, Manuel Pardo-de-Santayana, and other researchers.  (See e.g. Molina et al. 2014; Quave and Pieroni 2014.) 

I well remember a fascinating moment of truth.  A Mexican botany student of ours, Juan Jimenez-Osornio, who had come from a central Mexican farm,  was taking his oral examination, and was asked by our weed expert, Jodi Holt:  “What do you do with the weeds in your fields?”   He answered:  “Well, we eat them.”  Jodi Holt is hard to astonish, but that stopped her.  All her career had been spent getting rid of weeds.  But in the next few minutes she learned that every weed has its use:  if not as food, then as medicine or pest control source.  I have visited Mexican fields with Juan, who is now a professor in Mexico.  With him I observed the spectacular Mexican marigolds saved because no pest will come near them—they contain powerful pesticidal and fungicidal chemicals.  Often, there is a continuum from weed to cultigen.  In Juan’s fields were growing cultivated varieties of purslane, verdolagas in Spanish (Portulaca oleracea).  The same plant is a wild plant, but gathered for food, in other parts of the world.  But in California it is merely destroyed as a weed.  It is basically tasteless but has a very high nutritional value.  It will grow literally on a brick (it routinely grows in cracks in the pavement at my house), so its future for food security is bright.

            The crux of the matter is changing worldwide priorities from support of large-scale industrial agribusiness to support for small-scale, intensive, skilled, diversified farming.  This does not mean going with the current fads for locavory, organic farming, or the like.  We will, instead, have to draw on every possible technical advance: new pest controls, genetic engineering, new storange and transportation systems.  We will have to widen the scope of world trade.

Above all, though, we must seriously support the existing small-farming sector, from Thailand to Mali, from Bolivia to California, from Finland to New Zealand.  The vast majority of the world’s farmers are still small-scale operators.  Many still follow traditional practices and maintain traditional crops.  Where they are supported with subsidies and research comparable to those lavished on industrial agribusiness, they prosper and flourish. 

 

Deeper Cure:  World Justice

 

            This, however, is not the end of the story, or perhaps even the beginning of it.  We must return to the initial observation of this paper:  hunger and food insecurity in the modern world are the result of politics, not lack of food.  As Amartya Sen pointed out, sometimes the government is so corrupt and incompetent that it cannot take care of its people, but usually it has simply abnegated the responsibility.  Often this leads to ecological collapse and the failure of the whole food production system (see e.g. Diamond 2005 on Haiti).  Often, government irresponsibility is the result of hate.  Two kinds of hate primarily concern us:  first, hatred and contempt of the poor and the weak; second, ethnic, political, gender-based, and religious hatreds.  Both are rampant worldwide.  The really deadly case occurs when they are combined—when a powerful, rich government looks down on the less fortunate and keeps itself in power by appealing to group hate. 

Unfortunately, the vast majority of food producers worldwide are small-scale local people, many of them impoverished and uneducated, and many of them members of minority groups or oppressed castes or classes.  Also, many are women, and gender bias is far too common worldwide.  In fact, a large percentage of the problems with both food production and food security in today’s world are straightforward matters of hatred and discrimination based on ethnicity, religion, gender, class, caste, political orientation, and other group identities.  This is not often stated and still less often addressed.  Sometimes whole groups are deliberately excluded, but more common is inadvertent exclusion based on sheer ignorance.  My wife Barbara Anderson and I have repeatedly seen, in many parts of the world, literature and workshops aimed at and delivered to me—in places where women do the farming and gardening work.

Moreover, sadly, most of the literature on world food production deals with technological fixes that would help large-scale agribusiness but would do nothing to alleviate the real problems.  Relatively little available material is aimed at ordinary small farmers.

            Thus, farmers tend to suffer disproportionately from unfair and violent treatment.  This may appear in the forms of war, genocide, repression, withholding of aid to the poor, or overall injustice.  These all impact the food system. 

More immediately deadly are direct attacks on the food production system itself.  Sometimes this takes the form of displacing local food producers through violence, urbanization, or simple theft.  Sometimes it takes the form of insecurity of land title—a huge problem especially for minorities including Indigenous groups.  Sometimes it comes through irresponsible development schemes, such as big dams.  I have even heard anecdotally of a proposal (presumably not very serious) to throw African farmers off their lands and bring in American and Chinese agribusinessmen—presumably thought to be more successful.  Of course, quite apart from social injustice, this would not work, because the farmers would have no idea how to cope with the harsh African landscape. 

One of the saddest manifestations of environmental injustice is displacement of local food producers in the name of environmental conservation (Brockington, Duff and Igoe 2008; West, Igoe and Brockington 2006).  Throwing productive, successful people off their land does not successfully conserve.  It is more apt to turn them into poachers and wasters.  It leaves the land unprotected and unmanaged.  I have seen this in Mexico (Anderson and Medina Tzuc 2005) and friends have studied it there (e.g. Martinez-Reyes 2004).

            New grassroots NGO’s, such as La Via Campesina, have now seen the necessity to deal with food security, political structures, and oppression through hatred as one problem that has to be addressed as one problem.

            Whether corruption, incompetence, or hatred is the problem, governmental failure is clearly the biggest factor in hunger worldwide, as Amartya Sen has shown.  Only through the success of real democracy and justice can food security exist, whether at local or national or worldwide levels.  Democracy means not only majority rule and minority rights, but a climate of honesty, tolerance, and valuing diversity.  It is a system in which each individual has value; no one is devalued because of poverty or ethnic or religious minority status, or because of gender or personal identification.  People have to be the ends of all action, not mere means to achieve “economic growth” or some other abstraction.  The environment, too, needs to be treated as an end in itself, worthy of preservation for itself.  Only by giving it an absolute right to exist, undamaged, can we protect even a minimum of ecosystem services.

            Religion has tried to teach these things throughout history, but has been bent to the service of evil and psychopathic persons in all times and places.  We need ecologically aware and morally engaged religion, uncontaminated by the evil (see Sponsel 2012; Taylor 2010).  We also need a more general and basic system of morality. 

I have recently been struck by the very widespread use of concepts that translate as “respect” as the basis for the morals of environmental and food security.  Of languages my students and I have worked in, I can mention shuteekh in Mongolian, isaak in Nuu-chah-nulth (Atleo 2004), and taaqheeq-e in Akha (a minority language of China; Wang 2013).  This may provide the real hope for the future: a morality based on respect for all life and all people.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Waters, Alice.  2008.  Edible Schoolyard: A Universal Idea.  San Francisco: Chronicle Books.

 

West, Paige; James Igoe; Dan Brockington.  2006. “Parks and Peoples: The Social Impact of Protected Areas.”  Annual Review of Anthropology 35:251-277. 

 

Wheeler, T., and J. von Braun.  2013.  “Climate Change Impacts on Global Food Security.”  Science 341:508-514.

 

Wilken, Gene.  1987.  Good Managers.  Berkeley: University of California Press.

 

Woodham-Smith, Cecil.  1962.  The Great Hunger.  New York: Harper & Row.

 

Yu, Guirui; Zhi Chen; Shilong Piao; Changhui Peng; Philippe Ciais; Qiufeng Wang; Xuanran Li; Xianjin Zhu.  2014.  “High Carbon Dioxide Uptake by the Subtropical Forest Ecosystems in the East Asian Monsoon Region.”  Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 111:4910-4915.

 

Saving American Education in the 21st Century: Administrators

Monday, September 23rd, 2013

Administrators

 

E. N. Anderson

Professor Emeritus, Anthropology

University of California, Riverside

 

            In 47 years at UC Riverside, I have seen administrators come and go, and have learned a little about the world of higher-level university administration.  My own administrative duties have been low-level, but ongoing and educative.

            Administrators tend to be of two types.  One hopes for dedicated, competent, academically trained administrators who can and will deal with crises and keep the system running well.  I have served under many such.  Unfortunately, one often encounters career administrators, many of them trained in business or educational administration rather than in an academic subject, who are neither competent managers nor interested in becoming so.  They are driven by ambition to rise in the system, not by desire to help it.

            The two are easy to tell apart.  Administrators of the first type are rarely noticed by the wider public.  They show themselves through new books in the libraries, new labs in the science buildings, new hires who win the Nobel Prize a few years later, new donations from rich alumni, and new computers in the  computer labs.  Above all, they show themselves through making sure that teaching and research faculties are paid decently and not worked impossibly hard (but are not allowed to laze on the job either). 

Administrators of the second type are very visible.  They are seen in expensive suits and flashy ties, or female equivalents, at every high-level meeting, major social event, and public photo opp.  They are featured on all the university’s publicity fliers.  They are seen at sports events and at the openings of new gyms, stadiums, sports fan facilities, and student unions.  However, a university run by them is singularly lacking in new books, new labs, new research, and new (or even old) instructional improvement projects.

            Though some people are intermediate, administrators tend to cluster at one or the other pole of this continuum.  This is because a real scholar or scientist, even if also politically ambitious, finds it difficult to ignore the scholarly side of the university.  Only the academically hopeless or resentful will willingly trash the entire research and education functions of their universities. 

            Administrators of the first type manage the old way:  They allocate scarce resources for maximum overall benefit, and they inspire and encourage their workers, from senior professors to gardeners. 

Administrators of the second type manage according to the latest fad.  Today, that is the “business model.”  The businesses used for a model are Enron, Madoff, and Wal-Mart, however, not Costco, Subway, or even Starbuck’s.  (Lest you think I am exaggerating…one of the people I am using as a model for a Type II actually had us read a book on “successful” businesses that had become “great.”  By the time we finished the book, half the cases in the book were in court for illegal practices leading to financial disaster.)  Put another way, the businesses used are McDonald’s and Burger King rather than Chez Panisse and Spago; we are talking mass consumption with minimal nutritional (educational) value, not specialized top-quality experience. 

The business model is a model in which the goal is to process more bodies cheaper.  We of the faculty are under continual pressure to teach more students and get them through the system faster, and at less cost.  This, of course, drastically impacts the quality of education—but that is not a concern.  The ultimate in efficiency is the MOOC (Massive Open Online Course), in which thousands of students can tune in to a single course of lectures—ideally given by a world expert who is also a great teacher.  The rest of us are too inferior to be of use. 

Of course, no one would use a MOOC to teach anything they actually wanted people to know.  No one would be mad enough to teach driving, or nursing, or brain surgery, or the all-important sports by way of a MOOC.  Even administrators know that those things require actual one-on-one teaching, practice, apprenticeship, hands-on training, and feedback.  MOOC’s, like standardized tests, are used only for things nobody cares about, such as literature, philosophy, and basic science. 

Actually, in an ideal world the mindless rote side of driving, nursing, and so on would be taught by some such method, though with thoughtful essays rather than standardized tests as the evaluation tools.  This would leave real teachers free to concentrate on the hands-on side.  Some online courses and universities do teach this way, with great success.  But all that is far too expensive and complicated for the business model. 

The business model, as applied to academic employees, means, first of all, less power and less pay for the teaching staff.  (Ironically, this has led to unionization in many public universities, including mine, and thus to more confrontation and management problems.  But there is really no alternative: without unions, our lower-level teaching staff would be so poorly paid and overworked that they would frequently have to drop out, leaving us with even worse staffing levels than we have now.)  Second, it means more and more highly paid administrators.  My university went from one vice-chancellor to six in a few years, and is moving on up.  UC’s systemwide administration absorbs as many resources as a major campus, but does little to earn it (they do provide useful legal services).  Third, it means not wasting money on such inconspicuous things as labs, computers, or libraries.  Money must go into something visible to the public.  We at my university have lots of beautiful new signs, a lovely student union, all manner of sports activities, and even new and very expensive uniforms for the students who help with orientation at the end of summer…but no new books, no new labs, no instructional improvement, worse and worse faculty/student ratios, fewer remedial courses, more overcrowded classes, fewer classes in total.

This is not to say that universities can’t be cut, but the cutting should be entirely in upper-level management and their folly projects.  Spending on administration has soared in American universities in the last two decades—doubling in many—while everything else has been cut to the bone, and in the case of libraries even the bones are going fast.

For some reason, strange and unimaginable to most of our administrators, measures of quality such as student graduation rates (especially in the recommended four years instead of five or six) remain poor at most universities.  Cheating has increased.  The job market for graduates is not steller; students clearly know less than they used to, and their employment fates prove it.  In short, career administrators using the business model have succeeded as well as did their models in Enron and Lehman Brothers.  Like the latter, university administrators can always count on generous governments to bail them out.  Universities are “too big to fail,” and their administrators always make the case that higher-paid higher-level administrators are the only hope.  Legislators, being what they are, usually sympathize—especially those many legislators who depend on an ignorant and uninformed citizenry to stay in office.

A sure sign of Type II administrators at work is the proliferation of “centers” that accomplish little.  The easiest way for an ambitious but incompetent academic to move up is by starting a center—say, for the investigation of research on centers.  UCR has countless centers that either do nothing or duplicate existing faculties.  It also, to be sure, has some real centers that actually do work.  All the centers absorb considerable resources; they are supposed to get grants that more than offset the cost.  It would be interesting to see how many of our centers do that.

Type II administrators sometimes steal outright.  More often, they have final say over the budget, and can move funds according to discretion.  Thus, one of our chancellors once used the year’s book-buying budget to redecorate his office.  The library, and thus the university’s teaching and research mission, never recovered—but you should have seen the chancellor’s office door.

The problem, however, is not so much the business model as the type of administrator who invokes it.  They are the people who early-on decided that rising in power through social ability and political skill was the way to win in academia.  (A catty writer might say that they tend not to have the intellectual skills to rise any other way…but two of our very worst chancellors at UCR were quite eminent scientists.) 

Probably the biggest problem with Type II administrators is not their laziness—though most of them indeed do little except posture in public—but their constant scheming to get ahead.  A second-string university like UCR is merely a place to polish their vitas and jockey for a better position.  Often, they show their competence the same way that bad CEO’s do: by cutting the work force and shrinking the budget, no matter how much it damages education.  Since they had already risen to their Peter Principle “level of incompetence,” we of the faculty have often wondered how they did in their later postings.  Sometimes we hear, and reflect that our gain is the later postings’ loss.  (Modern readers may not remember Lawrence Peters’ classic work [1969], in which he pointed out that managers tend to rise till they reach a job level they can’t handle, and then stick there—leaving the world mismanaged.)

Since Type II administrators spend their time playing social and political games, they, not the Type I administrators, are the ones that are visible to politicians and donors.  Those politicians and donors who love game-playing, fancy suits, and sports events will be impressed, and will steer some money to the university.  Unfortunately, politicians and donors who actually care about education and research will go somewhere else.  I would like to know how many hundreds of millions UCR has lost this way over the years.  I do know that one gift to UCLA’s medical school in 2012 was almost a third of our entire annual budget.  UCLA’s medical school has competent administration.  (Very fortunately, we have managed to get a medical school with an extremely competent Type I dean here at UCR.  Maybe we have a chance at last.)

 

Modern universities are incredibly complicated, and face diverse political and legal challenges.  Therefore, they actually do need administrators.  We do not need six or eight vice-chancellors, but we do need one, probably more than one.  We may not need as many deans as we have now, but we need several.  We do not need the “business model,” but we do need some genuine business management: cutting waste (i.e. high-level administrative spending), inviting comments from employees, constantly upgrading quality, allocating resources where they are needed (rather than where they make a show), and attending to the final product above all.

The problem, then, becomes one of finding Type I administrators.  Currently, university administration is so difficult and demanding that people who seriously want to work at it are daunted.  We at UCR used to have a hard time getting competent people to apply for chancellor and vice-chancellor positions.  We had to “wash” a vice-chancellor search a few years ago for sheer lack of qualified applicants.  With rising prestige, we are currently fortunate in having found a number of really good people.  Still, the problem continues, and the Chronicle of Higher Education reveals we are not alone in this.  One important step would be to give “service” a much higher place in promotion.  Encouraging people to rise through the ranks—where their capability can be judged—would produce a cadre of competent, decent administrators, rising within each school.  We could then dispense with the need to hire Type II people from other schools.

A competent administrator will, first of all, listen to what people say: students, faculty, staff, public, everyone.  He or she will then think seriously about what’s the best thing to do—not just take the most widely popular suggestion.  He or she will then thank everybody for their input, whether or not it was adopted!  Nothing is more valuable than input, and if people aren’t thanked they won’t provide it. 

He or she will be perfectly clear about the core functions of a university:  Education and research.  These come first.  Other functions come last.  Sports are an unsavory, wasteful luxury—they do nothing for most universities except waste a lot of money.  (It has been repeatedly shown that only the places with major established programs make money off sports.)   Fine food, beautiful dorms, beautiful student union buildings, and the like have their place—but their place is elite private schools, not struggling public universities that have to starve the library and the computer bank even without such luxury spending.

He or she will recognize that faculty and staff are human beings, and deserve not only fair pay but also respect.  Even Type II administrators usually know enough to be civil to senior faculty, but they have a reflex need to cut pay and resources for teaching and research personnel, and to be arrogant about it whenever possible.  Type I administrators try to get fairer shares of the state’s money and the university’s money for the people who actually do the heavy lifting, especially the overworked and exploited temps, teaching assistants, and junior faculty.  But if they fail in getting more state money, they at least try to soften the blow by being respectful and listening to the faculty.

He or she will work seriously with the community, addressing local needs as well as possible and thus hopefully getting donations.  Type II administrators, if they work with the “town” at all, tend to work only with the high-level business community.

He or she will work with the state and other powers-that-be to focus on quality teaching and research, cut other expenses, and above all not allow universities to become top-heavy with highly paid administrators.

He or she will strategically build on the strengths of the campus, and will also try to fix obvious weaknesses.  Type II administrators, by contrast, often hate and fear strong units and programs.  The most insane thing done by administration in my 47 years at UCR was summarily terminating the agricultural research program and firing the entire research staff—because the chancellor in question “did not want UCR to be seen as a cow college.”  This gutted one of the three or four leading agricultural research programs in the world, a program that was making enormous differences in poorer nations.  Of course, the researchers were not cow tenders, but world-class geneticists, entomologists, plant pathologists, cell biologists, and soil and water scientists.  Quite apart from devastating the intellectual and academic life at UCR—it had depended heavily on the ag scientists—this move, and all too many similar cuts at other universities, contributed to millions of people starving to death in Africa and Asia.  Decline in agricultural research is one of the major reasons why one and a half billion people are hungry and about one to two million die of malnutrition every year.

Make no mistake:  Type II administrators kill.  At thousands of universities, they have run down cutting-edge medical research, agricultural research, environmental research, crime studies, war-and-peace research, and other life-and-death agendas—all to feed their egos by redirecting the money to sports, fancy nonacademic buildings, glossy brochures, country-club dorm facilities, and, above all, lavish parties for each other.  Their natural allies, the legislators and boards of directors who want only to save money in the short term, bear even more of the guilt.  In a world where forward knowledge is the most important way of saving lives, this mischief is murder.

The psychology of leadership is now becoming known, thanks to Mark Van Vugt (see Van Vugt and Ahuja 2010), Paul Pederson, and others.  From my own observations, leaders are naturally good with people, but have perfected their skills and learned self-confidence through leading small groups, and then increasingly large ones.  They have a good intuition about what is important, and they stay on top of that, even if it looks “unimportant” to outsiders; conversely, they know when to stop wasting time on trivia.  They have a real vision and stick to it; they are not just coordinating, keeping the place going, or marking time.  They can prioritize.  They are always courteous and civil, but do not waste time “suffering fools gladly.”  (The best leaders I have known were not always popular.  As Confucius said, “If the good people like him and the bad people hate him, he’s probably a good man.”)  They are fair and tolerant, but not tolerant of immoral or amoral behavior by those that report to them.  They don’t show raw emotions or tip their hand.  Also, they know how to relax.  Two of the very best managers and administrators I knew at UCR tragically died of overwork–they literally dropped dead from exhaustion.  Needless to say, no Type II administrator ever died that way.

Peter, Lawrence.  1969.  The Peter Principle: Why Things Always Go Wrong.  New York: Bantam.

Van Vugt, Mark, and Anjana Ahuja.  2010.  Selected: Why Some People Lead, Why Others Follow, and Why It Matters.  New York:  Profile Books/HarperBusiness.

 

           

Some controversies about agriculture and change in late Imperial China

Saturday, August 3rd, 2013

Some Controversies about Agriculture and Change in Late Imperial China

 

E. N. Anderson

 

WARNING:  Preliminary draft, not all checked out thoroughly.  I’m confident enough of it to allow quotation with proper citation, but be warned.  I would deeply appreciate corrections, commentary, and discussion!

 

Population Growth

The great drama of late imperial China was the steady growth of population.  Ming reached about 150 million by 1600 (Brook 2010:44-45; see his excellent short discussion of rival estimates).  Then growth was interrupted by the enormous crash in the Ming-Qing transition, when population fell by at least 25% and possibly more.  Qing population soon bounced back:  to “313 million in 1794 and an estimated 430 million by 1840” (Brook 2010:45).  A side note is that with the rapid expansion of the educational system in this period, “lower degree holders…increased from around 40,000 in 1400 to…well over 1,000,000” around 1800 (Rowe 2009:151).  Of course this led to a crisis familiar today:  far more educated people than the system could absorb. 

Population growth put unprecedented stress on the production system.  Agricultural land per capita declined 43% between 1753 and 1812 alone (Rowe 2009:150; the dates are set by the availability of fairly reliable figures).   This was in spite of steady, rapid opening of new farmland on all frontiers.  William Rowe (2009:150) believes labor had previously limited the ability of the system to intensify, but now land was the limit, and labor was poured into making it yield more.  (In fact, the system had been intensifying for centuries, so labor was not a very dramatic limit, if it was a limit at all.)  This is a variant of Ester Boserup’s famous theory of agricultural intensification (1965) and is also related to Elvin’s high-level equilibrium trap (1973; discussed in detail in Anderson 1988).  Rowe also notes Elvin’s further development of a technological lock-in model (Rowe 2009:212; cf. Elvin 2004a).  China was stuck with a labor-intensive organic model and could not switch overnight to anything like a western plan. 

Supporting so many people on so little land took a level of skill, innovativeness, and hard work that has not been adequately appreciated.  Most of the literature (e.g. Elvin 2004a; Elvin and Liu 1998) stresses the grim Malthusian crisis, with deforestation, unsustainable conversion of wetlands, desertification, “retreat of the elephants” (Elvin 2004a), and so on, as the inevitable toll.  All these and more did indeed occur and were horrific, and conditions by the early 20th century were awful beyond modern imagination (Li 2007), but the real news was that somehow those 400 million usually managed to eat.  Superior water management (Zhang 2006), famine relief, forest control, ricefield protection, the New World crops, and many other creative and dynamic innovations were responsible.

As we have seen, Li Bozhong has pointed out that the effects of the new crops and cropping patterns introduced in Song and Yuan were not widely felt till Ming, and thus Ming population and wealth could grow steadily in spite of the poor governance of that troubled dynasty.  The Yangzi Delta and neighboring areas flourished especially.  Evidently this was one reason the dynasty survived so long.

Yields stayed about the same in shi per mu in Ming, but the shi measure became larger than it had been in Song (when it was ca. 145 lb.).  In Ming it was some 220 lb or more (Li 2003:170).  Thus, though landholdings shrank, the combination of higher yields and higher measures meant tha people were, on average, not desperate—though of course the plight of the least fortunate was dreadful.      

Population grew, but the idea that China “always” had a huge, fast-growing population is a myth.  China’s population, and its increase rate, remained comparable to Europe’s through most of this period (Lavely and Wong 1998; Lee and Wang 1999; Pomerantz 2000).  In fact, until the late 19th century, China’s population was less dense than that of the United States today.  Only when China’s 18th century brought peace, and Europe’s birth rate declined (and declined more in the 19th and 20th centuries), did China forge ahead.  Moreover, the rebellions of the 19th century reduced China’s population so much that whole regions were left labor-short (see e.g. Rowe 2009:198), leading to much more favorable terms for farmers and workers.  The effect was like that of the bubonic plague in 14th-century Europe.  This released land and capital for development, especially in the lower Yangzi region, China’s richest and one of the hardest hit by the Taipings.

Population pressure is not a valid explanation for differences between China and Europe.  In fact, I have yet to see a case in which “population pressure” by itself explains anything.  One must always explain why the population pressure builds up in the first place.  One must then explain why people picked one particular method of dealing with it as opposed to the infinite list of other possible ways.  Rising population drove ecological degradation in China (Elvin 2004a; Marks 1998), but other choices were possible, and were locally adopted.  The Chinese were fully aware of the environmental problems (Myers and Wang 2002:640), and did a great deal to prevent them—planting trees, maintaining forests, keeping dykes maintained and when possible keeping them low and letting the rivers run.  True remedies were, however, beyond China’s administrative power.  There simply was not enough government expertise or enforcement capability.

James Lee and Wang Feng (1999) have argued that China was not up against true Malthusian pressures, even in the late 19th century.  Infanticide was widely practised—especially, perhaps, in the most densely populated areas.  Even the imperial family practiced it, the poorer nobles more than the high elites.  In some areas up to a quarter or more of girls were killed, and toward the end of a completed family—when the mother was too old for much further hope of a son—even higher rates were observed (Lee and Wang 48 ff).  Since it was selective, eliminating female babies, it disproportionately reduced overall birth rates.  Lee and Wang also mention abortion, but Matthew Sommer has pointed out that abortion was rare in traditional China (Sommer 2011), which accords with my findings 40-50 years ago.  Today, abortion is common, especially abortion of female fetuses—thanks to ultrasound making sex determination possible.  South Korea has had to outlaw ultrasound to prevent mass abortion of girls.  Before ultrasound, however, people had to wait till the child was born, after which selective infanticide of girls was common.

 China may have had, over its history, 20% fewer people than it would have had if everyone had as many children as they possibly could.  A Chinese woman married at 20 and living to menopause could expect to have six children—Lee and Wang find the figure remarkably consistent over history—as opposed to 7 to 9 in the west in the old days (Lee and Wang 1999:86ff).  The figure of six, however, has been challenged, however, because it refers to registered children, not including those that died at birth.  Lee and Wang explain the lower figure (compared to the west) by sexual restraint of Chinese men—rather oddly, since they had just finished showing that infanticide eliminated exactly enough children to explain 100% of the difference: they conclude that it reduced birth rates by 20%.  Folklore, novels, and medical literature all agree that Chinese men were no more sexually restrained than any other men.  In reality, it was infanticide, poor diet, rampant disease and trauma, and chronic banditry that led to high child deaths in China.  Also, Lee’s and Wang’s high figures for “the west” are for relatively well-to-do countries in the early modern period.  Figures from the Balkans or Ukraine or Russia would show lower rates.

Lee and Wang, however, note a striking shortage of descendants even in noble lineages, where there was every pressure to have children (Lee and Wang 1999:105ff.).  They also note high adoption rates.  Less credibly, they allege that male heads of households had total authority, though qualified by heavy responsibilities (Lee and Wang 1999:125ff.).  This traditional view of the family was always the ideal, but in practice a paterfamilias could not exercise anything of the sort.  Research in Chinese communities confirms what Chinese novels, from The Story of the Stone (Cao and Gao 1973-1986) to Ba Jin’s Family, show:  a strong paterfamilias resorted to consultation and to empathetic listening, while a petty tyrant was invariably a weak man.  In the latter case, any coalition of strong women was enough to run rings around him; they kept him busy with outside matters (men’s proper sphere!) and ran the household more or less as they wanted; The Story of the Stone provides some 4000 pages of detailed proof of this point.  Either way, a man’s authority over his household seems not to have been greater than that found in America in my childhood, when father’s word really was law. 

The importance of this is that Lee and Wang make a case that fathers could both abstain from sex themselves and make sure their sons and sons-in-law did—thus keeping fertility rates low:  “Not only did married couples wait a substantially longer time to initiate reproduction than their European counterparts; they also ended their reproductive life much earlier.  Influenced by a different culture of sexuality, and under the close supervision of the collective family, Chinese couples were able to control the ‘passion between the sexes’” (Lee and Wang 1999:105).  A great deal of further attention is devoted to this saintly abstinence.  This also runs true to stereotype but against all evidence.  Chinese men were often away from home and usually worked terribly hard, often with little nourishing food, all of which militates against their having inordinate amounts of sex.  However, once again, my long stays in Chinese households in traditional times certainly did not reveal any sexual deficiencies.  (My sample was small, but we knew them well.)  And, once again, the novels are far better evidence.  One may also note (as Lee and Wang do not!) the enormous number of prostitutes, singing girls, and other hospitality workers in old China, available often for very small sums.

In fact there were plenty of men, and plenty of male sex drive, but relatively few women to bear children.  Selective infanticide and neglect kept sex ratios imbalanced, though to highly variable degrees in different parts of the country.  Thus men often married late or not at all.  Polygamy made it even harder, though Lee and Wang note that polygamy was rare—one in ten among the high elite, but only one in a thousand marriages among rural poor.  (My surveys 40-50 years ago found a bit fewer than one in a hundred.  These surveys were among middling people—some rich, some poor, most making an adequate but not good living.  Only the rich could afford two wives, and most of the rich actually remained monogamous.) 

Also, chronic disease, malnutrition, and other killers took a heavy toll.  On the other hand, public health was known, and new child care manuals devoted increasing attention to the values of breastfeeding, the proper introduction of solid foods, and other issues of care; in addition, smallpox vaccination was practiced widely (Lee and Feng 1999:45, 91; readers will recall that the Chinese, not Jenner, invented smallpox inoculation; he learned it from them).  Breastfeeding was indeed normal and kept on for two years or more; I found it extending even beyond three years in some cases, on the Hong Kong waterfront in the 1960s and 1970s. 

In all:  “As a result of China’s long history as the largest national population and the most densely settled nation, the Chinese evolved a demographic system early on of low marital fertility, moderate mortality, but high rates of female infanticide, and consequently of persistent male celibacy” (Lee and Wang 1999:105).  Of course this conclusion is debatable, and has been debated.

By the mid-18th century there may have been 500 persons per square kilometer of cultivated land in the densely populated areas of China.  Western Europe had only about 70 per square km at the time (Lee and Wang 1999:168).  The Chinese figure misses a lot of cultivated land in back regions and with low population densities, however.  Meanwhile, cultivated acreage increased considerably (contrary to earlier views; see Lee and Wang 1999:169-170), especially in the remote regions of Manchuria and the montane southwest.  Population grew rapidly here, slowly in most of China, and not at all in the desperately crowded central-east (Lee and Wang 1999:117).  The central-east became an enormous sender area; migrants moved to the other parts of China, but also to Southeast Asia and even farther afield.

China’s population increased from 150 million in 1700 to 300 million in 1800, perhaps 450 million by 1840.  It dropped back sharply because of the Taiping and other rebellions, but rose again to the famous “400 million”—a figure proverbial in the western world in those days—by 1900.  Rowe also stresses the importance of  “the period when Chinese civilization moved decisively uphill” (Rowe 2009:93), the 18h and 19th centuries; this again was due largely to the New World crops, especially potatoes and corn, which flourish on slopes.  Constant problems with servile and exploited labor and underclass populations, as well as ethnic minorities, followed (Rowe 2009:97ff.). 

There is doubt about population figures, since we have no believable figures from late Ming or the Ming-Qing transition, but the general trends are clear (see Lavely and Wong 1998; Myers and Wang 2002; Rowe 2002.)  The problem was certainly not lack of food or lack of ability to feed a growing, increasingly urbanized population. 

 

The Survival of Ming

Even the infamous “strike” by the Wan Li Emperor, who refused to sign edicts for decades, did not bring the dynasty down (Huang 1982).

No other Chinese dynasty came even close to this record of continued tranquility without interruption by coups or near-fatal rebellions.  The Yi Dynasty in Korea lasted longer, but faced continual crises and rebellions.  The Tokugawa in Japan lasted almost as long, but the shoguns were highly competent and assertive, and ruled during a period of expanding economy.

How Ming did it remains a mystery.  Apparently a major part of the reason was the incredible success of Ming at maintaining what political scientists call a perception of “legitimacy.”  People were truly loyal to Ming.  Nothing impresses more in this regard than the early Portuguese accounts, which emphasize the profound reverence—beyond mere loyalty—that common people in remote southeast China had for “Da Me.”  (This was the Portuguese transcription of the Hokkien pronunciation of da ming, “Great Ming”; Hokkien converts “ming” into “me,” which in both Hokkien and Portuguese has a strongly nasalized “e.”)  The Portuguese hoped for a local dissident movement that they could take advantage of—hence their concern and wonderment. 

The Dutch later ran into the same problem in Taiwan; they took the island, but were promptly expelled by Ming loyalists looking for a base to reconquer China from the Qing rulers!  The last Ming dynasts bestowed on Taiwan’s conqueror, Zheng Chenggong, the right to use the Imperial surname (Zhu), and he became immortalized in Hokkien slang as Coxinga (Hokkien kok seng a, “Imperial Surname Kid,” Mandarin guo xing zi; a is a Hokkien slangy diminutive with exactly the same extensions as “kid” in English).

Yet more:  even the 1911 revolution, which ended the Qing after almost 300 years of rule, was brought about by rebels chanting “Overthrow Qing and restore Ming!” In hundreds of years of persecution of Ming loyalists, this slogan not only survived, but several hand-gesture forms of it had developed to allow the faithful to communicate their sentiments even when there were Qing spies about.  Some of these morphed into criminal gang signs after Qing finally did fall.

Possibly the dynasty’s very eccentricity helped it.  When the emperor was on strike, or busy playing in a carpentery shop, or otherwise revealing all too well the dynastic family’s streak of mental instability, the country had to look after itself.  Bureaucrats and eunuchs were forced to act for the general good, because they knew they would all go if the system went down.  Ordinary people could be loyal to the Emperor, because he was doing nothing—thus giving no offense.  Obviously, however, this is an inadequate explanation of the fact, and we are left in wonderment.

Ming continued Yuan autocracy, and also Yuan’s repressive view of women.  (The Yuan view is itself surprising, given Mongol norms of female power; steppe women had to run the society when the men were off fighting, and had a great deal of independence and agency.)  Neo-Confucian influences and the development of the property-holding corporate lineage by Fan Chengda and other Song statesmen found fruition; the Ming regime imposed these as part of a comprehensive strategy of top-down, authoritarian control.  The status of women fell.  Widow remarriage, previously the rule, was discouraged.  Women lost many rights to dowry wealth if their marriages failed or husbands died.  Polygamy (as opposed to concubinage) was legitimized (Birge 2002).  Combining this with the property-holding lineage enormously increased not only male power but the power of corporate landholding entities ruled by central authority—the lineage elders in the case of lineages, the father in the case of families, the village leaders in the case of communities, and on up to the imperial court.

Some success was due to trade.   Ming trade with Japan was important, especially for silver.  Japan’s large silver mines were the source of most of this precious metal in Ming, at least until New World silver began flooding into the country—a process that began in Ming but did not become overwhelming till Qing, when Europeans paid in silver coins for Chinese goods.

Ordinary private voyaging, trade, contact, and settlement continued, and by the end of Ming, Southeast Asia—known as the Nanyang, “South Seas”—had large communities of Chinese, mercantile but involved in many extractive industries also.  This was the start of the large and well-educated southeast Asian Chinese communities that are so important in the world today.  The South China Sea, always a “Chinese lake” and heavily used for trade since Tang, became a crowded highway, with people constantly shuttling back and forth.

At first, it seemed that Ming was following in the tracks of earlier centuries.  The Ming government republished the Huihui Yaofang and other works.  It continued to release new books of research.  It opened more and more contacts with southeast Asia.  But after Zheng He’s voyages, China turned inward.  The Ming elite was not deeply concerned with foreign issues, especially of trade and expansion, though ties to southeast Asia and concerns with Japan continued.

 

The Rise of Qing

Qing came in with dynamism, and, initially, more open government than Ming.  This did not last long, as most Chinese resisted these non-Han invaders.  Rebellions flared everywhere, and, as we have seen, when Qing was finally overthrown in 1911 it was by people who still chanted the ancient line “overthrow Qing, restore Ming.” 

At first, the Manchus claimed to revert to their ancestors the Jurchen, who ruled the Qin Dynasty.  “In reality, [they] built their state partly from scratch and partly by liberal borrowing from…Ming….  In only several decades [before conquering China in 1644], they worked out not only a formidable mutiethnic miltary and political system but also a comprehensive ideology of mission that would put most modern corporations to shame” (Bronson 2006:140). 

Relevant is the wider context of peace; the core provinces were so calm that when a local rebellion finally occurred in Shandong in 1774 (Perry 1981), the local law enforcement personnel could not find their weapons.  When they finally located these in an old storeroom, they discovered that the weapons had rusted away!  I know of no comparable story anywhere else in the world.

In spite of such reign of peace, the Qing Dynasty was increasingly perceived as an unpopular reign of alien “barbarians,” especially after 1800 (Rowe 2009).  It found itself forced to become even more autocratic (see Peterson 2002, passim; also Elliott 2009, but that source is a bit more temperate).  Even their liberation of the (rather few) serfs and low-caste peoples was apparently a way to create a levelled, easily-ruled society, not as a blow for freedom (Rowe 2002).  Intellectuals protested and advocated small government in terms reminiscent of the American founding fathers, and were savagely repressed in consequence (Peterson 2002; see especially Woodside 2002).  Commerce greatly flourished, and capitalist-like firms and behaviors multiplied (Rowe 2002), but the oppression of all initiative crushed any chance of real development. 

            Qing had a surprisingly strong feminist streak in its early popular culture (see esp. Idema and Grant 2004).  Male writers like Cao Xueqin, Zheng Xie and Yuan Mei extolled the value of women, their intellectual equality with men, and their potential.  Yuan Mei not only advocated educating women along with men, but actually educated many of them himself, serving as tutor and mentor to over fifty women—a whole generation of brilliant female writers (Waley 1986).  Cao Xueqin’s great novel The Story of the Stone (Cao and Gao 1973-1986) portrays elite women who had the benefit of such education and turned out to be brighter and nobler than the men in their lives. (On these matters see Epstein 2011; Idema and Grant 2004; Widmer 2006.) 

There were various motives involved.  Cao and Zheng were intensely moral men, were concerned with fairness and ending abuses, but Yuan, who had the mores of a tomcat, made no secret of wanting lovers he could talk to.  Women themselves wrote countless poems, stories, and especially tanci, prose-poetic works thought to be largely a female medium; not surprisingly, tanci routinely portray women as “smart, learned, physically active, and the equal of any man in the examination field, imperial court, and sometimes even in physical combat” (Epstein 2011:7).  It will be recalled that women did not get this kind of fair shake in western literature until the late 18th and early 19th centuries.  (Sappho anticipated the trend by a few millennia, but one swallow does not make a summer.)  One wonders, as so often, why China did not go on to parallel the west.  Neo-Confucian morality reasserted itself.

 

Qing food

China’s cities were quite “modern,” having—among other things—a wealth of teashops, restaurants, and attendant food-related amenities (see e.g. Rowe 1989, esp. p. 86; Rowe 2002). 

            Business, trade and commerce enormously expanded through the 18th century (Rowe 2009:132ff.).  The old idea of international trade as “tribute”  and internal trade as minor and repressed is largely wrong.  Trade continued to expand after 1800, but, especially after 1840, trade with the west incurred increasing disadvantage.

This was in large measure because of opium, long known but explosively expanding its tentacles in the 19th century.  It was used moderately and reasonably before the 19th century, but then the British began “dumping” it on China in order to get silver and to get a local foothold on trade.  David Bello has recently updated the history of this drug (Bello 2003 and references therein—a comprehensive bibliography).  The Qing Dynasty tried, not without success, to prohibit it, but the western powers—finding little else they could sell at a profit—forced it on China anyway.  By the end of China’s last dynasty, in 1911, millions of Chinese were addicted to this debilitating curse.  The result of the British pressure was a rise in demand and in addiction, and eventually a serious problem, as I had plenty of opportunity to observe in Hong Kong in the 1960s.   The effect on food production was serious, as more and more laborers succumbed.  Attempts to eradicate opium in the early Communist years were quite successful, but, with the opening of the market after the 1970s, heroin and other hard drugs flooded in (Dikötter et al 2002; they are wrong in claiming the problem was not a large one earlier).

            Tea has its own stories.  Robert Gardella (1994) compared China’s smallholder production with the rise of plantations in the colonial world; Qin Shao (1998), in a fascinating article, showed that China vilified teahouses as dens of freethinking and other iniquities—just as Turkey and later Europe attacked coffeehouses, and just as “espresso joints” were attacked as hotbeds of “beatnikism” within my own memory.  Exports of tea to England “grew exponentially, from around 200 pounds eper year in the late seventeenth century…to over 28,000,000 pounds in the early nineteenth century” (Rowe 2009:166), with the average English household by then spending as much as 5% of its income on tea.  England at first paid in New World silver, but eventually only opium was valuable enough to trade to offset the buying of tea, porcelain, cloth, and so on.  So opium spawned the famous colonialist wars, which had much to do with “underdeveloping” China.

China kept developing more and more elaborate dishes, and became more and more committed to what we now recognize as “Chinese cuisine”—no more Central Asian and Near Eastern borrowings (Anderson 2005b). 

The great Chinese gourmet Yuan Mei (1716-1798) flourished in Qing (Anderson 1988; So 35-43; Waley  1956).  His birthday, set at March 25 in the western calendar, has recently been declared International Chinese Food Day.  It could be an arbor day, too; he planted a tree on his 70th birthday, saying:

“Seventy, and still planting trees….

Don’t laugh at me, my friends.

I know I’m going to die. 

I also know I’m not dead yet.”   (Tr. J. P. Seaton, 1997:92.)

His cookbook is thoroughly Chinese (Schmidt 2003; So 1986; Waley 1956).  No central Asian or western influences here.

The great novels, notably The Story of the Stone (Cao and Gao 1973-1986) and The Scholars (Wu 1957), are full of food images (Anderson 1988).  Classical cookbooks appeared, to be mined in our time (e.g. So 1992).  The Qianlong Emperor loved birds’ nests, though, oddly, Li Shizhen did not refer to them (Rosner 1999:7).

An odd sidelight into food in remote Taiwan comes from the career of He Bin, an outrageous rogue in the grand tradition of scoundrels (Andrade 2007).  Among other things, he misappropriated the taxes on mullet, very popular common fish that could be caught wild or farmed.  Working for (and simultaneously against) the Dutch, who occupied Taiwan in the 17th century, he managed, among other things, to channel a great deal of the mullet tax into his pockets.  A tax of 10% on mullet and their roe, during the season for fishing them, was charged, and little of it got past He Bin. 

 

In Qing, China revived its interests in Central Asia.  The dynasty conquered outward, not only bring China back to its classic Han and Tang borders, but extending these still further, in one of the great territorial upsweeps of history.  At its peak, China held what is now Mongolia and southern Siberia as well as all of contemporary Chinese territory.  Russia slowly pried away the Siberian lands, and then in 1921 the USSR “liberated” Mongolia, but England was never able to take Tibet, which remained Chinese territory.  (In spite of modern-day hopeful romanticism, Tibet was never independent after early Qing).

Qing became a cosmopolitan empire, after its fashion, by not only integrating these lands into Great Qing, but also respecting their cultures and giving them and their religions high status within the imperial framework (Elverskog 2013; Rowe 2009).  The Qing court, especially early on when Central Asian ideals of tolerance still held, was respectful of China’s minorities—rather more than some regimes since.  In Beijing they set up religious places of worship for all major faiths.  They patronized Buddhism of various forms, as well as piously continuing traditional imperial sacrifices.  Visitors to Beijing were treated respectfully.  A Muslim Uighur concubine in the court of the Emperor Qianlong in the 1760s and 1770s managed to avoid pork, eating mutton instead, and to eat sweets—probably with a Central Asian flavor (Millward 1994:435). 

 

Qing Agriculture

            Agriculture had, if anything, even higher prestige in Qing than in other eras.  The Manchus took seriously the Confucian worship of that activity.

            However, China’s (and perhaps the world’s) greatest novel, The Story of the Stone (Cao and Gao 1972-1986), shows that not all was well.  A recent and extremely insightful study (Zhou 2013) shows that Cao Xueqin, the author, consistently casts a sardonic eye on agriculture and farmers, and portrays his elite protagonists as holding it in varying degrees of scorn and ridicule.  This was noted and at least sometimes disliked by other Qing authors.  Evidently Cao touched a nerve (here as in almost everything else he wrote), and people were well aware of mixed attitudes toward farming.  This clearly goes far to explain Qing’s mix of policies favoring agriculture and lack of real energy about modernizing it.

Most careful observers of China’s food and population problems in the Qing and the early 20th century focus not on crude Malthusian stories but on the nature of growth.  China’s development before the Communist period was always “biological” in the terms of Yujiro Hayami and Vernon Ruttan (1985; cf. Elvin 1973; Huang 1990).  People applied more and more fertilizer, worked harder and harder, introduced new crops, learned better cultivation and management techniques—all of which increased output per acre, and output per factor input, much more than they increased output per worker.  It is doubtful whether output per work-hour increased at all.  Lee and Feng (1999) point out that individuals were more productive, and did eat better, but this appears to be the result of working both harder and smarter.  They note, for instance, that women “increasingly joined the main labor force” (p. 39). 

Qing for most of its time on earth had more area and people than Europe; it was continental in size.  By 1800, Europe had 180 million people; Qing had 250-300 million.  Feeding them was a challenge.

By mid-Qing, the borrowings from the New World—crops like maize and sweet potatoes came in the 16th century (Sinoda 1977:493)—were having a revolutionary effect.  Sucheta Mazumdar’s work dramatically confirms and extends our knowledge of this  (Mazumdar 1999).  Among other things, New World crops allowed Chinese cultivators to continue to live as small independent farmers.  The new crops also fed a sustained population increase that still continues.  As William Rowe points out, “New World food crops such as potatoes, sweet potatoes, and peanuts…served as brakes on starvation during harvest failures of the more preferred staples, rice and wheat” (Rowe 2009:91).  They also allowed cultivation of uplands and sandy soils. 

By contrast, increase in agricultural productivity in the western world was due largely to opening up new lands, to mechanization, and to industrial developments such as artificial chemical fertilizers.  Output per worker soared, but output per acre was stagnant until the rise of hybrid seed varieties and other biological improvements in the mid-20th century (Hayami and Ruttan 1985; local exceptions where both output per worker and output per acre increased included Denmark, the Low Countries, and parts of England and Italy.).  Thus, in Qing, China involuted (Geertz 1963; Huang 1990, 2002) while the west industrialized.

Modern authors like Kenneth Pomeranz (2000) and Bin Wong (1997) have stressed China’s many advantages in population, resources, productivity, learning, and organization, even as late as the 17th and 18th centuries.  They have done much to demolish the idea of European exceptionalism.  Li Bozhong (see above), also, emphasizes the enormous increases in agricultural production and productivity and the other economic gains in Ming.  Pomeranz feels that China was equal to Europe in production, productivity, and development until 1700, after which Europe forged ahead because of its maritime successes, its scientific tradition, and its cheap coal (at least in England—but China also has a great deal of coal). 

Against Pomeranz, however, Philip Huang (2002) reaffirms his arguments for agricultural involution, and argues that China was so trapped by its intensive agriculture and high person-to-farmland ratio that few resources (whether land, labor or capital) could be freed for development.  Huang argues from his work in the Yangzi delta (Huang 1990), without reference to pioneer fringes like Yunnan and Manchuria that produced more surplus.  Pomeranz has riposted to Huang (2002), and the debate has been joined by others (Lee et al 2002; Brenner and Isett 2002).  The argument came down to misplaced decimal points, misdrawn curves, and other minutiae, at which point it became beyond resolution with the data available at the time.  Recent work suggests rather strongly that per capita GDP in western Europe was about twice China’s—around $1200 in today’s dollars vs. $600—in 1700, and China remained at that level as late as 1820 (Bolt and van Zanden 2013:6-7).

Suffice it to say that China had a rich economy with a good deal of surplus that could have been invested, but west Europe had more, including a wealth of animals and a more easily accessible trove of coal (Morris 2010; Pomeranz 2000).  It is also clear that much of China was trapped in static situation of local lineage power, micro-farms, and razor-thin margins.  Change was impressive and important in Ming and Qing China, but much of it was driven by governmental desire to centralize and take ever more power, rather than by a real desire for development in the modern sense.  Local individuals and regions might resist, but they could, at best, slow down and dilute the rise of autocracy. 

“Taking grain as the key link”—an infamous campaign of Mao Zedong—had its ancestry in a Qing campaign launched by the Yongzheng Emperor.  In 1725 he wrote:

“I enjoy eating rice, and I never waste even a kernel.  Rice is a gift from Heaven and nourishes the people.  Because I love the people, I must respect heaven and take great pains to save and treasure rice….  If I…waste foodgrain, Heaven will be angry, and our people will suffer calamities.  I have heard that people in Kiangsi feed grain to the hogs.  This is not appropriate behavior….  Avoid waste and love grain!”  (Quoted Myers and Wang 2002:608.) 

Alas, China today feeds a great deal of its grain to the hogs, and in consequence has to import grain on a massive scale, driving up world prices and impacting the world’s poor.  The old Chinese line “Heaven will send calamities” is appropriate: the Chinese knew perfectly well that “acts of God” followed human mismanagement of the rural landscape.

Pomeranz, like other authors, has recently stressed the vulnerability of north China to floods, siltation, and other water problems, the rapid growth of population in Qing, the limits of agricultural intensification except in the very best habitats, and the problems of progressive forest destruction on the internal frontiers (Pomeranz 2010).  Pomeranz also follows others in noting that Qing government was thin on the ground, with one magistrate for every 300,000 people (as of 1840).  Things had been considerably better in earlier years.  In the mid-18th century: “Officials were few in number relative to the population—on average 1 per 100,000 in the mid eighteenth century” (Elliott 2009:152).  Still, even that is a very low ratio, and these government servants were paid little, reducing their capacity to do much.

Only 3% of GDP went to national taxes (Pomeranz 2010:93); recall this was the ideal established by Emperor Jing, far back in early Han.  Taxes were thus low; figures for 1753 are quite comprehensive, and show levels around half a tael to a tael (about 1 1/3 oz silver) per mu (a bit less than 1/6 acre) (figures from Bernhardt 1992:45).  Silver is worth around $27 per ounce today, so taxes were around $36 per mu, or $216/acre.  A tael would buy rather more than a shi of rice.  Yields of good rice land were about 10-20 shi per acre per crop, with most areas double-cropped and some triple-cropped  So taxes were, at worst, a bit over a tenth of income, and at best a mere 1/30 or so: again that classical Chinese ideal figure of 3%.  Rent levels were similar. 

 Of course the farmers paid much more, thanks to local taxes and above all to illegal squeeze.  But it is still a tribute to the Chinese philosophy of light taxation.  Pomeranz stresses that, thanks to all the wise measures from river management to low taxation, China did not collapse in the 20th century, even with the appalling violence and devastation that accompanied the fall of Qing, the rise of the Republic, the Japanese invasion, the Communist takeover, and (perhaps worst of all) the horrific excesses of Communism in Mao Zedong’s old age.

Pomeranz, Wong, and Philip Huang, as well as other scholars, all agree that China was extremely productive agriculturally during this time, thanks to millions of farmers on postage-stamp farms exploiting their family labor.  Myers and Wang’s summary article (2002) describes a stunningly successful, rationalized, developed agriculture with highly sophisticated technology.  Farmers and writers realized that bean plants, plowed in, restored soil fertility, as did beancake fertilizer (see e.g. Myers and Wang 2002:610-611).  They knew the relative values of different kinds of dung.  Efficiency of production, transportation, and processing all increased, at the same time as leasing arrangements, banking, and government policy were making it ever easier to trade in foodstuffs.  On the other hand, rural wages (calculated in rice-buying power) declined as population rose (Myers and Wang 2002:637, citing Kang Chao).  The classic work of Ruddle and Zhong (1988) on the Pearl River delta is relevant here; it describes a system so impossibly sophisticated and fine-tuned that it seems beyond the reach of even modern computerized society.  Yet it flourished everywhere in the coastal deltas.

Victor Lieberman has recently addressed these issues (Lieberman 2009), agreeing to some extent with both sides.  Much of China was involuting by 1800, certainly, but the system was still generating much wealth and showing considerable dynamism.  The involutionists sometimes forget that cultivation was actively expanding in the southern and southwestern frontier, even as the old rice-growing areas were getting more and more congested.  China’s wealth continued to expand up until the 1840s, when rebellions and famines began a devastating course that was to destroy Qing in time. 

Lieberman sees the low taxation rates as emphatically bad.  They prevented China from having the resources to develop, rationalize, invest, and improve governance.  He quotes the truly depressing statistic that the ratio of government administrators to people reached 1:21,750 by 1850; France’s was 1:213 in 1825 and even the rest of Asia had far greater ratios (Lieberman 2009:614).  I share with Pomeranz the view that low taxes on the agrarian sector are basically a good thing, allowing farmers to flourish, but this sort of ratio of governors to governed is indeed a problem by any standards.  Lieberman also notes that the English agricultural worker had 45 times as much land as his Chinese equivalent in 1800 (Lieberman 2009:569), but of course China’s land was far more productive.

Lieberman sees many of China’s problems and successes as due to its military situation; this is part of his wider thesis that military challenges force states to improve the efficiency and competence of governance and revenue collection, but that constant warfare and violence inhibits development.  For Lieberman, the “protected zone”—the areas of Eurasia safe from Central Asian invasions—succeeded and developed rapidly, while the “exposed zone”—the area hopelessly exposed to Central Asian war—was constantly being devastated.  China and, for a long time, Russia were in an intermediate status.  China was open to Central Asian invaders, but too big and isolated to be constantly challenged but other types of threat.  It thus had advantages over some isolated areas, but on the whole tended to be conquered by any strong Central Asian force (to say nothing of the Manchus), rather than subjected to the constant pressures that drove France, Italy, and other states to modernize.  (Lieberman is aware that Tokugawa Japan presents an anomaly here, but notes that true modernization in Japan did not occur until the west challenged it in the 1850s.  This somewhat underestimates Tokugawa success, however.) 

Like others, Lieberman sees China as falling behind the west in technological and scientific advances by 1700; he is skeptical of the extreme ability of China to repress progress and independent thought, but takes a position that the Chinese government (more specifically, the Qing government) was strong enough to discourage it or coopt it (Lieberman 2009:622-623; this is similar to my position in Anderson 1988).

Yet another important point raised by Lieberman and Pomeranz is the extreme importance of the New World and Australia in providing food and other resources for western Europe, and thus for releasing the pressure on European food production.  Pomeranz and others have pointed out that Europe was expanding its own agriculture and basically feeding itself, so one cannot make too much of a point of this, but the fact is that Europe was flooded with cheap food, silver, timber, and all manner of goods from its colonial conquests.  A problem barely noted by these authors, but worthy of more attention, is why China did not take over the Philippines, Borneo, and other lands occupied only by small, scattered, technologically less sophisticated populations.  The spice islands, in particular, had been supplying China with spices for millennia, yet they were always left alone. 

That Qing could have conquered the islands is proved by the example of Taiwan.  But the Qing government never wanted such expansion, and was not even very active in opening its own southwest.  Taiwan was taken, after all, by Ming loyalists under Zheng Chenggong.  Taiwan was settled against Qing’s will.  Qing was stuck with it after a long period of trying to ignore it.  Apparently there was plenty of food at home; involution could always produce more.  No need to take over remote islands at untold military and strategic cost.  The Iberians and later the Dutch, of course, had no such qualms, and took over the islands as soon as they could get more than one or two ships to them.  It is a profoundly interesting contrast.  Especially interesting is the contrast with Qing’s obsessive fascination with the deserts and uninhabited mountains of Central Asia and Tibet, which it took over at great expense and with enormous drive and determination (Perdue 2005).  The reason is clear: China had always seen Central Asia as the zone of threat, opportunity, and interest—the “gate of war,” the Arabs would have said.  Also, the Manchus identified with the Central Asian peoples.  But by seeing the world thus, Ming and Qing missed their great opportunity.

In general, as pointed out by Pomeranz and Lieberman, Europe was always a much more maritime world than China, especially after 1420, in spite of the enormous and continuing trade between China and the Nanyang.  China simply did not see its interests lying there. Europe may have been forced to the sea by its desperate need for protein (see e.g. Morris 2010, citing a very long chain of sources); beans yield poorly in Europe, especially the native Near Eastern species, while fish was available and cheap before the fishing boom of the late 20th century wiped out the North Atlantic fisheries almost entirely.  Europe’s dependence on high-seas fishing contrasts with China’s conservation of inshore resources and development of aquaculture.  As in agriculture, China did the sensible thing by intensifying local sustainable production, but Europe’s strategy paid off in the long run. 

By the 1700s, intensive development had progressed especially far in the Yangzi and Pearl river deltas.  Agriculture was thoroughly commercialized.  Most people depended entirely or in part on cash cropping and on their own labor in spinning their cotton and silk production into thread and weaving it into cloth for sale.  Other local crafts, from basketmaking to embroidery, added to income.  Families depended on crafts as well as farming, and many would starve if either income stream was disrupted.  Labor productivity, however, increased; yields increased after the troubles; and wages even rose, such that there was more meat for the farm laborers (Lee and Feng 1999:34) and more people could be supported.

Of course many farmers were purely subsistence producers as far as rice went, and had to raise silk, cotton or the like, and/or carry out household craft production, to make money for taxes.  There were extortion, illegal rent-seeking, theft, and other ills to contend with.  These were backbreaking for poor farmers, but not unsupportable for most.  

Around 1800, environmental crises due to rapidly rising population and cultivation began to get more serious.  “Generations of encroachment on lakeshores and riverbanks of the middle Yangzi watershed, stimulated by the growing downriver demand for commercial risce, had rendered the Yangzi valley, likely for the first time in imperial history, a source of flooding of equal concern as the Yellow or Huai rivers to the north” (Rowe 2011:76).  Lakes and sloughs silted up, hills eroded, mountains were stripped bare, forests fell.  The Grand Canal silted up (again).  The beginnings of China’s ecological catastrophe, so immeasurably worse today, were at hand.

Encroachment on lakes and wetlands continued (e.g. Osborne 1998), though it was far less serious than what is going on today.  More serious, and perhaps the worst environmental problem of Qing, was the massive deforestation (Vermeer 1998)—though again it was nothing compared to today’s.   Reduction of minorities was often the cause (Vermeer 1998:246 describes this for the Miao).  Their forests were plundered.  Sometimes this was done on the excuse that “bandits and rebels” (Vermeer 1998:247), many of whom were actually desperate resistance fighters, were taking refuge there.  Other forests were cut by poverty-stricken people who invaded them in spite of rules and restrictions.  Vermeer quotes a number of contemporary sources, some pro-forest, some pro-deforestation.  Awareness of the devastating effects of deforestation was widespread, but not adequate to stop the combination of official fear and grassroots desperation.  Agroforestry was practiced widely (Menzies 1994; Vermeer 1998:251).  Tree plantations were, however, vulnerable to poaching and government takeover.  These acted as disincentives.  Government reserves fell apart and were given over to cultivation, continuing a trend established as early as the Han Dynasty.

Keith Schoppa (2002) has chronicled the fate of the Xiang Lake, across the Qiantang River from Hangzhou.  This study is important not only for itself—and it is excellent—but because it is fairly representative of what happened in the more densely populated parts of China.  This lake was created as a reservoir in Song times; it held excess water and released it later for irrigation.  It became famous for its water-shield plants (Brasenia schreberi, a small waterlily relative, famous for its crunchy and succulent texture), and for bricks and tiles made from its alluvial clay.  Local elite lineages constantly tried to encroach on it, being stopped off and on by heroic efforts of local activists and magistrates; Schoppa’s main point in the book is that only a few such individuals existed, and could turn the tide, while the vast majority lived in terror of the local elites and dared not combine to act against them.  However, the well-meaning citizens succeeded often enough, and had enough local support, to slow degradation and keep the lake viable until the end of imperial times.  In the 20th century, the Xiang Lake met the fate of most of rural China—it was trashed by the Nationalists and destroyed utterly by the Communists, to the enormous damage and impoverishment of the area.

The highlands were even more stresssed.  Thanks to overcutting and similar environmental problems, “a huge pool of late eighteenth-century mountaineers led rootless, impoverished,and desperate lives” (McMahon 2009:94).  Fortunately, some forests were well managed.  Menzies (1994) recounts temples and “clans” that preserved forest adequately; best preserved, however, were commercial plantings of China fir and pine.  Worst managed were the imperial reserves.  Mushrooms were abundantly produced. 

 

The lower Yangzi was the economic heart of China.  “In Qianlong’s day, Jiangnan accounted for 16 percent of the total agricultural land in the empire, but provided 29 percent of the government’s land tax revenue in cash (paid in silver) and 38 percent of its revenue in kind (paid in grain), as well as 64 percent of the tribute grain sent to feed the capital” (Elliott 2009:78-79).

 Kathryn Bernhardt, in Rents, Taxes, and Peasant Resistance, a thorough and detailed study of the lower Yangzi River area, provides full statistics.  In the Yangzi delta, cotton had largely replaced rice, forcing import of thousands of tons of rice per year from upriver (Bernhardt 1992:18).  Rents were high; rice in the mid-19th century was about 2-3 taels of silver per shi, and a shi per mu (about 1/6 acre) was a standard rent (Bernhardt 1992:24).  A tael of silver today is worth about $36.00, which would mean that rice cost almost a dollar a pound in modern terms—a good deal more than rice costs today.  Of course one would have to adjust all these prices for inflation and so forth, but by no standard was rice cheap or rents low in those days.  Mark Elliott adds:  “Popular wisdom had it that it required 4 mu of land (about two-thirds of an acre) to feed one person.  With rapid population growth, this ratio had worsened under Qianlong from 3.5 mu per person in 1766 to 3.33 mu per person in 1790” (Elliott 2009:148).

In contrast to the typical, and ideal, situation, small independent yeoman farmers were relatively few in this rich but heavily-populated area.  Most were tenants.  A few large landlords, mostly resident in towns and cities, owned thousands of hectares.  Rents were high.  A division had come about of actual ownership of land from rights to cultivate it; the suffering farmer often had to pay rent to both.  (These were confusingly and inaccurately called rents for “subsoil”—actually, actual ownership—and “topsoil”—actually, rights to cultivate, i.e. usufruct.)  In Taiwan, the aborigines often retained ownership, but had no control over cultivation and virtually no income, because aggressive ethnically-Chinese immigrants had managed to get control of the cultivation rights, and used those to maintain a stranglehold over both the cultivators and the actual owners.  This is a case in which actual ownership of the land (“subsoil rights”) meant virtually nothing; “topsoil rights” had taken over.  Never was Marx’ distinction between formal ownership and actual control more dramatically seen.

Tenants thus continually used every possible means to make more money and pay less rent, from working harder to cutting corners to resisting rent collectors to rebelling openly.  Both they and their landlords also resented and resisted taxes.  As water management deteriorated and population increased, tensions grew worse and worse, and increasingly large resistance movements arose. Bandits could work for themselves, for angry tenants, for landlords repressing tenants, for the government, or for social ends—the same groups doing all these things in rapid succession (Bernhardt 1992).  Violence and crime became common, ultimately resulting in total meltdown in the Taiping Rebellion, when various rebel armies, various pro-government forces, and many independent militias and bandit gangs all vied for local control.   Writing of his fellow locals, an anonymous villager commented in 1860:  “Some even follow the bandits.  They do not know shame” (Bernhardt 1992:90).  

The resulting chaos was partially resolved by government success in quelling the Taiping Rebellion; the war devastated thousands of square miles and eliminated a large percentage of the population.  However, imperial China never recovered.  Kathryn Bernhardt goes on to tell a depressing story of the decline of rural society.  The decline of Qing led to increasingly desperate attempts by the government to raise money by taxing more and more heavily.  The fall of Qing in 1911 merely unleashed lawless violence on all scales.  China was not at peace till after 1949.

Western colonialist pressure was increasingly a factor after 1842, leading to classic peripheralization (Wallerstein 1976).  As this continued, through the 19th and 20th centuries, the western world was almost unanimous in taking a supercilious, patronizing attitude toward China’s traditional food sector.  Only those who had intimate acquaintance with it, such as F. H. King (1911; and several others quoted in The Food of China), recognized what an accomplishment mere survival was, under the circumstances.  Now that the United States has as dense a population as late Qing China had, and now that the world food system is tottering toward collapse, we may be able to take a more properly humble attitude.

 

Qing and Famine

Famines took place constantly (Li 2007; Mallory 1926; Wu 1996, 1997—with comments on the fears of cannibalism; Lee and Wang minimize famine, but are contradicted by all other sources).  They were worse in China than in most of the world, including Europe (Li 2007).

Particularly dramatic was the expansion of food, famine relief, and—consequently—population in the Qing Dynasty, and the collapse when Qing failed.  Lillian Li, in her magistral study of famine in China, Fighting Famine in North China:  State, Market, and Environmental Decline, 1690s-1990s (2007), notes that population rose from 150 million around 1700 to 300 million in 1800 and 430 million by the late 19th century.  “The human impact on the forests, soils, and rivers of China was a centuries-old historical process, but by the eighteenth century, the effects of human encroachment on land, forest, and water resources was becoming evident to officials and local elites of many parts of China.  Increasing population size demanded greater agricultural productivity…” (Li 2007:3-4), and this put yet more pressure on resources. 

By the 20th century, China was in trouble, especially the dry north, where south China’s land-making and land-enriching strategies did not work well.  Li’s chronicle of the disasters of the Beijing area is harrowing indeed.  She gives whole classification schemes for different types and levels of disasters (Li 2007:30, etc.).  The North Chinese had about as many words for floods and droughts than the Inuit have for snow.  Extremely erratic rainfall at the margin of the monsoon led to frequent droughts.  Wheat, the staple, was one of the more susceptible crops, making one understand why more drought-tolerant millets, sorghum, and sweet potatoes were traditional staples of the poor (Li 2007:25).  Foxtail millet was more nutritious than wheat, but sweet potatoes—newly introduced from the Americas—were not, and dependence on them always made for problems.  (Unlike American varieties, the common Chinese varieties are not rich in vitamin A.)

However, the rest of the world had no shortage of famines in those times.  For the vast majority of humanity, freedom from want became a real possibility only with the rise of modern bulk transport of grain and perishable commodities, by rail and ship, in the late 19th century.  Of course, even today, over a billion people, including a quarter of American children, live in poverty and want.  We can hardly feel superior to the Qing bureaucrats.

A study by Deng Yunte (as summarized in Xu 2010:157) found a total of 5,258 recorded famines in China from 1766 BC to 1936 AD.  Of course the earliest were either legendary or actually later, since there was no writing in China in 1766 BC, but on the other hand local small-scale famines were not normally counted, so for actual historic periods this is an absolute minimal figure.  These famines involved 1074 droughts and 1058 floods. 

Pierre-Étienne Will and Bin Wong (Will and Wong 1991) carried out major studies of famine relief, amazingly effective in much of Qing.  They and others (see Myers and Wang 2002; Rowe 2002) have showed that the Qing Dynasty’s famine relief system was pervasive and effective, probably the best in the world in the 17th and 18th centuries.  Beijing’s food security, for instance, was guarded effectively by a range of institutions (Li and Dray-Novey 1999).  Few countries at that time were so well organized as China in making sure that people had some access to food.  Moreover, while Ming sent taxes skyrocketing (to around 9.1% of grain; Brook 2010:108), Qing, as we have seen, dropped them back to the historic 3%.  Low agricultural taxes meant life to the farmers and thus to the whole food system.

Stockpiles of grain for famine relief could be huge, overflowing granaries and rotting because there was simply not enough storage capacity (Li 2007:169).  Famines persisted, however, because the population was so dense and so fast-growing that a government with only premodern transportation methods at its disposal was handicapped.   Lillian Li (2007) investigates the problems of Beijing and the areas around it.  Beijing grew from 660,000 to over a million in Qing (p.a 146) and the region grew even more. 

Like other observers, Li describes a diet of wheat, millets, sorghum, and—increasingly—the New World crops, maize, peanuts, and sweet potatoes.  Many varieties of soybeans were grown; the black one was for horses or for the starving.  Cotton competed for land with food.  Rice was grown but never did well in that cold climate, and there was little water for it in many years.  Rice from the south tended to be old and probably bug-eaten.  The land was productive (far more so than most of Europe at the time).  However, the climate was changeable and official policies and practices were too.  The climate could produce droughts or floods; the region has a very high amplitude of variation in rainfall.  The officials could produce excellent policy in a good time (such as the early 18th century), but corruption was common, and in bad decades even minimal law enforcement was difficult. 

Unlike the north, however, southern and especially central-east China were doing well (Lee and Wang 1999; Li 1998).  The lower Yangzi region and the coast southward from it were well fed and productive, and continued to increase production and per capita consumption through much of the time period in question (Li 1998).  This was accompanied by true involution, but it was successful; an incredibly dense population survived, and even thrived during the more peaceful periods.

The grain tribute brought an enormous amount of food to the capital.  Up to “13-15 million shi” (Li 2007:148; a shi was 133 lb. in the early 20th century) were stored in the city at a time; that would be about 10,000 tons of grain.  One effect was linking prices over the empire; regionalism was inhibited and grain flowed throughout eastern China and to some extent through the center and west.  The nobility was given huge donations of grain (as well as silver and other items) and sold some of it.  As so often, the novel The Story of the Stone is a good source for the realities of this system.

The government tried to keep grain prices low, favoring the urban population but often hurting the farmers.  This is a practice familiar in the modern world, where many countries have done it, usually with unfortunate results for agriculture.

Soup kitchens and other aid facilities, as well as grain storage, helped the hungry.  The system functioned best in the 18th century, preventing mass deaths.  The dreadful tales of late Ming, and again of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, are singularly absent from the records (Elliott 2009; Li 2007:247)  We do not read of cannibalism, living on bark, selling of children for a few coins or scraps of food. 

In the 19th century, all this slowly unraveled.  Rising population led to want, which fueled rebellions that brought the Qing down in 1911.  The worst rebellion was the Taiping (1850-64), which led to tens of millions of deaths, mostly from starvation due to the scorched-earth tactics of all sides in this multi-sided civil war.  Soon after it came perhaps the worst peacetime famine in premodern history.  In 1876-79, some ten to thirteen million people died (Li 2007:272; Lee and Wang 1999:174).  Up to 90% of the population died in some districts in 1878 (Bohr 1972).  Then and throughout the early 20th century, people were reduced to eating chaff, bark, weeds, and corncobs.  Even the more edible weeds and tree barks were long gone.  Cannibalism from desperation was widespread in the 1876-79 famine, and was observed by sober outside observers, not merely reported by the Chinese sources.  (The latter are unreliable, since, like literary sources everywhere, they loved to exaggerate this horrific recourse.)  A great deal of this is summed up in a beautiful and heart-wrenching poem by Chen Wenshu (translated by Yan-Kit So, 1992:226, and well worth looking up).  Food relief failed because transportation and communication resources were simply overwhelmed. 

James Lee and Wang Feng (1999) make the case that south and east China had a great deal of economic growth in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  They ignore the fact that these areas had been substantially depopulated a couple of decades before by rebellions and famines, and were rebounding economically.  They also ignore or minimize the effects of westernization, which brought new health and farming practices.  Perhaps most serious, they misconstrue the key arguments about growth vs. involution (a.k.a. high-level equilibrium trap).

 In the early 20th century, population growth and environmental deterioration reached a collision point (Anderson 1990; Bohr 1972; Li 2007; Mallory 1926).  Famines were appalling.  People were reduced to eating husks, roots, bark, and grass, until all the trees died because people had eaten not only the leaves but also the bark. 

By the early 20th century, however, China had a great deal of international help (Anderson 1990; Li 2007), which at least prevented cannibalism in most cases, though sale of children continued.  In the famines of the 1920s, death tolls were comparable to those of 1876-79 (Li 2007:304).  Even when it came, relief was slight; rations of 8 oz. of grain a day—i.e. 800 calories, 1/3 the needs of an adult—were given in 1921 (Li 2007:300).

By the 1930s, China, especially the north, was in the grip of chronic poverty, and people were reduced to near-starvation even in good times.  William Hinton (1966) reported people in the 1940s virtually hibernating in winter because there were not enough calories to allow any activity.  People simply lay down under wraps for days on end.  Maize had replaced more nourishing grains over much of China, with a resulting increase in malnutrition.  Life expectancy may have dropped to 25 in north China, with infant mortality running to 30 or 40% (Li 2007:315).  Modernization, trade, factory work, and other improvements stabilized matters, but the diet of the ordinary people remained one of coarse grain.  Banquets increased for the well-off, but very few were in that category.   The world depression of the 1930s and the Japanese invasion were utterly devastating.

 

Qing Fails to Modernize

This inevitably leads to the ancient question of why Qing failed to modernize—whatever that much-abused word may mean.  At the beginning, Qing China was in many ways ahead of Europe.  It had a much more productive agriculture and much more efficient food system, for one thing.  It had an outward-looking, tolerant policy toward its own varied peoples, and toward the rest of east and southeast Asia. 

As of 1100 A.D., anyone betting on different regions of the earth would probably have bet that China would be the unquestioned leader in all fields for the next many centuries. India, the Near East and perhaps southeast Europe would stay a strong second.  Any objective observer would have bet in 1100 that west Europe would remain a marginal backwater, except in so far as Muslim civilization brought Spain into the wider world.

By 1200 this was beginning to change.  India by 1100 was already beginning to suffer from Central Asian invasions that progressively restricted its cultural independence.  In the west, scientific progress had been dramatic in the Islamic world, but came to a brutal near-ending.  The Mongols ravaged the Near East in the 1250s, and the bubonic plague 90 years later (Dols 1977) completed the work of ruining the region economically and academically.  Our futurologist in 1100 could not possibly have predicted these two world-altering processes.  Science survived under the Mongols—one thinks of the brilliant polymath Nasīr of Tus, who covered everything from astronomy to ethical psychology—but significant scientific innovation almost ended with the plague epidemic.  In later centuries, the increasingly oppressive and violent competition and colonialism of Europe kept the Near East down.  The Ottomans succeeded to the Byzantine Empire, but unfortunately tended to continue its policies, which did not involve heavy investment in science and progress.

By 1300, China was also showing strains.  It had not only had the Mongol conquests, but, even earlier, the declining Song and its war-torn environment (Twitchett and Smith 2009). 

However, Kenneth Pomeranz (2000, 2010) has argued strongly that China did very well indeed through Ming and Qing, developing as fast as Europe and remaining as prosperous, until the Industrial Revolution pulled Europe far ahead.  He minimizes the importance of China’s turn away from sea travel in 1420, regarded by others as a critical retreat from what could have been a breakthrough to modernity, since it gave the seas to Portugal and Spain (cf. Anderson 1988).  Jared Diamond (1997, 2005) thus stresses 1420 as a key date. 

Pomeranz argues that Europe’s coal and farmland, and to a lesser extent metal ores and forests, gave it an advantage.  Pomeranz also argues that China was as developed as Europe, in technology and in capitalist economic forms, till the 18th century. Certainly the Middle East could not compete, but China had its own coal and soil, and Bin Wong and Philip Huang have proposed alternative formulations that make the situation more complex (Huang 2002; Wong 1997).  They show that Europe lacked a huge lead in resources, and they reaffirm the conventional wisdom that Europe had pulled ahead of China well before the 18th century.  Huang, like Morris (see below), points out that Europe’s sparser population allowed more feeding of and thus use of animals, and so productivity per person was greater.  One must add, here, that productivity per acre was correspondingly less—a real problem.  Europe could export its excess population to the colonies.  Further, Huang shows that the price of labor was low, especially in the 19th century in China.  The vast majority of Chinese lived on a bare subsistence wage.  Starvation was by far the commonest cause of death.  Pomeranz is on very shaky ground in maintaining that China still had parity and a good shot at the brass ring as late as the 18th century. 

It was much easier for Europe to develop economically.  But China could have risen, had it been ready.  Not all areas were poor and densely populated.  Surplus could be, and was, extracted.  Some people were well paid, and levels of living were not abysmal for everyone.  Also, capitalism, science, and technology require a mind-set rather than a rich peasantry.

As noted above, most scholars today would probably accept the conclusion that, while China failed to expand into global sea trade, Europe was forced to expand in that direction, and profited greatly.  Portugal in particular had nowhere to go but out into the Atlantic, and the Dutch too had little option but to take to seafaring.  These nations were, successively, the leaders of long-range voyaging and trade.  The Dutch are sometimes credited with, or accused of, inventing capitalism as a result.  (On all these matters, Wallerstein 1976 remains classic.)  Thus the Europeans became, in Victor Lieberman’s striking and insightful phrase, “white Inner Asians” in their relations with southeast Asia, especially the islands; they came as overwhelming conquerors who appeared out of the blue and swept over the region with devastating effect, like the Mongol hordes (Lieberman 2009:857-894).

China was ahead in maritime matters until the early 1400s, but then turned against government sponsorship of large-scale marine trade and voyaging.  Ming tried to ban sea trade, and Qing fought piracy in ways that damaged the seafaring economy.  Sea trade actually continued, and even flourished, but was largely confined to trade with southeast Asia and other nearby points, and remained largely a trade in luxuries rather than staples—though pottery and other useful goods were exported in industrial quantities.  Ventures did not stop, but the lack of major voyaging gave the west a chance to catch up and then forge ahead, to take a commanding lead by 1500.

China’s turn from world trade after 1420 contrasted with Europe’s dependence on it.  The effects of long-range seafaring and trade on west Europe have been stressed far too often to need repetition here (see e.g. Wallerstein 1976).  It seems clear that world trade forced science and development.  China’s exceedingly active trade with southeast Asia just was not the same thing.  Southeast Asia, always a realm of small trader states, was never a world leader in change or development, though the people are among the most dynamic and enterprising in the world.  Apparently the old southeast Asian states were always land-based and tributary enough, and sufficiently oppressed by bigger empires, to prevent them from taking full advantage of their situation.

A key date with much symbolic significance is 1593.  That was the year of publication of Li Shizhen’s Bencao Gangmu, the climax of Chinese herbal writing and a truly stunning achievement.  But it was also just slightly later than Rembert Dodoens’ Flemish herbal of 1554, which represented a similar breakthrough for herbals in Europe.  Soon after, in 1597, came Gerard’s Herball (1975 [1633], originally written 1597; based heavily on Dodoens), the first great modern herbal in English.   In 1593 there was every reason to believe that Li would stimulate a major breakthrough in Chinese herbal and botanical science, as Dodoens and his colleagues and followers did in Europe.  But Li remained unexcelled.  The Ming Dynasty fell, the Qing showed no interest in advancing the science, and Li is still the standard text in traditional Chinese herbalism.  By contrast, Gerard was almost immediately eclipsed by John Parkinson’s incredible achievement Paradisi in Sole (1976 [1629]), and then by John Ray’s development of taxonomy.  After that botany exploded in the west.  One could tell similar stories about medicine, zoology, geology, nutrition, weaving technology, and other natural sciences.  China lost the spirit at the same time the west got it.

Ming progress was slender enough, but the collapse of Ming seems to have truly blown out a light.  Only medicine slightly breaks the pattern, developing strongly in late Ming and staying dynamic in early Qing (see e.g. Furth 1999; Wu 2010).  Otherwise, in the sciences, the Qing Dynasty republished old works and added to encyclopedias and agricultural manuals, but really did very little creative work.  Recent works on Qing (e.g. Elliott 2009, Rowe 2009) are cautious about explaining this, but recognize the continuing growth of autocracy. They also point out the increasing woes of Qing as population grew, Europeans took over trade and then invaded, and the environment deteriorated.  Under a despotic but floundering government, China was in no position to innovate.

A fateful episode, probably more symptom than cause but still a very significant block on progress, was the Qianlong Emperor’s “literary inquisition.”  Plagued by increasing fears of disloyalty, he launched in the late 18th century a comprehensive attack on the literati.  It is reminiscent of, though far less extensive than, Stalin’s purges in the 1930s and 1940s. 

The inquisition came at the same time as the European Enlightenment.  As the Qianlong Emperor was turning the clock back to autocracy, the west was discovering human rights, democracy, nonviolence, liberation, and free trade.   Steven Pinker (2011) has conclusively shown how extremely transformative the Enlightenment and its values eventually were in the west; slavery was outlawed, wars gradually declined, feuds and duels ended, and eventually even ordinary murder and robbery became less common.  China had long eliminated chattel slavery, had no cult of the duel, and was relatively peaceful in most of Qing, so there was not so much to change.  In China the rise of the middle classes went on peacefully and was rather unproblematic though woefully slow.  In the west, the middle class rose fast, came into conflict with the nobility, and pushed hard for more rights.

One direct effect of Qing’s overextended autocracy was that corruption was rampant, and the victims had little recourse.  The fantastic levels of “squeeze” certainly prove that lack of capital was not China’s limiting problem!  Of course the west, and the rest of the world, did not lack for corruption, but in the west the ill-gotten gains were often invested in trade and industry.  The problem in China was that the spare capital was all going into someone’s pocket, to be spent ultimately on luxuries or on acquiring land.  This bid the price of land up to distressingly high figures, among other things, and thus created yet another wealth sink.  The corrupt officials did not do as America’s robber barons did, and invest their ill-gotten gains in progressive schemes.  (A few in China did, in such areas as irrigation improvement, but not on any scale until well into the 20th century.)  One cannot help noting that today’s American robber barons are investing in luxuries and land….

Finally, while Japan was frantically playing catch-up after 1868, China—with the same opportunities—was caught in a form of political paralysis, following Qing’s near-death experience in the Taiping Rebellion.  The Tongzhi Restoration of 1862 saved the dynasty, but it was dominated thereafter by the wily and foxy but increasingly conservative Empress Dowager Cixi.  China did not, of course, ignore the west.  The treaty ports and other imperialist impositions saw to that.  But such impositions (including, alas, many missionaries) showed the west in its worst light, and rarely led to much beneficial change.  All the revisionist literature cannot stand against the testimony of the Chinese themselves, who in the last decades of Qing were the first to admit that they were falling far behind Japan in adopting western industry, military technology, governmental management, media, educational innovations, and other “modern” developments.

The food economy was increasingly impacted by western technology and imports.  It did not suffer as much or as directly as the iron industry, of which Donald Wagner reports that  “up to about 1700 China had the world’s largest and most efficient iron industry” (Wagner 2008:74) but after 1850 the west flooded China with cheap imports, and ruined the old metal industries.  “It hit hardest precisely in the places where the most technically sophisticated and capital-intensive techniques were in use” (p. 78).  They were the most in need of skills, capital, and markets, and they were most directly competed by high-quality imports. 

Agriculture did not suffer that much, but comparable if less devastating impact occurred.  Then much greater damage was done when the Communists invoked Soviet-style westernization after 1958.  Everything old, whether sophisticated or rough, went down.  The result, with ironworking and agriculture, was that western observers and western-educated Chinese ones developed very low estimations of traditional technology.  They not only had the biases of their training; they had only the bare survivors of the traditional system to observe. This point has not been made for agriculture—we have, rather, F. H. King’s famous and wonderful exposition of the successes and strengths of the traditional system (King 1911).  But Wagner’s generalizations about the iron industry clearly apply to other aspects of technology, including much of agriculture.  This led to widespread ignoring of the successes of the old ways.

 

Europe and Qing Compared

In southern and western Europe, conversely, the coming of Aristotelianism from the Near East (Gaukroger 2006) led to a steady rise in scientific thinking and knowledge collecting.  Stephen Gaukroger thinks the “scientific revolution” of the 1600s was more or less a smooth continuum from this medieval and early Renaissance revolution.  He and other historians have cut the “scientific revolution”  of the 17th century down to size, pointing out that it had long antecedents (Gaukroger 2006; Osler 2010), and that it did not revolutionize everything, either.  Copernicus and Galileo genuinely revolutionized astronomy, Vesalius really changed anatomy, but progress in chemistry and biology was much slower.  Even Newton’s epochal contributions took a long time to be worked out, propagated, and adopted. 

Thus, revisionists now deny the existence of the scientific revolution.  I must respectfully disagree.  It seems to me that without the burst of sea trade and the religious wars, Europe would simply have kept developing slowly along very traditional lines.  The breakthroughs represented by Bacon and Descartes when they advocated experience above received wisdom were real.  They were related to the triumph of observation over tradition in the work of Galileo in astronomy, Harvey in anatomy and physiology, Boyle in chemistry, Sydenham in medicine, and others, including early agricultural and herbalist experts.  What is distinctive about the 17th century “scientific revolution” in Europe is that scholars throughout western Europe, throughout all the scholarly disciplines, kicked over the traces of received wisdom.  They looked with fresh eyes at the enormous masses of data being revealed by exploration and experiment.  Galileo, John Ray, Linnaeus, Boyle, Harvey, and their contemporaries were not only willing to break with tradition, but also—thanks to new instrumentation from microscopes to telescopes—they had the necessary data to do it successfully. 

They then came up with entirely new paradigms—not just new theories—based on that observation.  Francis Bacon and René Descartes were the spokesmen for all this, but not the inventors of it nor the most active in actually doing it. 

The 17th-century revolution was real.  Certainly, it built on a steady increase in knowledge and in original thinking, which came at a time when those were stagnating or decreasing in other areas of the world.  But so does any revolution.

Comparing China’s relatively slow progress with the west’s breakthrough certainly revitalizes the old idea of a “scientific revolution”!  China had the same slow development from traditional ideas through the period from 1200 to 1900.  After 1600, China did not stagnate, and did not ignore western learning; it simply did not match the frenetic pace of Europe in changing basic knowledge.  China did have the advantage of some European science (out-of-date and thin in many cases), thanks to the Jesuit missionaries.  Contrary to frequent western claims, the Chinese welcomed, adopted, and used the more valuable of the Jesuit introductions (Elman 2005).  This makes the problem more thorny; it seems that China could, at any time before 1700, have overtaken and passed the west. 

What really happened, to give an architectural metaphor with some “resonance,” was that the Chinese kept adding bricks to their old structure.  The Europeans tore down their old structure (or most of it) and built a whole new one, from different and superior materials.  We see this in medicine, for instance.  The Han and Tang Dynasty classics not only were still the textbooks in the 1700s, but they still are the textbooks for Chinese traditional medicine in the 21st century!  In medicine, the great Song, Yuan and Ming works are competitive with anything western before 1500 or even 1600, but then the explosion of medical innovation by Vesalius, Sydenham, Harvey and others coincided in time with the final shut-down of Chinese medical innovation.  Not only were there no revolutions, but the Song and Yuan breakthroughs became neglected.

Joseph Needham held in his early work that the eclipse of Daoism by Confucianism was the problem; Daoism was science-oriented and nature-oriented, Confucianism dry and moralistic.  The truth is otherwise.  China’s strong tradition of pragmatic conservation of resources found its home in Confucianism, not Daoism (Anderson 2001).  The Song Confucians were more similar to modern scientists than most Daoists.  Confucianism animated scholars like Song Yingxing and Li Shizhen.  Daoism did indeed represent and encourage Chinese love for nature and desire for unity with it.  It did indeed inspire a great deal of science.  However, it was the creativeness of the Chinese people and the union of the two philosophies (not to speak of other schools, absorbed by the two dominants) that led to the rise and glory of early Chinese science, food, and development. 

Needham wrote that China had equivalents to da Vinci (I assume he was thinking of Tao Hongjing and Shen Gua) but not of Galileo (Needham 2004).  Mark Elvin, in his introduction to Needham’s work, agrees (Elvin 2004b:xlii). China had polymaths, but no one who dramatically smashed a reigning paradigm and established a new and more accurate one.  Of course Galileo did not do that as cleanly and single-handedly as the old-fashioned books of my childhood said, but he did do it, and no one in China did anything comparable until the 19th century.

In chemistry, China had its alchemists but no equivalent to Robert Boyle.  In mining and mineralogy, China had been the leader for centuries, but Agricola’s work eclipsed it.  We have seen that in general technology, Song Yingxing’s Tiangong Kaiwu was similar to a number of contemporary western works, but the latter stimulated more and better, while Song had no followers.  We have also noted that Li Shizhen was ahead of the west in botany in the 1590s, but had already lost the lead by the 1640s.  The list could go on. 

 

Thoughts on Change, 1700-2100 

Marshall Sahlins (1993) said that speculations on why China didn’t develop capitalism when “they came so close” are like the speculations the Fijians might have made when first seeing missionaries explain Holy Communion:  why didn’t they develop true ritual cannibalism when “they came so close”?

Well, fair enough; the west has never been into ritual cannibalism, but it did have human sacrifice as an institution, very widespread from Denmark to Ukraine.  But its disappearance is easily explained:  the western world needed the labor power, and thus ended human sacrifices as cities and farms got large and absorbed more workers.  Forget “evolving morality” as an explanation; we are talking about the civilization that gave us the Inquisition and the African slave trade. 

Richard von Glahn (2003) and Victor Lieberman (2009:2-8) have reviewed a vast number of theories, ranging from the sublime to the ridiculous.  The ridiculous ones are those that essentialize Europe, making it either racially superior or else a homogeneous realm characterized by a single political-economic framework that somehow unites early Renaissance Italy and modern England.  One mentioned by von Glahn, and going back to Marx and earlier, is that Europeans were more ruthless than anyone else.  Anyone who has studied Chinese and Mongol history will have doubts.

Ian Morris (2010) sees largely a geographic determinism (partly following Jared Diamond 1997).  Morris finds in particular that the west had more energy resources, from animal traction to coal (recall Pomeranz’ point, of which Morris is well aware).  Also, the west had more diversity both ethnically and ecologically.  It had more farmland, more different kinds of habitat and thus more different kinds of farming systems, more mines and mineral resources.  It had more opportunities for trade.  The Mediterranean Sea, for instance, was indeed “medi-terranean,” in the midst of the lands, and thus a perfect place to develop trade and shipping; the China Sea was comparable but not enough to be equivalent.  China’s great trade route for most of history was the Silk Road, which did more to lay China open to predatory nomadic raiders than it did for serious trade in staple goods.   

Geography is not destiny; much of Europe never developed, and much of the Mediterranean shorelands were less developed in 1900 than anywhere on the continental shores of the China Sea.  Morris has to admit that China was generally ahead of the west in technical, economic, and scientific progress from about 400 to 900.  (I would see 400 to 1300 as more reasonable, and Morris considerably underestimates the successes of Han, too.)   Morris’ history founders on the rock of his belief that “it was not emperors and intellectuals who made history but millions of lazy, greedy, and frightened people looking for easier, more profitable, and safer ways to do things” (Morris 2010:359).  This is exactly wrong.  Emperors may not matter, but intellectuals and other people who are not at all lazy, greedy, or frightened are the ones that make progress.  Laziness and fear motivate people to crawl in a hole, do as little as possible, and above all change as little as possible.  This is well demonstrated in psychology and in common experience.  Change comes in moments of confidence, hope, and hard work for the group.  Any reasonable history of China proves this, but one may call particular attention to Johanna Smith’s study of charity in Ming, cited above (Smith 2009).

This matters, because if people really created out of laziness and fear, we would see creativity enriched and increased by poverty and insecurity.  As with Boserup’s theory of intensification, this would predict that Haiti would be leading the world; the United States would be the least innovative society.  Obviously, the opposite is true.  The way to get creative, proactive societies is to provide them with the most resources and the best security available.  In history, it was individuals and societies who were on the way up—who were doing well and fully expected to do better if they worked harder—who did the innovating.  (This also explains the purported “industrious revolution” in Europe—if it really happened, which I doubt.)  Max Weber traced the resulting feedback loops long ago.

The question is not explaining why “the west” won.  There was never a time when “the west” won.  The west always consisted, and consists today, of a few winners and a lot of losers.  In the 19th century, China was ahead in every way of much of eastern Europe, and it is today also.  The question is why a fast-moving, fast-changing subset of western polities kept replacing each other as winners.

A much more important point noted by Morris (among others) is the reliance in the west on extensive grazing, which forced the west to expand continually.  I have noted the importance of this above.  The New World was looted by those hungry for gold, but European settlement was largely about finding land to raise livestock, and to a lesser extent grain, sugar and cotton.  China’s agriculture, maximizing land productivity, tended to make people stay where they were, developing their home landscape more and more intensively.  Morris and others have thought the added animal power and meat in the diet mattered, and made that extensive land use worthwhile, but I doubt it; Chinese had plenty of protein from grain and soybeans, and had an intensive cultivation system that made maximal use of a few animals, rather than minimal use of a vast number. 

The scientific revolution was not only restricted to Europe, but to a handful of countries there:  Italy, the German realms, the Low Countries, France, and Britain.  Most obviously, its rise followed the rise of commerce and capitalism, a point not missed by Needham (2004) or others.  It was precisely in those countries that had gone from commerce to seafaring to full capitalism that science developed.  Moreover, countries developed science in the order in which they had achieved the (dubious?) status of capitalism:  Italy first, northwest Europe last.  Needham and most others have made the obvious inference. 

In fact, the great difference was not between “Europe” and “China,” but between the fast–changing trade-based states and the dinosauric tributary empires.  In Europe, this was an old and familiar story.  The Greeks had already told it, comparing themselves with the Persians.  Then the Greeks succumbed, and the Byzantine Empire ossified while Genoa and Venice rose and eventually made mincemeat of the Byzantines.  Then the Ottomans took over Byzantium’s territory, but did little to blast eastern Europe forward; the Ottomans remained more innovative than Byzantium, but hardly a force for rapid change.  Meanwhile, the Hanseatic League and later states in west and central Europe peripheralized the Polish-Lithuanian empire (Wallerstein 1976).  Then France, the Low Countries, and Britain entered the trading stakes in a serious way, reaping the benefits from the increasingly ossified and tribute-based Spanish and Portuguese empires.  The rise and fall of states in Europe, then and since, has always perfectly tracked the difference between small, innovative trading states—and then, later, democratic republics—and the great land-based empires. In fact, the great tributary empires of Europe—Byzantium, Poland, early Russia, and even the Spanish and Portuguese empires in their expansive days—were far less scientific-oriented and progressive than China.

The popular literature is still full of sweeping claims about the innate superiority of “Europeans” or of “Western civilization” from the ancient Greeks onward.  These conveniently overlook the Dark Ages, the Counter-Reformation, and the hapless state of eastern Europe throughout most of history—today included.  I have always wondered why “the west” never seems to include places like Rumania or Russia.  They remained backward as long as China did, if not longer.  Even today, the smaller Balkan and ex-Soviet nations are far behind China, let alone Japan or Singapore, in every respect.  Some, such as Moldova and Byelorus, are behind even the better-off African states on many statistics.  These failed European nations certainly disprove the classic racist and civilizationist arguments! 

By contrast, if the lower Yangzi or the Guangzhou area or central Sichuan were independent countries, they would have been consistently among the richest and most forward-looking ones for the last several hundred years, and they would be today.

The Chinese found it possible to “think outside the box,” but they needed to break out of the box entirely.  Essentializing claims such as Chinese lack of individuality, or slavery to tradition, are wrong.  The Chinese had come up with highly original and individualist philosophies and ideas in the Warring States and Han periods, and to some extent in mid-Tang and Song; why did they not in Qing?  Basically, the reason is that they were constrained by a repressive government that could coopt any fresh new thinkers into its bureaucracy.  The ancient ideas remained powerful and compelling. 

It should be remembered that people do not normally innovate.  Revolutionary new ideas are usually wrong and always disturbing.  People realize this.  They fear change—above all, revolutionary change in basic ideas.  This is especially true if they are aging emperors unsure of their thrones.  But it is true of humans in general, as psychologists have found.  Moreover, Chinese children were raised in a highly traditional educational system, and saw no great reason to challenge it. 

Europe—or, rather, France—adopted Chinese ideas, or what they thought were Chinese ideas, in the 18th century.  Montesquieu, Say, Voltaire, and others idealized China, and introduced such concepts as China’s rule of law (rather than by men), agriculture as the foundation of the state, and many others.  (Ironically, it was the Legalist ideas that inspired these radical critics of European autocracy.)  Of course printing, paper, gunpowder, and other innovations had already had their effect. 

Thus, not only did China fail to beat Europe, not only did it fail even to imitate Europe (before the 19th century), but it even wound up losing its best ideas to Europe.  Europe, not China, profited most from China’s own institutional inventions. “Fortune favors the prepared mind,” and only a mind ready for a new idea will accept it.    The European radical intellectuals needed new ideas about the rule of law and the development of a rationalized bureaucracy.  The European elites did not need Chinese religion or medicine, and found the religion (at least) too challenging to be acceptable.

In so far as China had brilliant, dynamic people anxious to improve the world—such people sprout in every country, and certainly China had many—those people went into religiosity, or arts, or developing more farmland, or government.  They did not create modern science or innovate new political-economic institutions.  The Neo-Confucians in China had the same high ideals and high hopes as the Enlightenment sages of Europe, but felt that hopes could best be realized by going back to the past—or, with Wang Yangming, the most original and driving Confucian thinker of the Ming Dynasty, into mystical escape. 

This shows a critical point.  A regime naturally attracts opposition, and the have-nots generally coalesce behind a particular ideology, as Marx pointed out.  The elites’ position is always quite clear:  We are on top; we want to stay there; therefore we oppose all disruptive change, whether progress or regress.  The have-nots can then take what they feel is the opposite position.  In Marx’ theory, they will simply oppose the haves, and a third, new class will appear between the two and take over.  The feudal lords escaped the master/slave opposition when Rome fell.  The capitalists escaped the feudal lord/peasant and serf opposition.  The proletariat was supposed to take over, led by Communist intellectuals. 

What really happens is that a number of possible ideologies can unite those who are out of power but want to take it.  In Ming, those who were not bandits tended all too often to Wang’s type of escapism.  In Qing, Han chauvinism and scholarly Confucianism fused to produce a different but equally regressive anti-elite ideology.  In the west, increasingly after 1500, the scientific and proto-Enlightenment ideology gained ground steadily, in spite of regressive religious movements.  The latter either went along with the scientific program or were too other-worldly to attract many elites or middle-class people.

The fact that ideology was the final, proximate cause of modernization is shown by the very rapid changes in Japan, Korea, and the Chinese polities once they accepted a western-type ideology that favored moderizing science and production.  They did not even abandon Neo-Confucianism or Buddhism; they simply added western attitudes toward material progress.  The transition happened in only a generation in Japan, and not much longer in Korea.  Economics, military contingencies, and other real-world matters forced the change, but in the end the ideology had to change with them.

The autocratic, backward-looking state created incentive issues. For an upwardly mobile Chinese in imperial times, getting into government service was always a major goal.  Families diversified their portfolios by investing in land, trade, and education for government service, rather than focusing on economic development.  China had large cities but rather few large towns, and the population was scattered and rural, in a vast network of marketing areas.  Myers (Myers and Wang 2002:579) contrasts this with the highly urban-centric (“plexus”) economy of Europe.

Moreover, if they did think outside the box, they had nowhere to go to escape inquisitions like Qianlong’s.  In Europe, an original thinker could flee persecution in his homeland by going to the Netherlands (as Descartes did), or England, or whatever other realm might tolerate him.  In China, one could become a mountain hermit, but there was no other real option.  Japan and Vietnam were regarded as unthinkably barbarous, and if a Chinese thinker did go there he had little opportunity to publish and be read at home. 

Thus, Europe’s geography of small states into which one could easily escape, while keeping contact with friends just over the border, was certainly a factor.  Europe benefited from lack of unity; geography made unification under an autocratic emperor almost impossible (Lieberman, Morris and Pomeranz are among many who have discussed this idea).  It was not for lack of trying.  From the Romans to Napoleon and Hitler, conquerors attempted to unite Europe.  The mountains always got in the way, saving Europe from unity and stagnation.  The European Union might theoretically have ended European progress, but by 2012, it was already showing strains that threatened to dismantle it. 

However, an exactly comparable disunity did not work for southeast Asia (Lieberman 2009).  It was apparently locked in a luxury-trade pattern, supplying unmodified primary products, mostly luxuries, to more developed realms.  It was, in short, a classic periphery (or at best semi-periphery).  It was kept down by the logic of trade.  Traditional rulers drew strength from keeping the system backward; they profited from selling primary products, and were threatened by innovation.  They did try hard to get into the modern world of manufacturing and industry when it came calling, as Lieberman shows, but by then it was too late; they were taken over outright by European powers, or, in the case of Siam (Thailand), forced to do a complex and difficult dance to keep from that fate (Lieberman 2009).  In short, southeast Asia was exactly comparable to eastern Europe in Wallerstein’s model (Wallerstein 1976).  It had all the geographic and cultural advantages, but its position in the military-economic order of the times kept it down.

Conversely, if Japan had been a continent with several conflicting polities, it might have parlayed its rather striking parallels with Europe (see von Glahn 2003) into equally rapid and impressive development.  It too was split by mountains into several different local regions.

Another major component in Europe was religious pluralism.  The Jews were always at the forefront of thought and innovation.  So were the Muslims on the tense frontiers in Syria and Persia, and later in Italy and Spain, in the early medieval period.  Later, certain radical Catholic monastic orders took over some of the function of being dissident innovators.  Then, finally, the Protestant explosion in the 1500s led to both violent and intractable conflict and a whole new way of thinking.  The importance of this for the development of science is well known (Merton 1970; Morton 1981).  Particularly critical was the idea that one could be in a minority and still absolutely right—a bearer of God’s truth.  This led people to argue, defend, and stick to their principles and perceptions, rather than accommodating.  Such arguing over truth began on the Muslim frontiers, driving science there, among both Muslims and Christians.  This suggests a reason why the Jews were among the most important thinkers: they were minorities on both sides. 

The Protestant reformation wrote a whole new book, one in which forward thought, new ideas, and innovative perceptions were argued with dogmatic stubbornness.  It is certainly no accident that so many of the greatest early scientists—including John Ray, Robert Boyle, Rene Descartes, and Baruch Spinoza—were major religious thinkers.  By contrast, the Chinese fondness for accommodating all worldviews into one harmonious bureaucratic order was fatal to sustained argument.  The exceptions prove the rule:  new and exciting currents of thought (such as Song medicine, mathematics, and philosophy) were accepted all too easily, and swallowed up into a vast blur of ideas, where they were diluted into innocuousness rather than sharpened into revolution.

Interestingly and significantly, China remained ahead of the west in agriculture, forestry, nutrition, silk work, and certain other practical fields until rather later.  Chinese nutritional science was ahead of the west’s until the discovery of vitamins around 1900.  Forestry was better in China and Japan than in most of the west until the late 19th century, though a few forests in northwest Europe were at least as well-managed as anything in China.  We must beware of bland stereotypes.  But the fact remains that China did not have a scientific revolution or an Enlightenment until later times.

It should be remembered that science—in the sense of discovering new knowledge—is rarely popular.  In general, people like the familiar and are wary of anything new and different.  In particular, science is notoriously challenging to orthodoxy, not only in religion but in politics, land management, water use, forestry, everything.  Scientists are constantly finding things that are at least embarrassing and often devastating to the interests of big landlords and giant firms.  This was perhaps more true in the Renaissance than at any time before or since, but it is a general finding.  China and the Near East lost their early and commanding lead in science because the elites not only ceased to back it; they actively opposed anything that rocked the boat.  Even today in the United States, there are only a few tens of thousands of research scientists, while 40% of the country actively disbelieves in evolution, while even more disbelieve in global warming.  A large number (some estimates run to 20%) do not even realize the earth circles the sun.  Science is hated, feared and distrusted by the millions that hang on every word of Fox News. 

Now, of course, the importance of trade and commerce is proved by the fact that as the east Asian countries moved into it, they quickly adopted European science and technology, and soon made themselves leaders and innovators in what is now a truly global scientific enterprise.

As they became democratic and trade-based, the small East Asian countries have explosively modernized, become prosperous, and become world leaders in education and science.  Merchants in Hong Kong and Japan held their own from the 19th century onward, and eventually outcompeted the west at its own games.  Slowly, Vietnam is coming on board today.

Even dinosauric China is waking from the Maoist nightmare.  However, it can be confidently predicted on the basis of past experience that China’s hopeful beginnings in science and education will come to a bitter end if repression and corruption continue.  China is developing an even more bureaucratic, dictatorial, and corrupt government than that of Qing.  It is also eating its seed corn:  destroying its resource base and overworking its people.  Also, it is copying the west, not innovating or developing new paradigms. 

 

William Rowe (2009:216-218) lists four main possibilities for China’s failure to industrialize and modernize in the 19th and early 20th centuries:  political failure of will, traditionalism and Confucian scholarly reaction, the high-level equilibrium trap (however phrased), and deliberate Western suppression through colonialism, war, unequal treaties, industrial policies, and general terms of trade.  One may note that these are not mutually exclusive, but, in fact, would be mutually reinforcing if they were all true.

As he points out, the traditionalist argument is probably the weakest.  Confucian traditionalism not only singularly failed to halt the explosive development of Japan in the 19th century and the various Chinese-majority nations in the late 20th; it is actually claimed by the latter as their secret of success.  Singapore, currently by some measures the best-off and best-educated nation in the world, has been explicitly neo-Confucian in policy since its independence.   Japan transitioned from an extremely “traditional” frame of mind to a very modernizing one in a few years in the late 19th century; the change of “mentalité” seems to have been real enough, but did not displace, or even much affect, the basic Buddhist-Confucian character of Japanese culture.  It is now clear that broad religious and philosophical traditions can all accommodate modernization perfectly easily—or they can justify stagnation and reaction.  Even within American Christianity, we have the gap between classic Weberian Protestantism and the extreme reaction and anti-modernity of the fundamentalist sects.  Islam has its range from the educated elite of Lebanon and Turkey to the Taliban of Afghanistan. 

The same could be said for the high-level equilibrium trap.  China was indeed trapped in a biointensive agriculture.  So were France, Denmark, the Netherlands, and, in east Asia, Japan.  Enough said.

Rowe’s book confirms my long-standing opinion that autocratic repression coupled with weak local rule was the main problem.  In fact, it is so overwhelmingly the obvious cause that I cannot help wondering what the debate is about.  The government could not even control bandit gangs, yet it could and did shut down free enquiry.  Autocracy in China vs. relative openness in Europe was already visible in the days of ancient Greece—though China’s Warring States period came close to Greek openness—and more visible by 1200 (Lieberman 2009:2). 

The key here is not so much autocracy per se.  Most modern success stories begin with autocratic governments that aggressively modernized.  This applies not only to east Asia from Japan to Singapore, but also to France, Germany, Sweden, and some other western states (though not England or America).  France in particular got its major and dramatic intellectual and scientific revolution before it had its famous (or infamous) political one.  But even earlier than that was France’s commitment to trade, commerce, and nascent capitalism. The connection of commerce and revolution seemed obvious to contemporaries, whether they liked the changes (as Smith generally did) or hated them (as Edmund Burke did). 

The problem is with huge imperial bureaucracies that have the power to suppress change over vast areas and populations.  There is no case anywhere in the world of an agrarian tributary empire successfully modernizing; the Chinese came fairly close, and so did the Ottomans, but both collapsed when change became really rapid.

Also incompatible with rapid change are weak, incompetent autocracies that are threatened by modernization and change.  They are effective at suppressing, terrorizing and disuniting progressive forces of any sort, but are ineffective at controlling corruption, local violence, or local rapacity.  This was the story of Ming and Qing.  It was a problem with the late Ottoman and Mughal and other empires (Dale 2010; Streusand 2010).  It is the story of Myanmar, Congo and Sudan today.  To some extent it was and is the story in the Old South of the United States.

Such states can even be “democracies,” if the democracy is not backed up by meaningful legal protection for the weak; Indonesia today is one eastern Asian example (though, after the overthrow of Suharto’s fascist regime, even it is economically progressing—somewhat—thanks to what democracy it has). 

A strong, modernizing autocracy can give way easily to a strong, modernizing democracy, as in Korea and Taiwan, but a corrupt, ineffectual autocracy tends to give way to a corrupt, ineffectual “democracy,” as in Indonesia and several post-Soviet states.  What matters is whether the government feels threatened by change and can effectively crush it.  Most autocracies think this way, but the exceptions are striking.  Conversely, even slightly democratic states usually prefer dynamism, but here too there are striking exceptions.

It seems clear to me—though I recognize there can be debate on this—that if Europe had continued on the path to autocracy from 1600 onward (P. Anderson 1974), Europe would have had the same sluggish development as China, if not even more sluggish.  It would have had the same involutional tendencies.  We may point yet again to eastern Europe, ruined by autocracy and by peripheralization (Wallerstein 1976).  The Ottoman Empire, like the Byzantine before it, proves that large tributary empires are hopelessly stagnant, even when they are the heirs of the ancient Greeks.  The fate of the Spanish Empire in the 17th and 18th centuries provides another example.  In short, and this cannot be said often enough, the contrast is not between Europe and Asia but between small, relatively open countries and autocratic empires.  The European exceptionalism (or racism) of authors like Samuel Huntington and David Landes always founders on this rock (Morris 2010).  It simply cannot explain Byzantium and Russia on the one hand or Japan and contemporary Taiwan, South Korea, or Singapore on the other.

Revolution, colonization, the labor movement, and other processes saved the western nations (P. Anderson 1974).  It was a near thing.  It was not automatic.  It would never have happened without the massive injection of wealth from oveseas trade, and probably the advantage of cheap and easily available fuel (such as England’s coal; Morris 2010), but these were not enough.  They did not do much for Spain or Poland, or China.

One further refinement is provided by the failure of southeast Asia to take advantage of its trade centrality and small, diverse states.  Southeast Asia had trading city-states comparable to Venice and Genoa:  Melaka, Aceh, Palembang, and others.  These followed in the footsteps of earlier trading cities from Oc Eo onward.  The great empires of Majapahit and Mataram were trade-based and urban.  But these trading city-states were all run  more or less as the agrarian states were.  Thomas Raffles and other early western observers (Marsden 1966; Raffles 1965—both originally early 19th century)  compared them with Europe in this light, noting the autocratic and closed nature of southeast Asian society as opposed to European openness.  Even allowing for the huge doses of racist and colonialist distortion in these sources, the point is hard to deny after reading them.

Thus, in the end, I personally continue to accept the hoary, time-honored view that China’s autocratic centralism inhibited change, while the ferment and competition of multinational western Europe’s small nations and feuding religions forced change.  The rise of science tracked the rise of capitalism and ran ahead of the rise of Enlightenment politics.  The coincidence here is not “mere” coincidence.  This is why Adam Smith (1910 [1776]) envisioned a fourth age, that of commerce, following the classic Greek ages of hunting-gathering, pastoralism, and farming.

After all, and this book exists to prove the point, China did not refuse to westernize.  During earlier centuries, Central Asian cuisine had penetrated north and especially northwest China, where it is still robustly evident in the cuisine.  Such items as mantou and shaobing recall the centuries of Silk Road contact.  We have seen that mantou comes from the Turkish root mantu, a word found throughout the Turkic languages in various forms (Eren 1999:286; Paul Buell, pers. comm.). Then later, since the mid-sixteenth century, western food crops totally revolutionized China, as shown long ago by Ping-ti Ho (Ho 1955).  Some medical and other influences crept in too.  But they were not addressed by scholars on any major scale.  Ho had to comb local gazetteers for the first mentions of crops, and even then it is clear that many crops had been established for years or decades before making it into the gazetteers, let alone the more elite sources.  But on these matters I defer to those more expert than I (e.g. Elman 2005).

 

 

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Lavely, William, and R. Bin Wong.  1998.  “Revising the Malthusian Narrative:  The Comparative Study of Population Dynamics in Late Imperial China.”  Journal of Asian Studies 57:714-748.

 

Lee, James; Cameron Campbell; Wang Feng.  2002.  “Positive Check or Chinese Checks?”  Journal of Asian Studies 61:591-607.

 

Lee, James, and Wang Feng.  1999.  One Quarter of Humanity:  Malthusian Mythology and Chinese Realities, 1700-2000.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

 

Li Bozhong.  1998.  Agricultural Development in Jiangnan, 1620-1850.  New York:  St. Martin’s Press.

 

—  2003.  “Was There a ‘Fourteenth-Century Turning Point?’”  In The Song-Yuan-Ming Transition in Chinese History, Paul Jakov Smith and Richard von Glahn, eds.  Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Asia Center.  Pp. 135-175.

 

Li, Lillian.  2007.  Fighting Famine in North China:  State, Market, and Environmental Decline, 1690s-1990s.  Stanford:  Stanford University Press.

 

Li, Lillian M., and Alison Dray-Novey.  1999.  “Guarding Beijing’s Food Security in the Qing Dynasty:  State, Market, and Police.”  Journal of Asian Studies 58:992-1032.

 

Lieberman, Victor.  2009.  Strange Parallels:  Southeast Aisa in Global Context, c. 800-1830.  Vol 2: Mainland Mirrors: Europe, Japan, China, South Asia, and the Islands.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

Mallory, Walter H.  1926.  China, Land of Famine.  American Geographical Society, Special Publication No. 6. New York.

 

Marks, Robert.  1998.  Tigers, Rice, Silk, and Silt:  Envronment and Economy in Late Imperial South China.  New York:  Cambridge University Press.

 

Marsden, William.  1966.  A History of Sumatra.  New edn. (orig. ca. 1800).  Oxford:  Oxford University Press.

 

Mazumdar, Sucheta.  1998.  Sugar and Society in China:  Peasants, Technology, and the World Market.  Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press.

 

—  1999.  “The Impact of New World Food Crops on the Diet and Economy of China and India, 1600-1900.”  In Food in Global History, ed. by Raymond Grew.  Boulder, CO:  Westview.

 

McMahon, Daniel.  2009.  “Qing Reconstruction in the Southern Shaanxi Highland.”  Late Imperial China 30:85-118.

 

Menzies, Nicholas.  1994.  Forest and Land Management in Imperial China.  New York:  St. Martin’s.   

 

Merton, Robert K.  1970 [1938].  Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England.  New York:  H. Fertig.  Orig. publ. in Osiris.

 

Millward, James A.  1994.  “A Uyghur Muslim in Qianlong’s Court:  The Meanings of the Fragrant Concubine.”  Journal of Asian Studies 53:427-458.

 

Morris, Ian.  2010.  Why the West Rules—For Now:  The Patterns of History, and What They Reveal about the Future.  New York:  Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

 

Morton, A.  l98l.  History of Botanical Science.  New York:  Academic Press.

 

Myers, Ramon, and Yeh-Chien Wang.  2002.  “Economic Developments, 1644-1800.”  In The Cambridge History of China, vol. 9, part 1, The Ch’ing Dynasty to 1800.”  Willard Peterson (ed.).  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press.  Pp. 563-645.

 

Needham, Joseph.  2004.  Science and Civilisation in China.  Vol. 7, Part II:  General Conclusions and Reflections.  With the Collaboration of Kenneth Girdwood Robinson and Ray Huang (Huang Jen-Yü) and Including Contributions by Them.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press.

 

Osborne, Anne.  1998.  “Economic and Ecological Interactions in the Lower Yangzi Region under the Qing.”  In Sediments of Time:  Environment and Society in Chinese History, Mark Elvin and Liu Ts’ui-Jung (eds.).  Pp. 203-234.

 

Osler, Margaret J.  2010.  Reconfiguring the World:  Nature, God and Human Understanding from the Middle Ages to Early Modern Europe.  Baltimore, MD:  Johns Hopkins University Press.

 

Parkinson, John.  1976 (1629).  A Garden of Pleasant Flowers:  Paradisi in Sole, Paradisus Terrestris.  New York:  Dover.

 

Perdue, Peter.  2005.  China Marches West:  The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia.  Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press.

 

Perry, Elizabeth.  1981.  Shantung Rebellion:  The Wang Lun Uprising of 1774.  New Haven:  Yale University Press.

 

Peterson, Willard (ed.).  2002.  The Cambridge History of China, vol. 9, part 1, The Ch’ing Dynasty to 1800.   Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press. 

 

Pinker, Stephen.  2011.  The Better Angels of Our Nature:  Why Violence Has Declined.  New York:  Viking.

 

Pomeranz, Kenneth.  2000.  The Great Divergence:  China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy.  Princeton:  Princeton University Press.

 

—  2002.  “Beyond the East-West Binary:  Resituating Development Paths in the Eighteenth-Century World.”  Juornal of Asian Studies 61:539-590.

 

—  2010.   “Calamities without Collapse:  Environment, Economy, and Society in China, ca. 1800-1949.”  In Questioning Collapse:  Human Resilience, Ecological Vulnerability, and the Aftermath of Empire, Patricia A. McAnany and Norman Yoffee, eds.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press.  Pp. 71-110.

 

Raffles, Thomas Stamford.  1965.  The History of Java.  New edn. (orig. ca. 1820).  Oxford: Oxford University Press. 

 

Rosner, Erhard.  1999.  “Regional Food Cultures in China.”  Paper, Sixth Symposium on Chinese Dietary Culture, Fuzhou.

 

Rowe, William.  1984.  Hankow:  Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796-1889.

 

— 1989.  Hankow:  Conflict and Commerce in a Chinese city, 1796-1895.  Stanford:  Stanford University Press.

 

—  2002.  “Social Stability and Social Change.”  In The Cambridge History of China, vol. 9, part 1, The Ch’ing Dynasty to 1800.”  Willard Peterson (ed.).  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press.  Pp. 473-562.

 

—  2009.  China’s Last Empire:  The Great Qing.  Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press.

 

—  2011.  “The Significance of the Qianlong-Jiaqing Transition in Qing History.”  Late Imperial China 32:74-88.

 

Ruddle, Kenneth, and Gongfu Zhong.  1988.  Integrated Agriculture-Aquaculture in South China:  The Dike-Pond System of the Zhujiang Delta.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press.

 

Sahlins, Marshall.  1993.  Waiting for Foucault, Still.  Chicago:  Prickly Paradigm Press. 

 

Schmidt, J. D.  2003.  Harmony Garden:  The Life, Literary Criticism and Poetry of Yuan Mei, 1716-1798.  New York:  Curzon Press.

 

Schoppa, Keith.  2002.  Song Full of Tears:  Nine Centuries of Chinese Life around Xiang Lake.  Boulder:  Westview.

 

Seaton, J. P.  1997.  I Don’t Bow to Buddhas:  Selected Poems of Yuan Mei.  Port Townsend, WA:  Copper Canyon Press.

 

Shao, Qin.  1998.  “Tempest over Teapots: The Vilification of Teahouse Culture in Early Republican China.”  Journal of Asian Studies 57:1009-1041.

 

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Smith, Joanna Handlin.  2009.  The Art of Doing Good: Charity in Late Ming China.  Berkeley:  University of California Press. 

 

So, Yan-kit.  1986.  A Study of Yuan Mei’s Iced Bean Curd.  In Cookery:  Science, Lore and Books (Oxford Symposium on Food and Cookery for 1984 and 1985), ed. by Alan Davidson.  Pp. 52-54.

 

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—  1997.  From History to Allegory:  Surviving Famine in the Xingshi Yinyuan Zhuan.”  Chinese Culture.

 

Zhang Jiayan.  2006.  “Water Calamities and Dike Management in the Jianghan Plain in the Qing and the Republic.”  Late Imperial China 27:66-108.

 

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Anthropology was Not All White Males: Early Ethnographies by Women and Persons of Color

Monday, January 9th, 2012

 

The Antilist

Fifty early anthropological works by women and Indigenous, minority, and other non-white-male anthropologists

compiled by E. N. Anderson

 

The purpose of this list is to make it clear that early anthropology was absolutely not a white male preserve or an enterprise confined to some sort of colonial elite.  It was very much a science of the “others”–women, immigrants, ethnic minorities.

This list is confined to early works by women and by Indigenous and minority anthropologists.  I have tried to confine my attention to works written and published before 1950.  In several cases, though, I include books based on early research but not published until later (e.g. Weltfish 1965).  After 1950, the number of women and Indigenous or minority anthropologists becomes far too large to be confined in a list like this.  Special mention should be made of Mary Douglas, whose work began before 1950 but properly belongs to a later period (her first major publication was 1963).

Far from having to scrounge to find material, I generated this list in an hour or so (acknowledgements to Patrick Walton for some suggestions).  The problem was limiting the list to manageable size.

I also let my own biases run rampant here–it’s all ethnography and mostlyNorth America.  If you want to find equivalent materials in other fields of anthropology, go to it.  There is no shortage of material!

I have had to exclude archaeology (apologies to Dorothy Garrod, Kathleen Kenyon…), non-English sources (apologies to Germaine Dieterlen, G. Calame-Griaule, Maria Montessori…), and references to people who did wonderful work, published some, but never got out a major book of wide importance (apologies to Lucy Freeland, Anna Gayton, Arthur and Ely Parker [Morgan’s informants]…).  Saddest of all is a need to exclude nonwhite “informants,” often the actual authors of major works, who made valuable contributions but did not have actual anthropological or ethnographic training or formal publication venues.  Some did eventually get the author credit they deserved, such as Black Elk, Fernando Librado Kitsepawit, and Tom Sayach’apis.  It should be remembered that early anthropologists published vast amounts of actual texts recorded from such informants.

Even today, too few anthropologists give author credit to their coworkers in the field.  There are, however, many important and worthy exceptions.  See e.g. Birds of My Kalam Country by Ian Saem Majnep (Auckland: Auckland Univ. Press, 1977), Native Ethnography by Russell Bernard and Jesus Salinas Pedraza (Newbury Park: Sage, 1989), and my own Animals and the Maya in Southeast Mexico by E. N. Anderson and Felix Medina Tzuc.

Sometimes, early collections of texts have been redone and reissued recently as literature rather than as a supplement to an ethnography; see e.g. Hanc’ibeyjim, ed./tr. William Shipley, The Maidu Indian Myths and Stories of Hanc’ibyjim (Berkeley: Heyday Books, 1991), which consists of myths and tales recorded by Roland Dixon in 1902-03.

It is often claimed today that the dominance of “white males” in early anthropology means that it was some sort of Establishment field.  This claim is made in ignorance not only of the materials in this list, but also in ignorance of the fact that being a “white male” was no guarantee of privileged status in early 20th century America and England.  Anti-Semitism and anti-immigrant feelings were rampant and extreme.  If one was a Jewish immigrant inAmerica like Franz Boas or Edward Sapir, or a Jew inEurope like Emile Durkheim, one did not have an automatic easy time.  InAmerica, many of the early anthropologists were Jewish and/or immigrants or children thereof.  Consider also Malinowski, the Polish immigrant toEngland.  When impeccably White Establishment figures did get involved in anthropology, they were often rebels and radicals (e.g. Elsie Clews Parsons).

 

Some might argue that few of the following made major contributions to theory–though of course this is not true of Benedict, Mead, Paredes, or some of the others.  However, all actually made highly important contributions to ethnography–the theory, art, and science of providing adequate or useful descriptions of cultures.  In this age, that major achievement is too often ignored.  In that area, Bunzel, Fletcher, Hewitt, La Flesche, Stevenson, and many of the others below made pathbreaking contributions ranking with those of the Greats (Morgan, Boas, Cushing, Powell, etc.).  Further, some of the later writers below, like O’Neale and Powdermaker, were pathbreakers in areas only now becoming recognized as important.   One must conclude, alas, that these contributions were neglected because of sexism and racism.  I keep hoping this list will correct some of that.

 

15 particularly worthwhile sources are starred below.

 

Benedict, Ruth

**1923  The Concept of the Guardian Spirit inNorth America.  American Anthropological Assn., Memoirs, 29.  Classic work of great theoretical importance.  Deserves to be resurrected.

**The Chrysanthemum and the Sword.

This classic work is still current.  There is a huge literature on it inJapan.

The above two works are less well known than Patterns of Culture (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1934) but are very much better.

 

Beynon, William

Barbeau, Marius, and William Beynon (collectors); John Cove and George MacDonald (eds.).  1987 (re-editing of material collected and originally published in the early 20th century).  Tsimshian Narratives. Canada,Museum ofCivilization, Mercury Series, #3.  In spite of the multiple authorship, this is Beynon’s book.  He was a Tsimshian chief (with a white father—but the Tsimshian inherit matrilineally), trained in ethnography by Marius Barbeau.  The collecting and information on the stories was basically Beynon’s work.  This is one of the greatest of all the old-time text collections.

 

Blackwood, Beatrice

1935  Both Sides of Buka Passage. Oxford:OxfordUniv.Press.  Classic ethnography of aSolomon Islandssociety.

Buck, Peter (Te Rangi Hiroa)

1959  Vikings of the Pacific. Chicago:Univ.ofChicago.  This book summarizes his work throughoutPolynesiain the 1930s and 1940s.  Buck, an indefatigable ethnographer who produced many standard accounts of Polynesian groups, was part New Zealand Maori.  Though not raised in a particularly traditional manner, he took his background very seriously.

Bunzel, Ruth

**1929  ThePuebloPotter. New York:ColumbiaUniv.Press.  One of the first books to look seriously at women’s work as creative and culturally important.

See also 1992  Zuni Ceremonialism.  Recently reissued byUniv.ofNew Mexico Press; orig. 1930s.

One of the more important early ethnographers.  Her works are classics in their fields.  Several of her important works came out after 1950 (e.g. Chichicastenango, a Guatemalan Village, American Ethnological Society, 1952).

 

Busia, K. A.

1958  The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System ofAshanti. London:OxfordUniv.Press for International African Institute.

Busia went on to become president of his nativeGhana.

Colson, Elizabeth

1953 (but work and most writing done before 1950).  The Makah Indians. Minneapolis:Univ.ofMinnesota.

Colson went on to a distinguished career as an Africanist.  Her earlier work on the Makah of the Olympic Peninsula is of interest here not only for the early date but for its value as one of the first ethnographies to deal seriously with education and with modern cultural realities (as opposed to “the ethnographic present”).

 

de Laguna, Frederica

1972  Under Mount Saint Elias.  Smithsonian Institution, Contributions to Anthropology, #7.

The most important work by one of the leading figures in North American ethnography.  Late date, but much of the research for it was done before 1950, and she was publishing long before.

Deloria, Ella

1932  Dakota Texts.  Papers of the American Ethnological Society, 14.  Vine Deloria’s aunt; a Boas student.

 

Dozier, Edward

1954  The Hopi-Tewa ofArizona.Univ.ofCaliforniaPublications in American Archaeology and Ethnology, 44, pp. 259-376.  Classic ethnography of Dozier’s own people.

 

Drake, St. Clair

**1945  Black Metropolis. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.

Pathbreaking ethnography by an African-American social scientist.

Dube, S. C.

1955 IndianVillage. Ithaca:CornellUniv.Press.

One of the founders of anthropology inIndia.

 

Fei Hsiao-tung

**1939  Peasant Life inChina. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

In the interests of space, I list only the most famous of Fei’s many major contributions to anthropology.

 

Fletcher, Alice, and La Flesche, Francis

1911  TheOmahaTribe.  Bureau of American Ethnology, Annual Report XXVII (for 1906).  This great classic–sometimes called the greatest ethnography of all time–is only one (though the most important) of a number of works on theOmahaand their relatives by this brilliant and intrepid team.  La Flesche was anOmahahimself (like most early Native American ethnographers, he was part White, but raised as a Native person.  See under La Flesche, below).

On Fletcher, a paradoxical and deep individual, see the excellent biography by Joan Marks: A Stranger in Her Native Land (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1988).

Frazier,E. Franklin

**1962  Black Bourgeoisie. Ithaca:CornellUniv.Press.  2nd edn (first was before 1950).  Classic ethnography; Frazier, a Black sociologist, was writing in theChicagotradition of ethnographic sociology.

 

Garfield, Viola

1939  Tsimshian Clan and Societey. Univ.ofWashingtonPublications in Anthropology, 7, pp. 167-349.

Gunther, Erna

1945  Ethnobotany ofWestern Washington. Univ.ofWashingtonPubls. in Anthropology, Vol. X, #1.  Still in print.

Hewitt, J. N. B.

1903  Iroquoian Cosmology.  Bureau of American Ethnology, Annual Report for 1899-1900 (vol. 21).  This mammoth work is the main achievement of one of the first Native Americans trained in anthropology.  It is also, by a very slight margin, the first major ethnography by a Native American.  Hewitt was a Seneca Iroquois whose long and distinguished service at the BAE involved a great deal of editing, linguistic work, referencing, etc.  See also:  Seneca Fiction, Leegends and Myths, collected by Jeremiah Curtin and J. N. B. Hewitt, ed. by Hewitt; BAE-AR 32 for 1910-11, issued in 1918.

 

Hsu, F. L. K.

1948  Under the Ancestors’ Shadow. New York:ColumbiaUniv.Press.

Classic ethnography of a village inYunnan.  Hsu went on to become a major figure in the culture-and-personality field.

 

Hunt, George

Franz Boas with George Hunt.  1921.  Ethnology of the Kwakiutl.  Bureau of American Ethnology, Annual Report 35.

Listed as by “Franz Boas,” this incredible achievement is actually by George Hunt, a half-Scottish, half-Tlingit man raised among the Kwakwaka’wakw (“Kwakiutl”).  He was trained by Boas and wrote in response to Boas’ questions and queries; Boas edited the result.  The Hunt family is still important and still producing artists and ethnographers.

 

Hurston, Zora Neale

**1978 (reissue of 1935 work)  Mules and Men. Bloomington:IndianaUniv.Press.

Now well known as an African-American writer, Hurston was trained in folklore studies by Boas.  This book is the main result of her researches.  It has become something of a classic.  It is somewhat fictionalized–she made it more interesting by casting herself as the heroine of several of the stories she collected!  Her classic novel Their Eyes Were Watching God also shows the Boas influence.

 

Iyer, Diwan Bahadur, and L. K. Ananthakrishna.  1935.  TheMysoreTries and Castes.  4 vols. (2-4 completed by H. V. Nanjundayya).  Classic survey.  There are other early ethnographic surveys by British-trained Indian researchers; forMysore, the gazetteer of 1926, edited by C. H. Rao.

 

Jones, William

1939  Ethnography of the Fox Indians.  Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 125.  Jones was part Fox and was raised among the Fox.  He gave his life for the cause; while conducting ethnographic research among Philippine headhunters, he had his head collected.  This book was published posthumously.

Kelly, Isabel

Kelly, Isabel, and Angel Palerm.  1950.  The Tajin Totonac. Washington: Smithsonian Insitution,InstituteofSocial Anthropology, Publication 13.

Kelly also did important research on the Paiute of theGreat Basin.

 

Kenyatta, Jomo

**1938  FacingMount Kenya. London: Secker and Warburg.

Malinowski’s star student found better ways to make himself useful than continuing a career in anthropology, but he did produce this work–perhaps more “consciousness raising” for his people than objective ethnography, but still a wonderful “insider’s view.”

La Flesche, Francis

1921-30  The Osage Tribe.  Bureau of American Ethnology, Annual Reports, 36:35-604; 39, 31-630; 43, 23-164; 45, 529-833.

Incredible achievement by one of the best ethnographers of all time.

1963  The Middle Five. Madison:Univ.ofWisconsin(new edn.; original pub. y Small, Maynard and Co. inBostonin 1900).  Autobiographical narrative by one of the best of the early Native American ethnographers.

 

Laird, Carobeth

1976  The Chemehuevis.  Banning:MalkiMuseumPress.

1984  Mirror and Pattern.  Banning:MalkiMuseumPress.

Carobeth Laird was, briefly, the wife of John Peabody Harrington.  An incomparable field worker, she did not publish under her own name until sought out by Harry Lawton of theUniversityofCcalifornia,Riverside.  She then produced several superb books, including autobiographical ones as well as the above ethnographic classics.  Though late in date, these report pre-1950 research.

Marriott, Alice

1945  The Ten Grandmothers. Norman:Univ.ofOklahoma.  Classic account of Kiowa women (one of the first studies to focus on women).

1948  Maria, the Potter of San Ildefonso. Norman:Univ.ofOklahoma.  Probably the first ethnographic work to focus on the accomplishments of a woman in a traditional small-scale community.

 

Mead, Margaret

**1938-   The Mountain Arapesh. AmericanMuseumof Natural History, Anthropological Papers, vol. 36, part 3; 37:3; 40:3; 41:3.

Margaret Mead is too well known to need introduction or much referencing.  She wrote a number of other important works before 1950, contributing a great deal to ethnological theory (she more or less invented what is now called gender theory).

Murie, James

1981  Ceremonies of the Pawnee. Washington: Smithsonian Institution, Contributions to Anthropology #21.  Originally written early 20th century, but unpublished.  Murie was another protege of Alice Fletcher, with whom he collaborated on the classic account The Hako: A Pawnee Ceremony (BAE-AR 22, for 1900-01, issued 1904).

 

O’Neale, Lila

**1932  Yurok-Karok Basket Weavers. Univ.ofCaliforniaPublications in American Archaeology and Ethnology, 13, pp. 1-155.

This little gem was one of the first anthropological studies to take “tribal-society” women and their artistic work really seriously.  It is well ahead of many or most works on that issue done today.  One finds it somewhat difficult to believe it was written more than 60 years ago.

Paredes, Americo

**1958  With His Pistol in His Hand. Austin:Univ.ofTexas

I’m bending it a bit on both the date and the “nonwhite” status of this Texas Chicano, but it isn’t every day that a technical anthropological monograph becomes a major Hollywood film (“The Ballad of Gregorio Cortez”).  Anyway, it’s a superior book and a particularly early example of a serious Mexican-American approach.  Paredes, one of the great teachers and folklorists, recently passed; his tradition continues in the work of José Limón and others.

 

Parsons, Elsie Clews

1936  Mitla, Town of the Souls. Chicago:Univ.ofChicagoPress.

1939 PuebloIndian Religion. Chicago

Parsons, Elsie Clews, and Esther Goldfrank.  1962.  Isleta Paintings. Washington,DC: Smithsonian Institution.  Two leading women anthropologists in collaboration.

Elsie Clews Parsons was one of the larger-than-life figures of early anthropology.  Tough, savvy, and radical to the core, she was a leading feminist, pacifist, civil rights agitator and sometime socialist.  She also married money, and used her fortune to fund anthropology.  See A Woman’s Quest for Science by Peter Hare (New York: Prometheus Books, 1985), an affectionate portrait by a relative rather than a detached historical study; it quotes great amounts of personal material.

Phinney, Archie

1934  Nez Perce Texts. ColumbiaUniv.Contributions to Anthropology, 25.  Another Boas student, Phinney was Nez Perce, and collected most of these tales from his grandmother.

Powdermaker, Hortense

1939  After Freedom: A Cultural Study of theDeep South. New York: Viking.

1950 Hollywood, the Dream Factory. Boston: Little, Brown & Co.

1933  Life in Lesu. New York: Norton.

An important theorist, explorer of new fields of research, and student of Boas.  “After Freedom,” a study of a Black community inLouisiana, was part of a wave of studies of African Americans in the 1930s (see Frazier, above).  The “Hollywood” book anticipates modern “cultural studies” and does a better job than most of the latter.  She produced several important works after 1950, also.

Rasmussen, Knut

1927  Across ArcticAmerica. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons.

**1929  Intellectual Culture of the Iglulik Eskimos.  Reports of the Fifth Thule Expedition, vol. 7, part 1.

Rasmussen was the son of a Danish father and a Greenland Eskimo mother; he was raised as an Eskimo.  Probably the most traditional in upbringing of any of the “third world/fourth world” ethnographers, he may well also have been the greatest.  His work is unsurpassed, for sheer ethnographic quality, by any anthropologist of any origin.

Reichard, Gladys

**1950  Navaho Religion. New York:ColumbiaUniv.Press.

Space permits listing only the greatest of Reichard’s countless contributions.  This book was of major theoretical importance in its time, and remains unsurpassed—though now out of date in approach, etc.—as an account of the subject.  (It is to be found in many a Navaho home today.  Anthropologists asking Navaho about their religion are often directed to this book.)

 

Richards, Audrey

**1948  Hunger and Work in a Savage Tribe. Glencoe,IL: Free Press.

Classic account.  Richards founded the field of nutritional anthropology, and her studies have never been surpassed.  A “high-born British lady,” she was happy in the wildest and most difficult “bush.”

 

Spott, Robert

Spott, Robert, and A. L. Kroeber.  1942.  Yurok Narratives. Univ.ofCalif.Publications in American Archaeology and Ethnology, vol. 35, #9, pp. 143-256.

Spott, a traditional Yurok from northwestern California, was trained as an ethnographer by Kroeber and became an excellent researcher.  (For an interesting comparison piece, see To the American Indian by Lucy Thompson [Berkeley: Heyday Books, 1991], the autobiography of a Yurok woman.  It originally appeared in 1916.)

 

Stevenson, Matilda Coxe

1904  The Zuni Indians.  Bureau of American Ethnology, Annual Report 23.  Classic ethnography.  Stevenson is famous for her feuds with the Zuni, and with Frank Cushing, who identified with them strongly.  She still managed to collect a formidable amount of information on them.  She was so outraged at sexism in academia that she organized a Woman’s Anthropological Society of America in 1885.  (And you thought nobody did things like that till the 1970s!)

Underhill,Ruth

1946  Papago Indian Religion. New York:ColumbiaUniv.Press.

Weltfish, Gene

**1965  The Lost Universe. New York: Basic Books.

A study of the Pawnee.  One of the finest ethnographies of the Boasian tradition.

 

Wheeler-Voegelin, Erminie

1938  Tubatulabal Ethnography. Univ.ofCaliforniaAnthropological Records #2.

 

Yang, Martin

1945  AChineseVillage: Taitou,ShantungProvince. New York:ColumbiaUniv.Press.

 

Important Dates in the History of Anthropology

Monday, January 9th, 2012

Dates Worth Contemplating

 

5th century BC  Socrates, Plato, Herodotus, Thucydides; Herodotus provides brief ethnographies ofEgypt,Scythia, etc., and launches cultural relativity with an ironic story about Greeks confronting endocannibalism

 

4th  Aristotle; Chinese social theory launched by Mencius, Shang Yang, Shen Pu-hai and others

 

3rd  Xunzi, Han Feizi, Dao De Jing.  Major social thought that fed into Western social thought from the 17th century

 

98 AD  Germania by Tacitus (ca. 55-ca. 120); the first “ethnography” and very much the inspirer of the tradition

 

14th century AD   Ibn Khaldun, Tunisian theorist of cycles and systems

 

early 1500s  Europeans in New World and elsewhere, and English inIreland, develop modern colonialism and imperialism

 

1542  Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies, by Bartolome de Las Casas (1484-1576); full-out attack on the extermination of the Native Americans by Spanish colonialism; first work of its kind

1580 (approx.)   “Of Cannibals” by Montaigne (1533-1592); highly sympathetic treatment, launches idea of cultural relativity

 

1590  Death of Bernardino de Sahagun, whose Codex Florentinus, using “native” accounts to construct a full-length ethnography, was finished around 1580

 

1596-1650  René Descartes; argued for empirical experimental science and for natural laws; with Francis Bacon, critical for invention of “science” as we know it

 

1651  Leviathan, by Thomas Hobbes; “the life of man in his natural state is poore, solitary, nasty, brutish and short”

 

1690  Essay Concerning Human Understanding, by John Locke (1632-1704)

1718  Society of Antiquaries founded inLondon(after informally meeting since 1706); classical antiquities and some ethnography

 

1748, Spirit of Laws, by Baron Montesquieu (1689-1755); first serious use of worldwide ethnographic comparison to establish social theory; draws heavily on Chinese sources.  Also,

Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding (David Hume, 1711-76; it’s redone from the Treatise of Human Nature, 1739-40).

 

1712-1778  J.-J. Rousseau; major writings relevant to anthro in 1750s; lifelong critic of European society; far from idealizing the “noble savage” (he never used the phrase), he had some perceptive things to say about apes and humans, anticipating Darwinin some things. 1762, his Du Contrat Social critiques Hobbes and Locke and adds much (including a lot of healthy cynicism) on how society really works.

 

Ca. 1750  Word “civilisation” coined inFrance; popularized by Mirabeau.

 

Ca. 1770  “Ethnologie,” “ethnologisch” and “Völkerkunde” coined by August Schlözer atUniv. of Göttingen,Germany.

 

1772, Ernst Platner:  New Anthropology for Doctors and Philosophers:  With Special Consideration to Physiology, Pathology, Moral Philosophy, and Aesthetics.  Early if minor work about “anthropology.”

1775, Blumenbach’s Treatises on Anthropology (Eng edition; of the original editions, the Latin of 1770 is important)

 

1776  Wealth of Nations (Adam Smith, 1723-1790)

 

1786  William Jones, inCalcutta, reads paper presenting evidence that Sanskrit is related to European languages; Indo-European is born.  Meanwhile, inRussia, P. Pallas begins publishing his Comparative Vocabularies of the World’s Languages.  Comparative philology (and, thus, scientific linguistics) can be said to date from this year.

 

1788  Antropologie ou science générale de l’homme by Alexandre-César Chavannes; first book to use the word in the title.  Inconsequential, however, and the word did not really get going until:

 

1798,  Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, by Immanuel Kant, introduces the word “anthropology” to mainstream discourse.  The book was perhaps closer to sociology or social psychology (both fields that trace directly to Kant) than to modern anthro, but is in the direct ancestral lineage of all three.  Some brilliant insights and good political commentary, but also, alas, all too much evidence that Kant was a man of his time in re sexism and racism.  Still worth reading for the insights.

1798, also, and very significantly, Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834), Essay upon the Principle of Population.  This was the bleak book that made “Malthusianism” a bad word and got political economy called “the dismal science.”  The sixth edition, 1826, was considerably less bleak.

1806, Rasmus Nyerup’s call for a Danish museum of antiquities; under Nyerup, Thomsen, etc. this museum really developed scientific archaeology

 

1813  Researches into the Physical History of Man (1st edn), by James C. Prichard.

Vedel-Simonsen inDenmarkproposes Stone-Bronze-Iron Ages sequence.

1821  Champollion deciphers the Rosetta Stone

 

1830-33, Principles of Geology by Charles Lyell; establishes concepts of uniformitarianism, stratigraphy, and the very long time scale for the earth and its development.

 

1835  Henry Rawlinson copies cuneiform texts; translates the Persian, pub. 1838; deciphers Babylonian by 1851

1836  C. J. Thomsen, Guide to Northern Antiquities, establishes the sequence Stone, Bronze and Iron ages.  (Work extended by J. Worsaae, his student, in 1850s.)

 

1836-38, J. Boucher de Perthes identifies stone tools contemporaneous with extinct megafauna in the Pleistocene; as he put it, “Practical people came to look…they did not suspect my good faith, but they doubted my common sense.”  (Quoted in Lowie, History of Ethnological Theory, p. 7.)  Widespread acceptance came in the 1850s.

1837  Founding of Aborigines Protection Society (the early equivalent of today’s Cultural Survival),England

 

1839  Founding of Societe Ethnologique de Paris

 

1841, Incidents of Travel in Central America, Chiapas and Yucatan by John L. Stephens (1805-1852); his Incidents of Travel in Yucatan, 1843.

1842  Founding of American Ethnological Society, with Albert Gallatin (1761-1849, Swiss-born) as first president; H. R. Schoolcraft, H. Hale, etc.

1843  Founding of Ethnological Society of London, as a spinoff from the Anti-Slavery League and influenced by the Aborigines Protection Society

 

1846-48  Potato blight and bad weather cause famine acrossEurope.  This coincides with the early peak of socialism and nationalism as ideologies, leading to a rash of revolutions and to new heights of social thought.

 

1847, Broca begins his physical anthropology work (most active publishing, 1870s)

Austen Henry Layard’s Nineveh and Its Remains reports early Mesopotamian archaeology; sells 8000 copies in the year, “which,” Layard wrote, “will place it side by side with Mrs. Rundell’s Cookery”–the Julia Child of the 19th century

 

1848  Karl Marx and F. Engels, Communist Manifesto.

John Stuart Mill’s Principles of Political Economy.

Gallatin publishes his final work on American Indian languages in long introduction to Horatio Hale’s book Indians of North-West America; scientific linguistics firmly established in America.

1850  Social Statics, first book by Herbert Spencer (1820-1903); steady and active publisher thereafter; particularly influential in 1860-1885 period.  Spencer, notDarwin, gave us “social Darwinism,” which, as various people have pointed out, should be called “social Spencerism.”

 

1851, League of the Ho-de-no-sau-nee or Iroquois (Lewis Henry Morgan: 1818-81).

Auguste Comte’s Systeme de Politique Positive (1851-54); his Cours de Philosophie Positive was 1830-42. (Auguste Comte, “father of sociology,” was yet another neo-Kantian; he lived 1798-1857).

 

1854, Rise of pseudo-scientific racism with A. de Gobineau’s Essai sur l’inegalité des races humaines.  Nott and Glidden, American racists, wrote similar books in 1854 and 1857.

 

1856 (excavated), 1857 (studied): First Neanderthal to be recognized as an early human (by T. H. Huxley and others)

 

1858, Darwin and Wallace jointly publish the theory of evolution through natural selection

William Pengelly invents stratigraphy in excavation, using natural strata in excavatingBrixhamCave

1859, Origin of Species, by Charles Darwin.

Beginning of paleolithic archaeology: J. Prestwich begins publishing; Boucher de Perthes and others meet inFrance, recognize that the material soon called “paleolithic” is very early in date; Charles Lyell formally announces this inEngland.  The fact that this andDarwin’s publication occurred in the same year is no mere coincidence.

1860  Thomas Henry Huxley debates Samuel Wilberforce atOxfordand soundly defeats him, establishing evolution as a formidable foe of traditional religious creationism.  (Huxley was called “Darwin’s bulldog,” since the retiringDarwinhated debates.  Huxley also coined the word “agnostic” to describe his religious attitudes.)

Britainis reading Dickens, Carlyle, Macaulay….

 

1861, Ancient Law by Henry Maine; holds that patriarchy was the original form of social organization among Classical European peoples (but NOT everywhere)

Das Mutterrecht by J. Bachofen; holds that matriarchy was the original form everywhere.

 

1863  Evidence as to Man’s Place in Nature, by Thomas Henry Huxley

 

1864, Fustel de Coulange’s Cité antique, social study of Greek and Roman cities

 

1865, J. McLennan’s Primitive Marriage (much expanded into Studies in Ancient History, 1876); puts the real spin on the matriarchy theory, and introduces much of the modern terminology for marriage studies, including “exogamy” and “endogamy”

J. Lubbock’s Pre-Historic Times; 2edn 1872.

1867, first volume of Marx’ Capital (last vol. published posthumously in 1894; Marx lived 1818-83)

 

1868, Museum für Völkerkunde opens inBerlin; the great neo-Kantian liberal and ethnologist, Adolf Bastian, director.

L. H. Morgan, The American Beaver and His Works, published.  (On top of inventing modern anthropology, Morgan essentially invented animal behavior studies and the whole idea of comparing animal to human society and behavioral complexity.)

 

1869, Bastian and Rudolf Virchow establish the Berlin Society for Anthropology, Ethnology, and Prehistory, and start the journal Zeitschrift für Ethnologie, still a major journal last I looked.

 

1869-70  “The Worship of Animals and Plants,” article in the Fortnightly Review by J. McLennan, introduces the theory of totemism

 

1871, Morgan’s Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity (introduces the anthropological concepts of kinship “systems” and of “social organization”).

Darwin’s Descent of Man.

Edward Burnett Tylor’s (1832-1917), Primitive Culture, the book that launched the modern use of the word “culture.”   That definition is still used.  The book was standard inEngland for decades.  Tylor later became the first anthropology professor atOxford.

Anthropological Institute ofGreat BritainandIrelandestablished; name coined by Huxley.  Later became the Royal A. I.

J. O. Dorsey begins work on Cegiha (Omahalanguage); arguably the first thorough anthropological-linguistic field research.

H. Schliemann begins work atTroy, working there and nearby till his death in 1890; over the years, his assistant Doerpfeld develops techniques of stratigraphy and other modern archaeological methods.

Talk about the Axial Year…!

 

1870-1900  Golden age of imperialism; US Indian Wars (peak in 1870s), “Great Game” in Central Asia (started earlier), “Scramble for Africa” (esp. 1880s and 1890s), British takeover of Malaysia, Dutch consolidation in Indonesia, etc.  Anthropology develops partly as a reaction against this, partly as an accommodation.

1875  Frederick Ward Putnam (1839-1915) becomes curator of Peabody Mus.

 

1875-80, first Paleolithic art research: Marquis de Sautuola inAltamiraCavediscovers the art 1875, publishes it in 1880 after research

1877  Morgan’s Ancient Society

 

1878-9, Erminnie Platt Smith studies the Tuscarora; first major ethnographic research by a woman; she trains J. E. B. Hewitt first as assistant, then as ethnographer, and he goes on to a distinguished career with the BAE–the first Native American anthropologist; Smith thus pioneered the technique (later perfected by Fletcher and Boas) of getting local indigenous people to take over the ethnographic project.  Unfortunately, Smith’s work was cut short by her untimely death in 1886.

 

1879, US Congress establishes USGS and BAE.  First BAEAR (Bureau of American Ethnology Annual Report), 1880.   Frank Cushing (1857-1900) at Zuni, 1879-1884.

 

1883, Tylor starts teaching at Oxford, thanks to General Lane Fox Pitt Rivers funding a post along with his museum there.

 

1883-4  Franz Boas (1858-1942) carries out his Inuit field work.  1885-6, Boas assists Bastian at Mus. for V.

1883  W. M. Flinders Petrie begins work inEgypt.  Major publications include Tell el Amarna, 1894, and Royal Tombs of Abydos, 1901.

1884  Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State by Frederick Engels (1820-1895)

1885, Women’s Anthropological Society founded by Matilda Coxe Stephenson in protest to Anthro. Soc. ofWashingtonexcluding women.  The WAS lasted till around 1899, when the new AAA arose (1898) and opened its doors to all genders and ethnicities

 

1886, Putnam becomes Peabody Professor of Anthropology at Harvard, but no real instruction there till 1890.

 

1887  Le suicide, by Emile Durkheim, 1858-1917.

F. Tönnies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Community and Society), sociological classic that greatly influenced ethnology

 

1887-88, First and main Hemenway Expedition; Cushing and several archaeologists launch major study of the Southwest

1888  American Anthropologist begins (started by the Anthropological Society of Washington).  Boas begins teaching at Clark U (leaves 1892; to AMNH in 1895).

1889  Tylor, address to RAI, “On a Method of Investigating the Development of Institutions, Applied to Laws of Marriage and Descent,” introduces the term and theory of “cross-cousin marriage”; in a comment, Francis Galton (statistician, eugenicist, racist, sometime president of the RAI) introduces Galton’s Problem

 

1890  First edition of The Golden Bough by James Frazer (1854-1941).  The final, definitive edition in many volumes came out in 1911-15.

First really modern archaeology: Flinders Petrie at Tell el-Hesi,Palestine, uses techniques of stratigraphy, cross-dating, and careful excavation of all artifacts, developed by him inEgyptand by Lane Fox Pitt-Rivers inEnglandover preceding decade

1891, John Wesley Powell (1834-1902), “Indian Linguistic Families of America North of Mexico,” published in 7th BAEAR

Edward Westermarck, The History of Human Marriage, 1st edn.; definitive 5th edn., much larger, 1921

 

1892, Alexander F. Chamberlain receives the first PhD in anthropology in theUS(under Boas atClark; a very fine anthropologist, Chamberlain became sickly and died young).  Anthro begins at U. of Chicago, but with Frederick Starr, a geologist and not very good ethnographer; in spite of giving out two early PhDs, to Merton Miller and David Prescott Barrows, in 1897, Chicago didn’t start real anthro till Fay-Cooper Cole got there in 1924 and Sapir in 1925; and then it was still under Sociology till 1929, giving a strong, still-enduring flavor to the Dept. there.  Starr and Barrows were “lost” to administrative positions, and Miller was never heard from again, soChicagowas not really a player till Cole.

 

1893  Columbian Exposition.  Lots of archaeology and ethnology on display; material from Mancos, CO, leads John Harshberger to coin term “ethnobotany” in 1895

 

1894  First archeology PhD in US: George Dorsey under Putnam at Harvard.  Cyrus Thomas’ mound researches published in BAEAR for 90-91.  Livingston Farrand teaches anthro atColumbia(with W. Ripley; Boas arrived in 1896).

B. Spencer and F. Gillen begin their classic joint work in centralAustralia.  Spencer was an ethnographer, Gillen a local who started by helping with details and wound up becoming an excellent ethnographer in his own right.

Arthur Evans begins work onKnossos(excavates Minos’ palace in 1900).

1897-1902  Jesup Expedition

 

1898-9 Torres Straits Expedition, led by Alfred Cort Haddon.  (Haddon’s The Study of Man, an early four-field text, pub 1898.)  This expedition was the first serious field work by British anthropologists.  W. H. R. Rivers, brought along as psychologist, does the first field work in psychological anthropology.

 

1900 RolandDixonPhD; 2nd in US, 1st at Harvard (under Putnam).

Wilhelm Wundt, Völkerpsychologie, published; a leading psychologist’s statement on culture and psych.

 

1901, anthropology begins at UCB: A. L. Kroeber and P. E. Goddard.  (1902-3, Putnam there, organizes it.  Boas opposed, Putnam supported, the new department.)  Kroeber was Boas’ first Ph.D. atColumbia(I think 1901)

 

1902  Pyotr Kropotkin’s Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution.

 

1903, Durkheim & Mauss’ Primitive Classification.

Max Uhle publishes major work onPeru.

William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience.

1904-5, Die protestantische Ethik usnd der Geist des Kapitalismus pub., in 2 parts, by Max Weber (1864-1920.)

1906  Alice Fletcher and Joseph La Flesche, The Omaha Tribe, classic ethnographic collaboration between Anglo andOmaha ethnographers, published in BAEAR.

 

1908, Rites de passage by Arnold van Gennep.  Georg Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations (Ger. orig.)

1911, Boas’ Mind of Primitive Man

 

1912  Formes elementaires de la vie religieuse, by Durkheim

Piltdown skull and accompanying material discovered; quickly championed (and possibly created) by Arthur Keith; attacked by Ales Hrdlicka and many others

1913  Sigmund Freud, Totem und Taboo (Eng transl. by A. A. Brill, 1918)

 

1914-18, Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942) stuck in Trobriands (as war internee allowed to do field work)

1915, Cours de Linguistique Generale issued by Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye from notes on lectures given 1907-11 by Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913)

 

1921  Sapir’s Language (and, in the same year, Otto Jesperson’s book by the same title and with the same “educated layperson” reader in mind; the contrast is dramatic; Sapir is fully 20th century, Jesperson thoroughly 19th)

 

1922  A. R. Radcliffe-Brown’s Andaman Islanders and Malinowski’s Argonauts of the Western Pacific.  (ARR-B’s classic articles came out soon after: “The Methods of Ethnology and Social Anthropology,” 1923; “The Mother’s Brother inSouth Africa,” 1924.  Known for his devotion to Durkheimian theory, R-B had had an earlier devotion to Kropotkin that earned him the nickname of Anarchy Brown.)

1922-3, Weber’s Gesammelte Aufsaetze zur Religionssoziologie (collected essays on sociology of religion; core works published originally in 1916-19; Weber’s core economic work was also collected and published in 1922-3)

 

1923, Ruth Benedict’s The Concept of the Guardian Spirit in North America published; neglected classic, much better than Patterns of Culture

1925, Marcel Mauss’ (1872-1950) Essai sur le don (The Gift) published.  Not translated till 1954!

A. R. Radcliffe-Brown (1881-1955) and Malinowski both in US.

 

 

Knowledge in anthropology

Sunday, November 27th, 2011

A book-length manuscript on knowledge in anthropology, from some basic epistemology through social psychology to culture, culture and emotion, cultural models, the postmodern challenge, and notes on the great thinkers.  It was seeking a publisher when it was overtaken by a number of books that say the same thing better–but you have to buy a lot of them to get this coverage, so the present ms is still worth at least posting.

Knowledge

Conservation Basics

Monday, October 10th, 2011

 

Conservation Basics

 

           

 

Caring as the Most Basic of All

 

The one word is care.  If we care about each other and the environment, we will act responsibly.  If we do not care, we will not only lose all in the future, we will have no life worth living, now or ever.  This book will look at how other cultures constructed care for the environment, human and natural.

 

Caring must be about other humans as well as “nature.”  Indeed, separating the two is a problem for modern society; other societies have often avoided it, not making a hard distinction.  We cannot afford to remain indifferent to the plight of the billions of people now suffering from environmental decline and disaster.  We also can no longer afford to divide into warring nations, warring environmental ideologies, warring economic theories, and above all warring religions.  We have to unite against the greatest threat to life in the history of the planet:  our own devastating tide of pollution and misuse. As the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico say, “we are all kernels on the same corncob” (Cajete 1994:165).

 

Caring includes love for the natural environment, or at least some sort of attachment to some of it; genuine concern for other people; and awareness that we are all in this together, and will live or die together.  We—both humans and nonhumans—are all in this together. 

 

Care, to mean anything, also has to have a strong component of self-efficacy (Bandura 1982, 1986).  If we do not think we can do anything, we will not do anything.  We simply have to have some confidence that we can actually care for the world, and some awareness of how to do it.

 

So the problem is threefold:  Loving and caring about our environments; prioritizing care for them; and solidarity in defending and saving them. 

 

Learning to live sustainably and within limits involves loving nature (Milton 2002), or at least not hating it.  It means avoiding the false choice of “people vs nature,” “jobs vs owls” (Goodstein 1999).  That false choice has given us both “progress” that is mere wanton destruction and “preservation” that is mere displacement of local people from their lands (Brockington et al. 2008; West et al. 2006). 

 

Care means respect.  If one thinks the subject of one’s care is unworthy of respect as a valued being, one will not care much for it or about it. 

 

 

 

The Problems

 

The world environmental problems have been largely solved, as far as technology and economics goes.  We know what to do, or at least enough to make a good start now and develop more knowledge as we go on.  Simply planting trees and preserving areas of biodiversity would solve many of the problems; nothing could be conceptually easier, yet we are not doing it on anything remotely close to an adequate level.

 

All problems come down to one common ground:  resource exhaustion.  The resource may be water, genetic diversity, human potential, fossil fuels, or open space.  The problem is the same:  we are using too much of it. 

 

Worldwide, the most intractable environmental problem now is accommodating a fast-growing population already well above seven billion.  There are not enough resources on the planet to give that many people a middle-class western-style livelihood.  By midcentury there will be 9 to 10 billion people, and, contrary to hopeful claims, there is every indication that population increase will not stop there, unless major action is taken.  At some point, such a runaway growth must end in a crash, if studies of natural animal populations apply to humans—which they almost certainly do.  The classic Malthusian mechanisms bring excess numbers down.

 

To survive, we have to stop population growth and stop resource overuse.  Fortunately, the solution for high birth rates is both clear and simple, and does not involve the draconian policies invoked in the past by India and China.  Everywhere that modern medicine and education for girls have been introduced, birth rates drop like a plummet, usually approaching zero population growth in a generation or two.  I actually watched this happen in Hong Kong and again in Mexico during the years I spent doing field work there.  Completed family sizes fell steadily and rapidly.

 

 The medicine component must include a full range of birth control technologies, but not only that; keeping children alive by providing shots and other public health needs is just as important.  Parents know they can raise all their children; they do not have to have three children to be sure of raising one.

 

 

 

As to resource overuse, its simplest cause is waste due to short-term, narrow planning as opposed to long-term, wide planning (Anderson 1996, 2010).  We fail to consider downstream users.  We fail to consider our own futures.  We fail to consider other lives than human ones.  This occurs in several contexts:  the desperation of the poor, the thoughtlessness of the rich.

 

There are several different problems here.  Fishers and loggers may directly overharvest resources, leading to collapse of that specific resource base.  Pollution is different:  it involves production of one good while damaging others.  Still different is destruction that costs everyone, and has no motive other than status and conformity (as in McMansions and lawns).  Still more deplorable are outright arson and vandalism.  All these require slightly different cures. 

 

Resource misuse is made worse by poor education.  At present, education worldwide is not only failing at this task, it is getting rapidly worse in many areas.  The education system has to change to make people active workers for improvement, instead of passive receptacles for factoids to spit out on standardized tests.  High administrators, testing corporations, and government servants who oversee education conspire to reduce it to this sort of mindless cramming.  It is incompatible with learning one’s environment, and incompatible with caring about anything.  Children are now cut off from nature (Louv 2005, 2011).  Many urban children grow up without ever seeing the starry sky or a butterfly.  Attention to other cultures’ spiritual and aesthetic aspects, so common in the 1950s and 1960s, has suffered an eclipse.  Environmentalists talk less and less of loving nature, more and more of doom through pollution and oil depletion.   Too many of the proposed solutions are technocratic fixes.  We are not going to save the world by grim sewage-treatment.  Would you educate your children by scaring them to death and then promising hi-tech?  If that doesn’t work with them, why should it with anyone?

 

Today, religion and culture are much less involved in such matters.  Religion often sets itself against learning and education.  Nationalist and political ideologies also disregard the environment and are often anti-intellectual across the board; recall the violent attacks on education, learning, and book knowledge by the Nazis, the Maoists, Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge, and countless other such groups.  The contrast between the extreme stress on environmental learning in the religions of traditional small-scale societies could not be greater. 

 

Many have blamed “capitalism,” usually without defining it.  We have underestimated the importance of economic lock-ins, both economic and psychological.  The throughput economy and the world’s commitment to fossil fuels, monocrop agriculture, and other evils has survived major changes.  Culturally, this lock-in involves lack of motivators for caring about nature and people-in-nature.  We have alternatives:  ideals of fairness, justice, egalitarianism, community, solidarity, charity, caring, mercy, peace, family farms, beautiful landscapes, efficiency and “waste not, want not.” 

 

Even the purest capitalist boss in the worst days of Victorian England or 1930s Shanghai had a set of cultural beliefs, often far more ancient than capitalism.  The basic concept “men vs. nature” goes back thousands of years earlier.  The capitalist bosses also had a set of knowledge and practices derived from their work (“you just can’t make quality furniture with unseasoned pine wood”).  The boss was thus not thinking “capitalism”; he was thinking within a far more comprehensive, specific, and contingent framework.

 

The throughput-maximizing world, and its corporate rulers, has dangerous political consequences (Anderson 2010; Bunker and Ciccantell 2000; Eichenwald 2000; Humphreys et al 2007; Juhasz 2008).  Yet we are now so committed to it that any change is immediately attacked as costing too much, hurting the workers who depend on the system, and so on.  To some extent this is true; yet not fixing the system will devastate all of us, sooner rather than later. 

 

Even conservation becomes a tragedy, when local people are displaced.  Externalizing the costs of conserving onto the very people who preserved the resource till now is immoral as well as inefficient (Anderson 2005; Brockington et al. 2008; Haenn 2005; West et al. 2006).

 

            However, this does not really tell us when people will value nature over artificiality:  natural plants over lawns, for instance.  It also does not tell us when they will value the welfare of the community over the welfare of their families, or the welfare of their families over the welfare of themselves as individuals.  Economics cannot deal thoroughly with these questions, because they are questions about the ultimate goals of actions, and economics is classically concerned with alternative ways to reach goals, not with predicting the goals themselves.

 

            Recent attempts to save the biota by appealing to economics, politics, and legal remedies have not succeeded.  Worldwide, people have learned to emulate the western value on artificial things and environments.  People want machines, lawns, beef, and paved streets.  They no longer want traditional foods, fabrics or formulas. 

 

Social science can go somewhat farther.  We know that the current situation, with extremely rich and powerful elites dominating a vast working mass, has happened many times before, and we know what happens:  to the extent that the mass becomes hopelss and dispirited, individuals become alienated from the community.  Either they become passive, or they become narrowly “individualist.”  When people feel hopeful and want to improve their lives, they are far more prone to think widely and expansively, and work for the community (see Bandura 1982).

 

            Most actual working conservation and environmentalism is concerned with more simple, direct matters.  Largely, these are means, not ends.  We use cars to get somewhere, computers to write and cipher.  We fish and farm for food to survive.  All means, to whatever ends, have costs, normally including environmental costs.  Willingness to clean up the means and produce fewer environmental costs is thus a major problem.  No one wants to pay for cleanup; all want to enjoy the benefits of it.  Large firms can pass on the costs of pollution and overuse to the weaker members of society.  Here again unity and community is necessary.  Only by uniting can these weaker members exert power over the large operators and force them to internalize the costs of production.

 

 

 

Actual Solutions

 

Solutions for the environment have to minimize throughput by using less and being more efficient, and maximize diversity by saving species, cultures, languages, cultures, tasks, lifestyles. 

 

We have made a start, worldwide, on  recycling, efficient production, clean energy, good farming, reforestation and tree farming or selective cutting, sustainable fishing and hunting, etc. 

 

We need to put this to work, but prioritize matters accordingly:

 

–Public health with full range of contraceptive services.

 

–Bans on further biodiversity reduction, especially deforestation, extinction of species, overhunting, extension of monocrop agriculture. 

 

–Education, especially environmental education involving actual hands-on use, certainly including education of girls.  This includes informal education and the  media.

 

–Reforestation, sustainable management, simplification, a shift to a less consumptive economy, efficiency, pollution control, etc.—i.e. a shift from short-term, narrow gains to long-term, wide-flung benefits and from throughput to efficiency.  

 

–Institutional means—accounting, laws—must make the above economically profitable:  No subsidies; severance fees; transform fees; high garbage charges.  An entire economic structure  using rules to drive efficiency, sustainability, and simplicity instead of waste, drawdown, and techno-worship.

 

–Environmental organizations and laws, conservation and management measures,  pragmatic helping.

 

–Concern for the poor—the neglected majority of humanity  In short, environmental justice.

 

–Scientific research on all these questions, and the propagation of such knowledge by all means possible.

 

–Environmental health is necessary to individual health, but also to the health of society; it is to society what bodily health is to the individual.

 

–Not only nature but—if anything still more—decent houses fitted into their sites, native landscaping, foods, arts, health, intensive diversified small farming, etc.  Lots of solutions to push directly.

 

–Diversity maintenance:  biodiversity, cultural diversity, social diversity, human diversity and individualism.  Diversity is not a perfect measure of ecological health, but is a sine qua non.  It means a lot more than species counts.  This is key, and involves a massive revaluing of diversity, including cultural differences.

 

            All this requires what I call “process goals”:  Goals that can never be achieved, but that we need to strive for anyway.  World peace, total health, and a fully saved environment are examples.

 

 

 

Levels of Concern

 

            All the above breaks out into three levels of concern:

 

            –Immediate conservation issues:  saving forests and sea turtles, stopping cancer-causing pollution, stopping the waste of fresh water.  This is largely economic, though often simply aesthetic.  But it requires a strong community morality.  Traditional societies did a lot of this, from saving seeds and breeding livestock to terracing and paddy-building, careful water management, and sacred groves.  Usually, immediate economic needs were served as well as long-term protection.  Even the most sacred groves were used.  Only a few remote sacred mountains and similar places were genuinely shunned.

 

            –General concern for the environment.  This is less coupled to economics.  There are always economic interests who attack environmentalism, conservation, and sustainable management as “trees versus jobs.”  Traditionally, environmental concern of this sort was, in many or most societies, managed at the level usually called “religion” by outsiders.  The local people may have considered it more a matter of reverence, moral concern, and spiritual bonding rather than “religion” in the strict church-on-Sunday sense.

 

            –The still wider question of political solidarity and caring.  This does not necessary involve “the environment” at all.  If a polity is unified, people will naturally manage for future generations.  If it is torn by disunity to the point of real civil conflict, there is little or no hope.  Most of the world today is somewhere between those extremes, and solidarity  needs to be foregrounded.  Traditionally, solidarity was, again, a religious and ethical matter.  It was decoupled from religion as nationalism rose in the 17th and 18th centuries.  It has taken on a strange life in the 20th and 21st, with cross-cutting loyalties to religion, nation, political party, political ideology, occupational ties, and even Facebook and other electronic communities.  Reviving a community solidarity that will bond people together to preserve their immediate environment is proving fiendishly difficult.  People are often more prone to work to save “the rainforest” (conceived as an utterly remote place) than their neighborhood trees.  I suppose people who actually live in the rainforest may be trying to save the Arctic.

 

            In considering other cultures and their environmental management, we will need to look at these levels analytically.

 

 

 

Pragmatics of Conservation

 

Modern American experience shows that one needs only a few activists who love the environment and scientists who know the risks to it, if there are enough responsible users of the resource to generate some long-term considerations, and also enough socially responsible people to see that general or broad welfare depends on it.  This combination gave us the national forests in the 19th century, the wildlife protection laws in the early 20th, and the clean air, wilderness, and other acts of the 1970s.  All these happened in spite of the powerful dominance of throughput and resource-consumptive interests in American political economy.  Usually, it succeeds only when people across the political spectrum can see the broad social needs; the current world situation in which conservatives are almost entirely anti-environment is extremely dangerous.  It was not so in earlier times.  Much, if not most, of the major environmental legislation in American history was enacted during the presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt and Richard Nixon.

 

This suggests that not everyone need have the powerful combination of love and ideology that animated John Muir and Rachel Carson.  In fact, the more the economy depends on holistic management of a resource, the less this strong self-conscious ideological position is needed. 

 

 

 

Resource preservation typically occurs when:

 

1.  The necessity for it can be so obvious and immediate that no one can miss it, and any community of users will develop enough working morality to keep each other honest.  This is the case with Maine lobsters (Acheson 2006; McCay and Acheson 1987), Los Angeles Basin water (Ostrom 1990), and Southeast Asian rice paddies. 

 

2.  The necessity for it can be obvious in the long run, to the point where a functioning community will get together and save it even though it is not immediately endangered.  This is the case with the national forests, much water conservation, and so on, but it is quite rare outside of democratic government action in modern societies, or religious protection through taboos and sanctification in more traditional ones.  Religion, social morality, or personal concern are necessary for this case.  Economic self-interest is never enough.  The pressures to exploit and run are too great.

 

When only rational material interest is involved, almost nobody ever manages or saves unless it is clearly an essential resource whose loss for even one day would be devastating.  Water is the most conspicuous and universal example, yet even water is chronically wasted.  Locally, topsoil, forests, fish, and agricultural resources are managed this way, but it takes effort and strict enforcement. 

 

3.  The resource can be saved for (ostensibly) other reasons.  This is where religion, recreation, and aesthetics are most vital.  Much that seems just religious is really exemplary of the previous two cases—fengshui groves, for instance.  But much is saved for aesthetics and then turns out valuable for other reasons, or is obviously valuable for many reasons but aesthetics is the decisive key.  National Parks, biodiversity, traditional cultural forms, and the like depend on this.  It is necessary in proportion to how wasteful and anti-nature the wider society is.

 

When only aesthetic or religious care is involved, people save, but often less than adequately.   Lock-down preservation is less a serious method of saving than a failure of management or a lazy solution to management problems.  Purely emotional saving also gives us problems with saving only the “charismatic megafauna” (or minifauna, as the case may be), or saving only “pretty” places even when these are of far less ecological concern than the “less pretty” ones.  We have saved most of America’s desert mountains but rather little of the wetlands.  Yet wetlands are far more valuable for conserving water, biodiversity, soils, and other benefits.

 

 

 

New Environmental Ethics

 

Ethics must begin with the general rule:  In the end, all action and morality has to be evaluated in terms of help versus harm.  For obvious reasons, long-term and wide interests have to transcend short-term narrow ones, but even that has to be evaluated (often case by case) in terms of overall help and harm. That is the only ultimate measure—the real Categorical Imperative.  (Kant’s idea, “act as though your every action could be a universal law,” ignores diversity; even identical twins require different things.) 

 

Essential for bioethics is compassion for all beings; creation care.                               

 

Among the corollaries are:

 

–Learning, knowledge, and self-improvement as basic moral charges.

 

–Responsibility, including simplifying, recycling, proacting to protect, etc.

 

–Tolerance and valuing diversity.

 

–A strong pragmatic sense of the need to balance human needs and conservation.

 

Civil and human rights are essential for all public goods (Anderson 2010).  However, they are not adequate for environmental protection, as the situation in the United States shows.  Eonomics exists within a moral shell.  Morals drive laws, laws create market structures.

 

Government, ideally, balances the private sector, with neither getting too big.  Both giant firms and the US Army Corps of Engineers have gotten above the law and above environmental common sense.  Both unregulated markets and uncontrolled big government have ruined whole countries.  Grassroots democracy, with environmental and social justice, appears better.  North and northwest Europe has done well with this general mix, but one might argue they had a pre-existing culture of environmental stewardship.  However, countries like Korea and Japan have also done fairly well with a mix.  Above all, however, accountability, recourse, transparency, and actually listening to scientific experts are the really desirable goals for a polity.

 

Any new ideology must be concerned with all beings.  It must foreground direct, proactive compassion and caring. What really matters is actively working for the common good, which in general means tolerance and mutual aid, but must mean a condign lack of tolerance and acceptance for hatemongers and anti-environmental activity of all kinds.  Ideally, this would resemble some traditional religions (Chinese Daoism, for instance) in being based on clear sight of the world and love for nonhuman beings.  Compassion for all beings, and idealization of simplicity, are two particularly common values in traditional religions, and we desperately need them now.

 

 

 

The ideal political system would be one where groups were interlocked and mutually interdependent.  They would be like fibres in a complex textile, except that one must imagine a fabric of ever-changing, ever-morphing fibres.  The fibres keep pulling away, or changing shape and length to fit the pattern.  A polity is a fabric made up of living threads, constantly weaving themselves into new tangles.

 

Group hatred is the worst in terms of world effects, having led to genocides that killed hundreds of millions of people in the last couple of centuries, but ordinary bloody-mindedness is fatal too. 

 

Success at driving solidarity against selfishness and against rejection games has come from not only from religion, but also from communities in general, as well as political parties science, the military, voluntary organizations, Alcoholics Anonymous and other 12-step programs, labor unions, and other organizations.  It can come from “imagined communities” (Benedict Anderson’s famous term for nations and other created large-scale forms; B. Anderson 1991).  All communities are imagined, but, also, all effective ones have some reality to them.  Of these, science, voluntary organizations, and 12-step programs have been eminently successful bridge-builders; religion, nationalism, and the military are great at bonding but generally negative at bridge-building.  Degree of emotional appeal, degree of emotional involvement, voluntariness, education level, and the degree to which people believe the order is “natural.” 

 

            The world needs a blanket organization or linkage that would integrate all possible conservation and environmental groups.  We have to cooperate now, and help the “bottom billion” (Collier 2007), as well and the nonhuman lives on the planet, before the rest of us need help.  If we wait, it will be too late; resource exhaustion and global warming will be beyond fixing. 

 

 

 

Communities of Conservation

 

A “community,” here, is a group of any kind that realizes we’re all in this together.  People need to take care of their own families and immediate circle to maintain community.  This requires some sort of emotional interaction: arts, ritual, worldview, political action, or religion.  The most important lesson of anthropology may be that these cultural elaborations of discursive practice are absolutely necessary in creating and maintaining communities, and above all in creating and maintaining moral and responsible behavior as defined and constructed by those communities.  Without emotionally and aesthetically compelling forms, there is weak community and no environment care.  Traditional societies have an advantage in being able to combine community maintenance, morality, and ecology into one thing—traditional environmental ideology, usually a part of religion—and make it so persuasive that no one can evade it.  As we see from the results of modernization, the more care, the more one can resist the dreadful carrot-and-stick approach of contemporary economic development (Dichter 2003; Ellerman 2005; Li 2007; Stiglitz 2003):  “We promise you wealth (some day!) if you give us your resource base for destruction, and if you don’t we’ll take over your land and destroy your resource base anyway.” 

 

Community can lead to rather rapid changes, in either direction.  A society can shift from a sensible, future-oriented elite to a presentist, irresponsible one.  Japan turned from highly conservationist under the Tokugawa (Totman 1989) to rather destructive under the Liberal Democratic Party (Kirby 2011).  The United States was the world leader in conservation during its most “rugged individualist” periods, 1890-1910 and 1960-1980.  During more conformist periods, it lost that edge.  Evidently, what is needed is responsibility for the common good, which takes both individualism and collectivism.

 

 

 

People in Nature

 

The best way to do this is through the Native American view that plants and animals are actually persons who are part of one’s society.  Next is the land or landscape sense:  we are in an environment we create, shape, and manage—a garden or mixed farm writ large.  Both of these demand emotional involvement, and make almost inevitable the cultural construction thereof in ceremonies and arts.  These are the cultures that produce the stunning environmental art we know from Northwest Coast animal sculptures, Australian Aboriginal paintings of “country,” Chinese landscapes, and Balinese temple rituals.

 

Worst is the idea of nature and separate from and conflicting with human interests.  This reaches an extreme in the common Western Hemisphere view that nature must be destroyed and replaced by totally artificial landscapes, agriculture being confined to monocrops in neat rows.  We live in a world where the natural is often considered uncouth, disgusting, or at best “underdeveloped.”  At best, it means that anything done to save nature must inevitably be seen to conflict with human interests.  This is the anti-environmentalists’ stock theme, but unfortunately it is basic to a dangerous and unfortunate side of western environmentalism, too:  the side that advocates “deep ecology,” clearing the Great Plains to turn them back to the animals, or nature reserves that displace indigenous people. 

 

This view of nature accompanies a view of humans as “individuals vs. mass” or, with America’s “tea party” movement, “individuals vs. government.”  This can lead to the extreme, antisocial individuality of the Republican far right.  Others opt for the mass to the point that the individual is seen as necessarily subjected to harsh top-down codes and mass conformity (as in the work of Alasdair MacIntyre [1984, 1988], or the radical religious right).  Even far more temperate individualist philosophers like John Rawls (1971) and Tom Scanlon (1998) explicitly excluded the environment in their considerations (see my posting “Ethics” at www.krazykioti.com).   All these views oppose the individuals-in-society and society-in-nature view of many traditional societies.

 

A state of despair has entered many people in the last generation.  Especially important in creating this mood of hopeless passivity has been the rapid decline of individual control over one’s world, as giant corporations and government bureaucracies take over more and more of life.  Our social reality is one of Big Oil, Big Agribusiness, the World Trade Organization, and the rest of the litany, not excluding Big Science and corrupt university administrations.  We are weak in the face of them, and so we lose heart.  Consider the despair shown by the contemporary right-wing belief, from the WTO down to the Tea Party, that total corporate domination is the best we can hope for—that all government and free agency is necessarily worse. 

 

It has destroyed any sense of closeness to or dependence on the nonhuman world.  It has been cultivated by powerful extractive interests:  big oil, big agribusiness, big chemical, and so on. 

 

These would have been unable to do the damage they have done without the failure of community.  If people were still solidary with each other, let alone the nonhuman persons of the world, they would have been able to withstand the pressures of the giant corporate extractive interests.  Everywhere people have been able to assert community solidarity (specifically across class and ethnic boundaries), they have been able to get at least some traction against corporate destructiveness.  The extreme case was in the Solomon Islands, where a copper mine ruined the land and livelihood of a local group.  The group fought back:  bows and arrows against the full corporate might of one of the world’s most powerful corporations.  The mine shut down.

 

A world of Kantian subjects, debating and negotiating their community’s rules, is impossible under extreme views.  Yet conservation and sound environmental management depend on precisely such dialogues.  Managing resources depends on revaluing humans. 

 

 

 

Thinking Too Narrowly

 

There are four major reasons why people think in too narrow terms (Anderson 1996, 2010).  First, we discount the future far too heavily.    Second, we also discount humans and other beings if they are not part of our immediate face-to-face world.  To some extent, this is necessary; I simply can’t be as involved with a farmer in India as as am with my children. We take it too far in modern America, however; we hardly know our neighbors.  Third, people bicker over trivia instead of uniting to save the world.  Fourth is simple laziness.  The human animal shares with dogs and cats a healthy value on resting up for whatever the future may bring. 

 

Humans under stress or attack move toward more short-term considerations.  When one is under threat one has to deal with that threat immediately (Anderson 2010; Bandura 1982).  Everything else has to wait.  Therefore, long-term, wide-flung planning must always swim upstream (Anderson 1996).  It depends on solidarity—the wide-flung connections and responsibilities—and solidarity itself must always swim upstream. 

 

All bad habits of thought have been enormously increased by the new economic order:  salaried managers rather than bosses, service workers rather than manufacturing and farming proletariat, and government-corporate fusion rather than separation.  The world is now run by individuals who migrate back and forth from government to industry, working for salaries and bonuses rather than because their careers are on the line.  They are typical bureaucrats:  unaccountable, nonresponsible, and unconcerned about the future of the enterprise.  They have secular ideologies and are not emotionally involved in their work, which in any case changes every few years.  The old capitalist boss at least had his job and his pride on the line.   He could be responsible and even conservationist if it suited him.  The modern bureaucratic CEO cannot be even if he wants to be; the directors and shareholders will not let him.

 

Lester Brown (2009) speculates on a world war or similar violence as the hungry “take to the streets,” but the hungry are too weak to do much.  It is those still declining, not those on the bottom, who resort to violence.  We have to start a hopeful program (such as Brown’s “Plan B,” now up to a 4rd version; Brown 2008, 2009) and push for it, now, before real shortage comes.

 

            The sort of “liberalism” represented by the “critique of environmentalism” (which sees environmentalism as mere elite snobbery) is obviously opposed to every point in every environmental or conservation program, and must be forthrightly attacked.  This critique is a part of the old Marxist attack on anything that delays industrial progress; it was the attitude that made the Communist-led societies the worst polluters of all.  The same is true of the sort of “conservatism” that opposes all environmental regulation.  It is a complete betrayal of all classic conservative principles, from thrift to family values. 

 

I have seen the same thing with loggers, who were all too willing to serve as the storm troops for their cynical bosses when environmentalists protested the rape of the old-growth forests (Helvarg 1997).  The loggers, of course, lost their jobs when they “won.”  I have seen the same with farmers dealing with soil erosion and stockherders dealing with overgrazing. 

 

Perhaps the greatest need today is investigative reporting on abuses of power—environmental destruction and its dirty politics.  We are now aware of the emotional nature of politics (Marcus 2002; Westen 2007).  This not only helps us with modern politics; it also shows us why religion was the driver for resource management in earlier times. 

 

I have seen the same thing with loggers, who were all too willing to serve as the storm troops for their cynical bosses when environmentalists protested the rape of the old-growth forests (Helvarg 1997).  The loggers, of course, lost their jobs when they “won.”  I have seen the same with farmers dealing with soil erosion and stockherders dealing with overgrazing. 

 

Once I thought it was high ideals and commitments that drove history.  Then I thought it was rational choice, or at least that rational-choice models were good enough to score.  Now I find that Ibn Khaldun (1958), Albert Bandura (1982), Aaron Beck (1999), Roy Baumeister (1997), and similar thinkers have the predictive power—basically, models based on individuals looking at reality and reacting with varying degrees of raw emotion rather than overall utility maximization.  People act within a general framework where perceptions of self-efficacy drive either sober coping or high-emotion maladaptive reacting, and where evil is all too common as a response. 

 

Effective opposition to conservation comes when vested interests draw on short-term narrow planning.  Often they wind up appealing to hate.  The hate has usually been right-wing (but often left-wing too), but the short-sightedness has often been liberal or populist, and often in the very best causes—cheap hydroelectric power, public health, affordable housing.  Conservation was a broadly based middle-of-the-road to conservative cause for most of its history.  Its identification with the left wing dates to the takeover of right-wing politics by the giant corporations in the 1950s and of left-wing politics by the urban educated voters in the 1960s.  

 

People are social, but not social enough.  Social disunion often leads to social rejection, and social rejection often leads to social hatred.  The “culture wars” and “debt increase wars” that got out of control in the early 21st century in the United States ran beyond anything that could benefit special interests; hatreds on all sides of the political landscape took on a life of their own.  These spilled over into environmental management via an attack on environmentalism that quickly escalated beyond anything that even the oil companies could have reasonably wanted.  Politicians seriously proposed ending all environmental regulation, and even the government’s public health activities. 

 

Anti-environmental forces keep up the divisive rhetoric; the most obvious recent case has been in the wholly spurious science of global warming denial, and the way it has been hyped not only by those who profit (the energy companies and heavy polluters) but also by conservatives and Marxists worldwide (see Hoggan 2009; Mooney 2005; Oreskes and Conway 2010; Powell 2011). 

 

 

 

America was settled as a nation of small farms.  Government policy, however, has favored large plantation-style operators almost from the beginning (Bovard 1991).  This has been due especially to the political power of southerners, often plantation owners, during several key periods of history.  Plantation policies displaced the Anglo-Celtic tradition of mixed farming on small independent family farms.  The death of the family farm in the United States  came in several waves:  the 1920s, the 1950s, the 1980s, and the 2000s (see e.g. Bovard 1991 for at least the earlier parts of this).  These tracked periods of Republican ascendency, but, especially in the 1920s and 1950s, the worst offenders were southern Democrats.  (Through the 1950s and 1960s, agricultural policy in the United States was dominated by Senator James Eastland, D-MS, who long headed the relevant Senate committee; his Sunflower Plantation was one of the largest farms in the world, and had some of the worst labor practices.) 

 

 

 

Unnaturalism

 

            I use the word “unnaturalism” to refer to the belief that something artificial, no matter how expensive and damaging, is better than anything natural.

 

            Most damage that humans do to the environment is done for reasons that are at least understandable, and usually perfectly good: making a living, making useful goods, getting more security and safety and comfort.  There remains a fair amount, however, that is done solely because the natural is seen as inherently bad and wrong.

 

            The most ancient, widespread, and universal bit of unnaturalism is modifying one’s own body.  Perhaps the second most universal human trait (after language) is painting and decorating oneself to become “more beautiful.”  Often, this merely highlights natural features.  However, in the modern world, it has led to the “extreme makeover.”  Everything natural about the body must be “corrected.”

 

            With civilization came huge showy buildings, often not for the living but for the honored dead.  Kings learned to show their power by maintaining a lavishly expensive lifestyle, even in the afterlife.  Robes and jeweled crowns may not be comfortable wear, but they show wealth.  Transportation by litter was no faster than by foot, and not much more comfortable either, but it looked impressive.  Public spaces showed how well the elite could build, create, and manage. Interestingly, this all appeared independently in the New World civilizations as well as in all the Old World ones.  It is endemic to the urban world.  Farmers and others who worked with nature were considered to be uncouth and backward—an attitude surviving today in most of the world.  Even for the masses, the city seems preferable to nature. 

 

            Unnaturalism took a far more extreme and ugly turn in the Near East, in the centuries just before Christ.  Grave sages concluded that the flesh, and indeed the entire material world, is downright evil.  Of this more later.

 

            A major rise of unnaturalism came with status consumption in the era of exploding world trade, from about 1500.  This phase involved a renewal of extreme sexual repression among the Puritans, Jansenists, and other religious movements of the time.  It also produced lawns, and clipped and pruned gardens.  It produced huge mostly-empty houses with airless rooms and constant remodeling, and other unpleasant and expensive environmental manipulations.  This is carried to obsessive levels in America today, where many suburbanites spend virtually their entire free time and disposable income maintaining the lawn and “working on the house.”  This Puritanical activity is unique in human history in the degree to which it combines waste of money, unnecessary environmental damage, and sheer unpleasantness to the doer. 

 

            Finally, modern science—at root an accommodation and understanding of nature—has been overextended and misused to sell extremely damaging things solely because they are unnatural:  unnecessary Caesarian sections, bottle feeding of infants, cosmetic plastic surgery, the whole lunacy of “virtual reality,” and finally the hermetically sealed modern environment.  Many mothers today fear to let their children go outside at all—there might be snakes and spiders (Louv 2005, 2011—and my own bemused observations in American suburbia). 

 

The rise of Caesarian sections is an extreme case.  Caesarians can be life-saving, but 2/3 of Caesarians in the United States are unnecessary.  Brazil has even higher rates.  Caesarians not only cost much more than normal births but carry forty times the risk of maternal death.  Clearly, rational self-interest is not driving this epidemic, except for the “rational self-interest” of certain greedy doctors (Wagner 2006).

 

Other cultures never moved so far beyond ordinary status consumption.  China developed or copied monumental architecture, industrial-style farming, and other unnaturalist ways of doing business.  Deforestation, wetland drainage, and similar practices were common.  However, China never abandoned the ideal of “harmony” with the world or the love of natural landscapes and natural beauty.  Traditional China had ambiguous attitudes toward the untended wild, but was strongly positive toward the spontaneous and natural.  And at least they enjoyed wine, sex and song rather than “working on the house!” The coming of Maoist Commuism, with its “struggle against nature” and the panoply of western unnaturalist ideas, was a shock to China and the Chinese, and had devastatingly bad effects.  The idea that “progress” meant destroying nature at all costs was soon firmly established, however.  This, among other things, involved selling a quite new concept of “nature” to the Chinese world.  The idea of “nature” as a separate thing, innately bad, was completely alien to the Chinese.  It resonates much better with a Christian west, raised to see the body as evil, human nature as inclined to sin, and the individual as born in Original Sin.

 

Other ancient civilizations, including those of the New World and southeast Asia, were even less fond of unnatural and unnecessary modifications of the world—though even they had their body-painting and monumental architecture.

 

            From these and many other examples, we can loosely classify some unnaturalism as simply human.  Some is a product of civilization.  Later came problems of the western world specifically, from anti-materialism to the Industrial Revolution’s fetish of technology.  In general, unnaturalism seems usually about status:  nothing shows one’s status better than one’s ability to waste a great deal of money on doing something flagrantly counter to common sense.  This is a “natural” urge, but increasingly expressed through unnatural means.  In body decoration and status consumption, expensive and unnecessary showing-off to make one’s point is known as “costly signaling” in behavior studies, “conspicuous consumption” in the social sciences (Veblen 1912).

 

            Mercifully, at most points there has been an opposite, if not always equal, reaction.  Nature flourishes, and people are more self-conscious about valuing it when there is an unnaturalist alternative staring them in the face. 

 

 

 

 

 

References

 

 

 

Acheson, James M.  2006.  “Institutional Failure in Resource Management.”  Annual Review of Anthropology 35:117-134.

 

 

 

Anderson,  E. N.  1996.  Ecologies of the Heart.  New York:  Oxford University Press.

 

 

 

—  2005.  Political Ecology in a Yucatec Maya Community. Tucson: UniversityofArizonaPress.

 

 

 

—  2010.  The Pursuit of Ecotopia:  Lessons from Indigeonous and Traditional Societies for the Human Ecology of Our Modern World.  Santa Barbara, CA:  Praeger (imprint of ABC-Clio).

 

 

 

Bandura, Albert.   1982.  “Self-Efficacy Mechanism in Human Agency.”  American Psychologist 37:122-147.

 

 

 

—  1986.  Social Foundations of Thought and Action:  A Social Cognitive Theory.  Englewood Cliffs, NJ:  Prentice-Hall.

 

 

 

Baumeister, Roy F.  1997.  Evil:  Inside Human Violence and Cruelty.  New York:  Owl Books.

 

 

 

Beck, Aaron.  1999.  Prisoners of Hate: The Cognitive Basis of Anger, Hostility, and Violence.  NY: HarperCollins.

 

 

 

Bovard, James.  1991.  The Farm Fiasco.  San Francisco:  Institute of Contemporary Studies.

 

 

 

Brown, Lester.  2008.  Plan B 3.0.  New York:  W. W. Norton.

 

 

 

—  2009.  “Could Food Shortages Bring Down Civilization?”  Scientific American, May, 50-57.

 

 

 

Brockington, Dan; Rosaleen Duff; Jim Igoe.  2008.  Nature Unbound:  Conservation, Capitalism and the Future of Protected Areas.  London:  Earthscan.

 

 

 

Bunker, Stephen G., and Paul S. Ciccantell.  2005.  Globalization and the Race for Resources.  Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University Press.

 

 

 

Cajete, Gregory.  1994.  Look to the Mountain:  An Ecology of Indigenous Education.  Skyland, NC:  Kivaki Press.

 

 

 

Eichenwald, Kurt.  2000.  The Informant.  New York: Broadway Books.

 

 

 

Ellerman, David.  2005.  Helping People Help Themselves:  From the World Bank to an Alternative Philosophy of Development Assistance.  Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

 

 

Goodstein, Eban.  1999.  The Trade-Off Myth:  Fact and Fiction about Jobs and the Environment.  Washington, DC, and Covelo, CA:  Island Press.

 

 

 

Haenn, Nora.  2005.  Fields of Power, Forests of Discontent:  Culture, Conservation, and the State in Mexico.  Tucson:  University of Arizona Press. 

 

 

 

Helvarg, David.  1997.  The War against the Greens:  The Wise Use Movement, the New Right, and Anti-Environmental Violence.  San Francisco:  Sierra Club.

 

 

 

Hoggan, James, with Richard Littlemore.  2009.  Climate Cover-Up:  The Crusade to Deny Global Warming.  Vancouver:  Greystone Books.

 

 

 

Humphreys, Macartan; Jeffrey Sachs; Joseph Stiglitz (eds.).  2007.  Escaping the Resource Curse.  New York:  Columbia University Press.

 

 

 

Ibn Khaldun.  1958.  The Muqaddimah.  Tr. and ed. by Franz Rosenthal.  New York:  Pantheon.

 

 

 

Juhasz, Antonia.  2008.  The Tyranny of Oil:  The World’s Most Powerful Industry—and What We Must Do to Stop It.  New York:  William Morrow (HarperCollins). 

 

 

 

Kirby, Peter Wynn.  2011.  Troubled Natures:  Waste, Environment, Japan.  Honolulu:  University of Hawai’i Press.

 

 

 

Louv, Richard.  2005.  Last Child in the Woods:  Saving Children from Nature-Deficit Disorder.  Chapel Hill:  Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill.

 

 

 

—  2011.  The Nature Principle:  Human Restoration and the End of Natue-Deficit Disorder.  Chapel Hill, NC:  Algonquin Books.

 

 

 

MacIntyre, Alasdair.  1984.  After Virtue:  A Study in Moral Theory.  Notre Dame, IN:  Notre Dame University Press.

 

 

 

—  1988.  Whose Justice?  Whose Rationality?  Notre Dame, IN:  Notre Dame University Press.

 

 

 

Marcus, George E.  2002.  The Sentimental Citizen:  Emotion in Democratic Politics.  University Park, PA:  Pennsylvania State University Press.

 

                              

 

McCay, Bonnie, and James Acheson (eds.).  1987.  The Question of the Commons.  Tucson:  University of Arizona Press.

 

 

 

Milton, Kay.  2002.  Loving Nature.  London:  Routledge.

 

 

 

Mooney, Chris.  2005.  The Republican War on Science.  New York:  Basic Books. 

 

 

 

Oreskes, Naomi, and Erik M. Conway.  2010.  Merchants of Doubt:  How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming.  New York:  Bloomsbury Press.

 

 

 

Ostrom, Elinor.  1990.  Governing the Commons:  The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action.  New York:  Cambridge University Press.

 

 

 

Powell, James Lawrence.  2011.  The Inquisition of Climate Science.  New York:  Columbia University Press.

 

 

 

Rawls, John.  1971.  A Theory of Justice.  Cambridge:  Harvard University Press.

 

 

 

Scanlon, Tom.  1998.  What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress.

 

 

 

Stiglitz, Joseph.  2003.  Globalization and Its Discontents.  New York:  W. W. Norton.

 

 

 

Totman, Conrad.  1989.  The Green Archipelago:  Forestry in Preindustrial Japan.  Berkeley:  University of California Press.

 

 

 

Wagner, Marsden.  2006.  Born in theUSA:  How a Broken Maternity System Must Be Fixed to Put Women and Children First. Berkeley: UniversityofCaliforniaPress.

 

 

 

West, Paige; James Igoe; Dan Brockington.  2006. “Parks and Peoples: The Social Impact of Protected Areas.”  Annual Review of Anthropology 35:251-277.

 

 

 

Westen, Drew.  2007. The Political Brain: The Role of Emotion in Deciding the Fate of the Nation.  New York:  PublicAffairs.

 

 

 

Science and Ethnoscience, bibliography, part 3

Monday, August 22nd, 2011

SCIENCE AND ETHNOSCIENCE

E. N. Anderson

Dept. of Anthropology, University of California, Riverside

Augmented Bibliography, Part 3

Pagden, Anthony.  1987.  The Fall of Natural Man:  The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press.

Parkinson, John.  1976 (1629).  A Garden of Pleasant Flowers:  Paradisi in Sole, Paradisus Terrestris. New York:  Dover.

Pavord, Anna.  2005.  The Naming of Names:  The Search for Order in the World of Plants.  New York:  Bloomsbury.

Perezgrovas Garza, Raúl (ed.).  1990.  Los carneros de San Juan:  Ovinocultura indígena en los Altos de Chiapas.  San Cristóbal de Las Casas:  Universidad Autónoma de Chiapas.

Perry, Charles.  2007.  “Foreword.”  In:  Medieval Cuisine of the Islamic World, by Lilia Zaouali.  Tr. M. B. DeBevoise.  Berkeley:  University of California Press.

Pinker, Stephen.  2003.  The Blank Slate.  New York:  Penguin.

Ponting, Clive.  1991.  A Green History of the World.  New York:  Penguin.

Popper, Karl.   1959.  The Logic of Scientific Discovery.  London:  Hutchinson.

Pormann, Peter E., and Emilie Savage-Smith.  2007.  Medieval Islamic Medicine.  Edinburgh:  Edinburgh University Press; Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

Posey, Darrell Addison.  2004.  Indigenous Knowledge and Ethics:  A Darrell Posey Reader.  New York:  Routledge.  Posthumous stuff; looks super.

Potter, Jack.  1976.  Thai Peasant Social Structure.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press.

Powell, J. W.  1901.  “Sophiology, or the Science of Activities Designed to Give Instruction.”  American Anthropologist 3:51-79.

Preece, R.  1999.  Cultural Myths, Cultural Realities. Vancouver:  University of British Columbia Press.

Pyne, Stephen J.  1991.  Burning Bush: A Fire History of Australia.  NY: Henry Holt & Co.

Rabinow, Paul.  2002.  French DNA:  Trouble in Purgatory.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press.

Radin, Paul.  1927.  Primitive Man as Philosopher.  New York:  Appleton.

—  1957.  Primitive Religion.  New York:  Dover.  (Orig 1937; this has a new preface.)

Re Cruz, Alicia.  1996.  The Two Milpas of Chan Kom.  Albany:  SUNY Press.

Reardon, Sara.  2011.  “The Alchemical Revolution.”  Science 332:914-915.

Reichel-Dolmatoff, G.  1971.  Amazonian Cosmos:  The Sexual and Religious Symbolism of the Tukano Indians.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press.

—  1976.  “Cosmology as Ecological Analysis:  A View from the Rain Forest.”  Man 11:307-316.

Robb, John Donald.  1980.  Hispanic Folk Music of New Mexico and the Southwest:  A Self-Portrait of a People.  Norman, OK:  University of Oklahoma Press.

Rosaldo, Renato.  1989.  Culture and Truth:  The Remaking of Social Analysis.  Boston:  Beacon Press.

 

Ross, Norbert.  2004  Culture and Cognition:  Implications for Theory and Method.  Thousand Oaks, CA:  Sage.

Rudwick, Martin.  2005.  Bursting the Limits of Time.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press.

 

—-  2008.  Worlds Before Adam.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press.

Sahagun, Bernardino de. 1950-1982.  Florentine Codex.  Tr. Charles E. Dibble and Arthur J. O. Anderson.  (Spanish original late 16th century.)  Salt Lake City:  University of Utah Press.

 

Sahlins, Marshall.  l972.  Stone Age Economics.  Chicago: Aldine.

 

— l976.  Culture and Practical Reason.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Said, Edward.  1978.  Orientalism.  New York:  Pantheon.

Schäfer, Dagmar.  2011.  The Crafting of the 10,000 Thngs:  Knowledge and Technology in Seventeenth-Century China.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press.

Schneider, Norbert.  1992.  Naturaleza muerte.  Kőln:  Benedikt Taschen.

Schipper, Kristofer.  1993.  The Taoist Body.  Tr. Karen C. Duval (Fr. orig. 1982).  Berkeley:  University of California Press.

Schopenhauer, Arthur.  1950.  The World as Will and Idea.  Tr. R. Haldane and J. Kemp. (German original ca. 1850; this translation orig. publ. 1883).  London:  Routledge, Kegan Paul.

Shah, Idries.  1956.  Oriental Magic.  London:  Rider.

Sharp, Henry.  1987.  “Giant Fish, Giant Otters, and Dinosaurs:  ‘Apparently Irrational Beliefs’ in a Chipewyan Community.”  American Ethnologist 14:226-235.

—  2001  Loon:  Memory, Meaning and Reality in a Northern Dene Community.  Lincoln:  University of Nebraska Press.

Sivin, Nathan.  2000.  “Introduction.”  In Science and Civilisation in China.  Vol. 6: Biology and Biological Technology.  Part VI:  Medicine, by Joseph Needham with Lu Gwei-djen.  Ed. by Nathan Sivin.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press.

Skinner, B. F.  1959.  Cumulative Record:  A Selection of Papers.  New York:  Appleton-Century-Crofts.

Sluyter, Andrew.  2003.  “Material-Conceptual Landscape Transformation and the Emergence of the Pristine Myth in Early Colonial Mexico.”  In Political Ecology: An Integrative Approach to Geography and Environment-Development Studies, ed. By Karl Zimmerer and Thomas Bassett.  New York:  Guilford.  Pp. 221-239.

Smith, Adam.  1910 (orig. 1776).  The Wealth of Nations.  New York:  Dutton.

Smith, Claire, and Wobst, Martin.  2005.  Indigenous Archaeologies:  Decolonizing Theory and Practice.  New York:  Routledge.

Smith, David M.  1999.  “An Athapaskan Way of Knowing:  Chipewyan Ontology.”  American Ethnologist 25:412-432.

Stauber, John, and Sheldon Rampton.  1996.  Toxic Sludge is Good for You: Lies, Damn Lies and the Public Relations Industry.  Monroe, Maine: Common Courage.

Steward, Julian H.  1955.  Theory of Culture Change.  Urbana:  University of Illinois Press.

—  1977.  Evolution and Ecology:  Essays on Social Transformation.  Ed. Jane Steward and Robert Murphy.  Urbana:  University of Illinois Press.

Strang, Veronica.  2006.  “A Happy Coincidence?  Symbiosis and Synthesis in Anthropological and Indigenous Knowledges.”  Current Anthropology 47:981-1008.

Sun Simiao.  2007.  Recipes Worth a Thousand Gold:  Foods.  Tr. Sumei Yi.  Chinese original, 654 A.D.  Electronically distributed on Chimed listserv, July 2007.

 

Tacuinum Sanitatis: The Medical Health Handbook.  1976.  Ed./tr. by Luisa Cogliati Arano.  New York: George Braziller.

Taylor, Shelley E.  1989.  Positive Illusions:  Creative Self-Deception and the Healthy Mind.  New York:  Basic Books.

Terán, Silvia, and Christian Rasmussen.  1993.  La milpa entre los Maya.  Mérida:  Authors.

Tedlock, Dennis.  1985. Popul Vuh.  New York:  Simon & Schuster.

Theophrastus.  1926.  Enquiry into Plants.  Tr. A. F. Hort.  2 v.  Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, Loeb Classics Series.

Thick, Malcolm.  2010.  Sir Hugh Plat:  The Search for Useful Knowledge in Sixteenth Century London.  Totnes, Devon:  Prospect Books.

Torrance, Robert (ed.).  1998.  Encompassing Nature.  Washington, DC:  Counterpoint.

Totman, Conrad.  1989.  The Green Archipelago:  Forestry in Preindustrial Japan.  Berkeley:  University of California Press.

 

Trautman, Thomas.  1987.  Lewis Henry Morgan and the Invention of Kinship.  Berkeley: University of California Press.

Tsien, Tsuen-Hsuin.  1985.  Science and Civilisation in China.  Vol. 5: Chemistry and Chemical Technology.  Part I:  Paper and Printing.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press.

Tuchman, Barbara.  1978.  A Distant Mirror:  The Troubled Fourteenth Century.  New York:  Knopf.

Tucker, Mary Evelyn, and John A. Grim (eds.).  1994.  Worldviews and Ecology:  Religion, Philosophy, and the Environment.  Maryknoll, NY:  Orbis Books.

 

Turner, Nancy J.  2005.  The Earth’s Blanket.  Vancouver:  Douglas and MacIntyre; Seattle:  University of Washington Press.

Turner, Nancy J.; Yilmaz Ari; Fikret Berkes; Iain Davidson-Hunt; Z. Fusun Ertug; Andrew Miller.  2009.  “Cultural Management of Living Trees:  An International Perspective.”  Journal of Ethnobiology 29:237-270.

Tylor, Edward.  1871.  Primitive Culture.  London: John Murray.

Unschuld, Paul.  1986.  Medicine in China:  A History of Pharmaceutics.  Berkeley:  University of California Press.

—  2009.  What is Medicine?  Western and Eastern Approaches to Healing.  Berkeley:  University of California Press.

 

Varner, John Grier, and Jeannette Johnson Varner.  1983.  Dogs of the Conquest.  Norman:  University of Oklahoma Press.

Vayda, Andrew P.  2008.  “Causal Explanations as a Research Goal:  A Pragmatic View.”  In Against the Grain:  The Vayda Tradition in Ecological Anthropology, Bradley Walker, Bonnie McCay, Paige West, and Susan Lees, eds.  Lanham, MD:  AltaMira (division of Rowman and Littlefield).  Pp. 317-367.

—  2009.  “Causal Explanation as a Research Goal:  Do’s and Don’t’s.”  In Explaining Human Actions and Environmental Changes. Lanham, MD:  AltaMira (division of Rowman & Littlefield).  Pp. 1-48.

Veith, Ilza.  2002.  The Yellow Emperor’s Classic of Internal Medicine.  New edn. (orig. 1949).  Berkeley:  University of California Press.

Vico, Giambattista.  2000.  New Science.  Tr. David Marsh.  New York:  Penguin.

Vogt, Evon Z.  1969.  Zinacantan:  A Maya Community in the Highlands of Chiapas.  Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press.

Waddell, Helen.  1955.  The Wandering Scholars.  Garden City, NY:  Doubleday.

Wear, Andrew.  2000.  Knowledge and Practice in English Medicine, 1550-1680.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press.

Weatherford, Jack.  2004.  Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World.  New York:  Three Rivers Press.

Weber, Max.  2001.  The Protestant Ethic and the “Spirit” of Capitalism.  Tr.  [German orig. 1907.]   London: Penguin.

Weber, Steven.  2001.  “Ancient Seeds:  Their Role in Undersanding South Asia and Its Past.  In:  Ethnobiology at the Milennium:  Past Promise and Future Prospects, Richard I. Ford, ed.  Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Anthropological Papers 91.  Ann Arbor:  University of Michigan.  Pp. 21-34.

Weber, Steven A., and William R. Belcher (eds.).  2003.  Indus Ethnobiology:  New Perspectives from the Field.  Lanham, Md.:  Lexington Books (member of Rowman & Littlefield).

Whicher, George F.  1949.  The Goliard Poets.  Cambridge, MA:  University Press.

 

Wilke, Philip J.  1988.  “Bow Staves Harvested from Juniper Trees by Indians of Nevada.”  Journal of California and Great Basin Anthropology 10:3-31.

Wilms, Sabine.  2002.  The Female Body in Medieval China.  Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of East Asian Studies, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ.

Witherspoon, Gary.  1977.  Language and Art in the Navaho Universe.  Ann Arbor:  University of Michigan Press.

Wolpert, Lewis.  1993.  The Unnatural Nature of Science.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Worsley, Peter.  1997.  Knowledges:  Culture, Counterculture, Subculture.  New York:  New Press.

Zambrano, Isabel, and Patricia Greenfield.  2004.  “Ethnoepistemologies at Home and at School.”  In Culture and Competence: Contexts of Life Success, ed. By Robert J. Sternberg and Elena L. Grigorenko.  Washington:  American Psychological Association.  Pp. 251-272.

Zaouali, Lilia.  2007.  Medieval Cuisine of the Islamic World:  A Concise History with 174 Recipes.  Berkeley:  University of California Press.

Zarger, Rebecca K.  2002.  “Acquisition and Transmission of Subsistence Knowledge by Q’eqchi’ Maya in Belize.”  In Ethnobiology and Biocultural Diversity, ed. J. R. Stepp, Felice S. Wyndham and R. K. Zarger.  Athens:  University of Georgia Press. Pp. 593-603.

Zarger, Rebecca K., and John R. Stepp.  2004.  “Persistence of Botanical Knowledge among Tzeltal Maya Children.”  Current Anthropology 45:413-418.

Zong Yao Da Zi Dian. 1979.  Shanghai:  Science Publishers.

Science and Ethnoscience: Bibliography, part 1

Monday, August 22nd, 2011

SCIENCE AND
ETHNOSCIENCE

E. N. Anderson

Dept. of
Anthropology, University of California, Riverside

 

Augmented Bibliography, part 1

 

To the references in text are added a large number of
references on folk science, including Chinese traditional sciences.

 

Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi.
1965.  The Eastern Key.  Tr. K. H. Zand, John A.Videan, Ivy E.
Videan.  London:  George Allen and Unwin.

 

Ahmad, S. Maqbul, and K. Baipakov.  2000.
Geodesy, Geology and Mineralogy; Geography and Cartography; the Silk Route across Central Asia.  In History of Civilizations of Central Asia, vol. IV, The Age of Achievement:  A.D. 750
to the End of the Fifteenth Century.
Part
2, The Achievements, edited by C. E.
Bosworth and M. S. Asimov. Paris:  UNESCO.
Pp. 205-226.

 

Anderson, Barbara A.;
E. N. Anderson; Tracy Franklin; Aurora Dzib-Xihum de Cen.  2004.
“Pathways of Decision Making among Yucatan Mayan Traditional Birth
Attendants.”  Journal of Midwifery and
Women’s Health 49:4:312-319.

 

Anderson, E. N.
1972.  Studies on South China’s
Boat People.  Taipei:  Orient Cultural Service.

 

—  1987.  “Why is Humoral Medicine So
Popular?”  Social Science and
Medicine 25:4:331-337.

 

—  1988.  The Food of China.  New Haven:  Yale
University Press.

 


1992.   “Chinese Fisher Families:  Variations on Chinese Themes.”  Comparative Family Studies 23:2:231-247.

 

—  1996a.  Ecologies of the Heart.  New York:  Oxford
University Press.

 

—  1996b.  “An Introduction to Wilson Duff.”  In Bird
of Paradox
by Wilson Duff.  Surrey, BC:  Hancock House.  Pp. 16-119.

 

—  1999.  “Child-raising among Hong Kong
Fisherfolk:  Variations on Chinese
Themes.”  Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, 86:121-155.

 

—  2000.  “Maya Ornithology and ‘Science Wars.’”  Journal of Ethnobiology 20:129-158.

 

—  2001.  “Flowering Apricot:  Environmental Practice, Folk Religion, and
Daoism.”  In Daoism and Ecology, ed. N. J. Girardot, James Miller, and Liu
Xaiogan.  Cambridge:  Harvard
University Press.  Pp. 157-184.

 

—  (with José Cauich
Canul, Aurora Dzib, Salvador Flores Guido, Gerald Islebe, Felix Medina Tzuc,
Odilón Sánchez Sánchez, and Pastor Valdez Chale).  2003.
Those Who Bring the Flowers.
Chetumal, QR, Mexico:  ECOSUR.

 

—  2004.  “’Loving Nature’ among the Maya.”  Paper, Society for Ethnobiology, annual
conference, Davis, CA.

 

—   (with Aurora
Dzib Xihum de Cen, Felix Medina Tzuc, and Pastor Valdez).  2005.
Political Ecology in a Yucatecan Community.  Tucson:  University
of Arizona Press.

 

—  ms 1.  The Morality of Ethnobiology.  Ms. in prep.

 

—  ms 2.  Learning from Experience.

 

—  ms 3.  “The Antilist.”  Ms.

 

—  2007.  Floating World Lost.  New Orleans:
University Press of the South.

 

Anderson, E. N., and Felix Medina Tzuc.  2005.
Animals and the Maya in Southeast Mexico.  Tucson:  University
of Arizona Press.

 

Anderson, M.
Kat.  2005.  Tending the Wild:  Native American Knowledge and the Management
of California’s Natural Resources.  Berkeley:  University of California Press.

 

Anderson, Perry.
1974.  Lineages of the Absolutist State.
London:  NLB.

 

Ankli, Anita; Otto Saticher; Michyale Heinrich.  1999a.
“Medical Ethnobotany of the Yucatec Maya:  Healers’ Consensus as a Quantitative Criterion.”  Economic Botany 53:144-160.

 

—  1999b.  “Yucatec Maya Medicinal Plants Versus
Nonmedicinal Plants:  Indigenous
Characterization and Selection.”  Human
Ecology 27:557-580.

 

Arikha, Noga.
2007.  Passions and Tempers:  A History of the Humours.  New
York:
HarperCollins.

 

Atran, Scott.
1990.  Cognitive Foundations of
Natural History.  Cambridge:  Cambridge
University Press

 

Atran, Scott.
2002.  In Gods We Trust.  New York:  Oxford
University Press.

 

Atran,
Scott, and Douglas Medin.  2008.  The Native Mind and the Cultural Construction
of Nature.  Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press.

 

Avicenna.  1999.
The Canon of Medicine (al-Qānūn
fī’l-T.ibb
).  O. Cameron Gruner and
Mazar H. Shah, tr.; ed. Laleh Bakhtiar.  Chicago:  KAZI Publications.

 

Bacon, Francis.
1901.  Novum Organum.  (Orig. 1620.)
New York:  P. F. Collier.

 

Balam Pereira, Gilberto.
1992.  Cosmogonia y uso actual de
las plantas medicinales de Yucatán.  Merida:  Universidad Autónoma de Yucatán.

 

Ball, Philip.
2008.  “Triumph of the Medieval
Mind.”  Nature 452:816-818.

 

Barnes,
Linda.  2005.  Needles, Herbs, Gods and Ghosts:  China Healing and the West to
1848.  Cambridge,
MA:  Harvard University Press.

 

Bennett, Bradley C.
2007.  “Doctrine of
Signatures:  An Explanation of Medicinal
Plant Disocvery or Dissemination of Knowledge?”
Economic Botany 61:246-255.

 

Bennett,
John W.  l976.  The Ecological Transition: Cultural
Anthropology and  Human Adaptation.  New
York:  Academic
Press, l976.

 


l982.  Of Time and the Enterprise:
North American Family Farm Management
in a Context of Resource Marginality.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press.

 


1992.  Human Ecology As Human
Behavior.   New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction.

 

Berg,
Jeremy M.  2007.  “The Age-Old Question of Researcher
Innovation:  Response.”  Science 318:1549-1550.

 

Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckmann.  1966.
The Social Construction of Reality.
Garden City, NY:  Doubleday.

 

Berkes, Fikret.
1999.  Sacred Ecology:  Traditional Ecological Knowledge and Resource
Management.  Philadelphia:
Taylor and Francis.

 

Berkes, Fikret; Johan Colding; Carl Folke.  2000.
“Rediscovery of Traditional Ecological Knowledge as Adaptive
Management.”  Ecological Applications
10:1251-1262.

 

Berlin, Brent.
1992  Ethnobiological
Classification
.  Princeton:  Princeton
University Press.

 

Birkhead, Tim.
2008.  The Wisodm of Birds:  An Illustrated History of Ornithology.  New York:
Bloomsbury.

 

Blackburn,
Thomas, and M. Kat Anderson (eds.).
1993.  Before the Wilderness:  Environmental Management by Native Californians.  Menlo
Park, CA:  Ballena Press.

 

Blaikie, Piers, and Harold Brookfield.  1987.
Land Degradation and Society.
London:  Methuen.

 

Blaser, Mario.
2009.  “The Threat of the
Yrmo:  The Political Ontology of a
Sustainable Hunting Program.”  American
Anthropologist 111:10-20.

 

Bourdieu, Pierre.
1977.  Outline of a Theory of
Practice.  Cambridge:  Cambridge
University Press.

 

—  1990.  The Logic of Practice.  Stanford:
Stanford University Press.

 

Bowker,
Geoffrey, and Susan Leigh Star.
1999.  Sorting Things Out:  Classification and Its Consequences.  Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press.

 

Bowler, Peter J., and Iwan Rhys Morus.  2005.
Making Modern Science:  A
Historical Survey.  Chicago:  University
of Chicago Press.

 

Boyle, Robert.
2006.  The Skeptical Chymist.  N.p.:
Adamant Media.  Orig. 1661.

 

Brandt, Richard.
1954.  Hopi Ethics.  Chicago:  University
of Chicago Press.

 

Braudel, Fernand.
1973.  The Mediterranean
and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II.  Tr. Sian
Reynolds.  Fr orig 1966.  New
York: Harper & Row.

 

Breedlove,
Dennis E., and Robert M. Laughlin.
1993.  The Flowering of Man:  A Tzotzil Botany of Zinacantán.  Smithsonian Contributions to Anthropology 35.

 

Brown,
Cecil.  1984  Language
and Living Things:  Unversalities in Folk
Classification and Naming
.  New
Brunswick, NJ:  Rutgers University Press.

 

Buell, Paul D.;  E. N.
Anderson; Charles Perry.  2000.  A Soup for the Qan.  London:
Kegan Paul International.

 

Callicott, J. Baird.
1994.  Earth’s Insights:  A Multicultural Survey of Ecological Ethics
from the Mediterranean
Basin to the Australian
Outback.  Berkeley:  University of California Press.

 

Callicott, J. Baird, and Michael P. Nelson.  2004.
American Indian Environmental Ethics:
An Ojibwa Case Study.  Upper
Saddle River, NJ:  Pearson Prentice Hall.

 

Carter, M. G.
1990.  “Arabic Lexicography.”  In Religion,
Learning and Science in the ‘Abbasid Period,
M. J. L. Young, J. D. Latham,
R. B. Serjeant, eds.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press.  Pp. 106-117.

 

Carter, Thomas.
1955.  The Invention of Printing
in China
and Its Spread Westward.  2nd
edn., rev. by L. Carrington Goodrich.  New York:  Ronald Press.

 

Cohen, Mark Nathan.
2009.  “Introduction:  Rethinking the Origins of Agriculture.”  Current Anthropology 50:591-596.

 

Colding, Johan, and Carl Folke.  2001.
“Social Taboos:  ‘Invisible’
Systems of Local Resource Management and Biological Conservation.”   Ecological Applications 11:584-600.

 

Collins, Randall.
1998.  The Sociology of
Philosophies.  Cambridge,
MA:  Harvard University Press.

 

Conklin,
Harold C.  1957.  Hanunoo Agriculture.  Rome:
FAO.

 

—  2007.
Fine Description.  Ed. Joel
Kuipers and Ray McDermott.  New Haven:  Yale
Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph 56.

 

Cronon, William.
1983.  Changes in the Land.  New
York:  Hill and
Wang.

 

Cook, Harold J.
2007.  Matters of Exchange:  Commerce, Medicine, and Science in the Dutch
Golden Age.  New
Haven:  Yale University
Press.

 

Crews, Frederick (ed.).
1998.  Unauthorized Freud:  Doubters Confront a Legend.  New York:
Viking.

 

Cronon, William.
1983.  Changes in the Land.  New
York:  Hill and
Wang.

 

Cruikshank, Julie.
2005.  Do Glaciers Listen?  Local Knowledge, Colonial Encouinters, and
Social Imagination.  Vancouver:  University
of British Columbia
Press.

 

Damasio, Antonio.
1994.  Descartes’ Error.  New
York:  G. P.
Putnam’s Sons.

 

—  2003.  Looking for Spinoza:  Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain.  Orlando,
FL:  Harcourt.

 

D’Andrade, Roy.  1995.
The Development of Cognitive Anthropology.  New York:  Cambridge
University Press.

 

Dawes, Robyn.
1994.  House of Cards:  Psychology and Psychotherapy Built on
Myth.  New York:
Free Press.

 

Dawkins,
Richard.  1976.  The Selfish Gene.  Oxford:  Oxford
University Press.

 

—  2006.
The God Delusion.  Boston:  Houghton Mifflin.

 

De
Kruif, Paul.  1926.  Microbe Hunters.  New York:
Harcourt, Brace.

 

De Landa, Manuel.
2002.  Intensive Science and
Virtual Philosophy.  New York:  Continuum Press.

 

Desowitz,
Robert. 1991.  The Malaria Capers.  New
York: W. W. Norton.

 

Deur, Douglas,
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Science and Ethnoscience, part 3: Classification

Monday, August 22nd, 2011

SCIENCE AND ETHNOSCIENCE

E. N. Anderson

Dept. of Anthropology, University of California, Riverside

Part 3.  Case Study:  Classification

One fact that is devastating to the view that science is purely a cultural or social construction is the broad consonance between folk and scientific systems of classification.  People everywhere classify plants and animals about the same way, recognizing categories like “bird,” “snake,” and so on (Atran 1990; Berlin 1992; Brown 1984).  Moreover, they focus on inferred biological relationships.  They classify dogs with dogs, cats with cats, and oak trees with beech trees, rather than—say—shepherd dogs with sheep and human shepherds, hounds with ducks, cats with grass, and oak trees with potatoes.

People classify things.  The fundamental, original purpose of this is to make the world manageable.  If we had to react to every stimulus as a new and unprecedented thing, we would never get out of bed in the morning.  Thus, as Kant (1978) pointed out, we assimilate and differentiate as we need to.   Humans seem to be natural classifiers.  Modern psychology confirms Kant’s points:  we essentialize categories, treating things we class together as if they were “the same” and exaggerating the differences of things we put in different categories (Atran 1990; Atran and Medin 2008).

Classifications are fundamentally about being useful.  We classify so that we can identify edible and useful plants, dangerous or poisonous animals, types of tools we need for projects, breeds of dogs used for different tasks, types of paintings (Impressionist, abstract expressionist, op-art…).  Most classifications are developed from actual interaction with the things we are classifying.  We classify them in ways that make for maximal efficiency in using them.

However, our love of classifying runs far beyond utility.  We classify all manner of things, and learn about them.  Folk biology everywhere includes an incredible number of names and facts, many of them essentially useless to the people who know them.  The Maya, for instance, have names for all manner of tiny insignificant birds, and know their life histories.

We classify everything:  dogs, personality types, ideas, gods, kinfolk, potatoes (some Peruvian farmers know hundreds of varieties by sight), and kinds of love.  People even develop classifications for fun, like the classifications of imaginary creatures (unicorns, dragons, and so on) in fantasy books.

Conversely, people may develop classifications to keep people in line—from those endless classifications of sins and impurities in the Bible to those endless classifications of traffic violations in the modern civil codes.  So one main, and universal, use of classification systems is to maintain control not only over natural complexity but also over people’s lives and social actions (Bowker and Star 1999; Foucault 1970).

Classifications range from legally defined, like types of property, to biologically based, like types of fir trees.  Classifications may be very clear, simple, and sharp, like classifications of living elephants:  there are only two, not much like each other, and not at all like any other animal.  Conversely, classifications of philosophic theories are so endlessly argued by philosophers that one may wonder whether the reason for having the classifications at all is to stir up debate.  Obviously, we will never have an accepted classification of philosophies.

Classifications may be universal (modern scientific nomenclature—among scientists, at least), cultural (English bird names), or at lower levels.  My classification of foods I like is unique to me.  My children’s classification of foods they would not eat was an all too significant family reality in their early years, but is of no significance today.

Classifications may be broadly true in some sense.  The modern scientific classifications of chemicals, stars, and living things are grounded in real and demonstrable facts.  We classify animals and plants on the basis of biological relationships.  Linnaeus had to infer these from appearance, and brilliantly saw that flowers are basic rather than leaves, stems, and roots.  We can now use cladistic analysis backed up by comprehensive genetics, and prove directly the genetic relationships we once had to infer.

On the other hand, classifications can be ad hoc, or plain wrong, or utterly ridiculous, like José Luis Borges’ “Chinese encyclopedia” parody cited in Foucault (1970:xv).

The purpose of classification is not to be right but to be useful.  Even Borges’ is useful:  it is intended to shock the reader into thinking about the whole philosophical issue of classification.  Anyone reading it realizes it is a joke, because the units are totally non-comparable; a real system has to have units that are comparable, in ways that matter within that particular system.  In technical terms, there has to be an “emics” to the system.

A great deal of research has been devoted to the history and cross-cultural variation of classification.

Kinship terminology has received by far the most effort.  Kinship is unique in that it is equally important and elaborate in all cultures.  It is the only realm in which every culture has an elaborate, precise, formalized, and almost universally known system.  Australian aboriginals may not have elaborate physics or chemistry, but their kinship systems are so formal and elaborate that many brilliant English-speaking scholars have spent years unsuccessfully trying to analyze them.  Thus they provide ideal material for comparative analyses of human thought.  Therefore, theorizing about family and kin has always been basic to anthropology.  Lewis Henry Morgan’s vast classic work Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity (1871) put the seal on kin classification as a major field for anthropological endeavor (Trautman 1987).

Since the 1870s, much work has been devoted to taxonomies of animals and plants, and sometimes other living things (like fungi).  Comparative work has shown that people everywhere see real biological relationships, and use them as one basis for classifying.  This has even led authorities on the subject to postulate that people have a natural tendency to classify on the basis of perceived basic similarities (Atran 1990; Berlin 1992; Brown 1984).

In classifying living things, every culture has a general classification systems versus special purpose classifications.  Brent Berlin found that this distinction is basic and apparently worldwide (Berlin 1992).  The general system is the one based on apparent biological relationships or real-world appearance.  It is the one that provides everyday names.  Everywhere, it is based on inferred similarities out there in nature.  Everywhere, if you simply ask “what is that?” you get the name in the general system.  The name of an animal or plant is always understood to be its name in the general system unless you specify otherwise.  Local utilitarian factors influence all general purpose systems (Hunn 1982), but do not determine them, so they end by looking very much like the modern international scientific system.

On the other hand, Roy Ellen has long emphasized real differences between cultural classification systems (e.g. Ellen 1993).  Similarly, Geoffrey Lloyd (2007) has found many areas that are not accurately perceived in folk biology.  He makes much of the microorganisms, which are irrelevant to his case, but he makes the more serious point that traditional classifications generally fail at the higher levels.  Nobody seems to have words for “mammal,” and many cultures lack a word for “animal.”  Plants are variously assembled.  Carol Kaesuk Yoon (2009) has recently held that there is a “clash” between “instinct”—the natural categorization that humans do—and “science.”  She maintains this because genetics has now shown that fish fall into several classes, with the bony fish closer to humans than to cartilaginous fish.  One might add that birds are closer to some “reptiles” (dinosaurs) than those are to other reptiles.

So science is indeed a cultural construction.  Even modern classifications are not 1:1 maps of biology, and folk systems certainly are not.

Yet, in fact, folk and traditional people see natural categories astonishingly well—not as well as the best modern geneticists, but well enough to show that nature is hard to ignore in these matters.  Sometimes the traditional small-scale societies had views closer to modern genetics than the Linnaean biologists did.  Fungi were still “plants” when I was an undergraduate, but the indigenous peoples of Mexico correctly place them closer to animals (Hunn 2008; Lampman 2008).  I found that the Yucatec Maya categorize orioles according to the best modern analysis.  And certainly my friends on the Hong Kong waterfront were aware that “fish” (yu) was a functional class (swimming aquatic life), not a natural biological one.  They knew from inspection, for instance, that cuttlefish were closer to octopi than to bony fish, though cuttlefish were “fish” and octopi were not.  It is significant that this example translates perfectly; folk English does the same thing.

The point is that it is constructed on the basis of ongoing interaction with reality.  (Even those unicorns are based on reality, at a couple of removes.  The original “unicorn” was the rhinoceros, and tales of it—a huge horselike creature with one horn in the middle of its forehead—were duly interpreted as reasonably as possible:  a horse with a narwhal tusk for a horn, the Europeans having no other one-“horned” animal to compare.)  Obviously, no society could exist if it did not base its knowledge on truth learned by experience.

One proof is the development of dictionaries in Arab (Carter 1990) and Chinese civilizations.  Technical vocabularies specialized on particular subjects, such as horses (Carter 1990) or drugs and medicines, show the classification systems appropriate to those matters.  Early Arabic dictionaries sometimes arranged words by linguistic domains, and these were much like ours or anyone else’s.  The early Greek and Latin writers also classified plants and animals in ways not irrational or incomprehensible.  They are not the same as our ways, but they are close enough that we still use many of Theophrastus’ and Pliny’s names as scientific names, either for the same plants or for similar or related ones.  (Still, one sometimes wonders about the more modern sages!  Kaktos, Greek for a kind of thistle, wound up applied to some plants that have nothing in common with thistles except prickliness.  Dozens of other names were similarly applied any old way, just to recycle a Greek name, no matter how inappropriately.  This started early; kardamon, another thistle, had already—and mysteriously—become the name of a spice in late antiquity.)

Special purpose classifications classify plants and animals in relation to human wants and needs. In Hong Kong, when I asked “what is that fish?” I got the name in the general system, relating fish to fish—classifying them as soles, sharks, groupers, and so on.  I slowly learned there were many other ways to classify fish:  by price, by technique used to catch them, by habitat, by sacred and ceremonial significance, and by eating qualities.  These were five separate, salient, well-known systems.  They were not merely ad hoc.  The fishermen never confused them with the basic system (Anderson 1972).  When I asked “what is that fish?” I always got a name from the basic system, never “a netted fish” or the like.

Proof that even the arcana of fish classification can suddenly become important is found in the striking book Trying Leviathan by D. Graham Burnett (2007).  This book is the history of a trial that took place in New York City in 1818 to decide whether a whale was a fish or a mammal.  The state had passed a law requiring inspection of fish oil, with a fee to be paid by the seller.  This being New York, a whale-oil dealer immediately challenged the law on the basis of science:  whales had recently been classified as mammals by Linnaeus and Cuvier.  This early example of New York chutzpah got him haled into court.  The trial involved the formidably brilliant icthyologist Samuel Mitchill as witness for the defense, but the verdict went against the dealer, since the plaintiff could establish that the state legislature had passed the law based (at some remove) on the supposition that whales were fish and whale oil would be inspected.

This was long before Darwin.  There was no obvious reason to prefer lactation, air-breathing and live birth over fins, aquatic habitat, and streamlined shape as classification markers.  The lawyers were astute enough to realize that classification could be ambiguous; they made reference to the “duck-billed beaver” (platypus) and other anomalies.  Not only New York lawyers find whales confusing.  My fishermen friends in Hong Kong told me that whales and porpoises were anomalous because they looked like fish but acted intelligent (unlike fish) and were “like pigs” internally.  My friends thought these creatures were uncanny, and avoided catching them.

In anthropology, studies of classifying everything from religious ceremonies to art objects have continued to proliferate.  An unwise attack on such studies was launched in the 1960s by Marvin Harris (1966, 1968) and others.  Harris chose to criticize a study of Maya firewood knowledge by Duane Metzger and Gerald Williams (1966), branding it—and by extension all such research—as “trivial.”  He could not have picked a worse target.  The Maya depend on firewood for cooking and warmth.  They live in a wet climate where good dry wood is hard to find and must be carefully chosen.  Like hundreds of millions of other people around the world, they spend up to several hours a day searching for firewood.  Knowing how to get the best wood in the shortest time is a life-and-death matter for them.  Firewood use is a matter of enormous councern worldwide, since about 1/3 of all the wood used in the world goes for this purpose, greatly contributing to global warming and deforestation.  Nothing could be less trivial, either to the Maya or to the planet.

An area in which folk classification is infamously important, inaccurate, and pernicious is “race.”  Americans are addicted to the notion that everything important is genetic and that genetics is a simple science.  (Many have wondered how a nation of overachieving immigrants from all manner of other cultures can believe this.)  Thus, as noted above, Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray in The Bell Curve (1994) give us a “Latino race” with an IQ of 89!  Quite apart from the absurdity of such aggregated measures of intelligence, Herrnstein and Murray simply ignored the fact that Latinos can be white, black, Native American, East Asian, or any and all mixtures of these.  Similar confusion surrounds “Black” Americans, Native Americans, and other categories.  We have lately been inflicted with something called “race medicine,” which prescribes different drugs for Black and White Americans.  Yet there is a total continuum.  Millions of Whites are part Black, and almost all Blacks are part White—frequently 15/16, since anyone with any African appearance is called “Black.”  These 15/16 Caucasian patients are given “Black” drugs!  Even such appalling bureaucratic monstrosities as “Asian-Pacific Islander”—the creation of arbitrary Census Bureau labeling—have become “real” to Americans.  This shows how “race” classifications can not only change arbitrarily but can be invented out of whole cloth.  The strange, if not downright surrealistic, history of “race” labels has been well covered in anthropology by Lee Baker (1998), Audrey Smedley (2007), and Jonathan Marks (Marks 2001), among others.

Even Linnaean classification is related to economic and aesthetic theories of the Enlightenment elite (Foucault 1970).  Foucault also saw many other interesting aspects of classification that go far beyond its immediate utility.  He wrote:  “Take…animal and plant classifications.  How often have they not been rewritten since the Middle Ages according to completely different rules:  by symbolism [the medieval use of animal and plant symbols], by natural history, by comparative anatomy, by the theory of evolution.  Each time this rewriting makes the knowledge completely different in its functions, in its economy, in its internal relations” (Foucault, in Chomsky and Foucault 2006:26; cf. Foucault 1970).  There is some truth in this, but Foucault misses the key point that actual everyday classification of creatures did not change significantly during this period.  Dogs were dogs, cats were cats, whales were whales.  Nor, of course, was it “completely different in its functions”; it still functioned largely to let people name what they saw, and give similar names to similar creatures.

Over centuries, many new plants and animals were added to European knowledge, necessitating major changes in everyday words and usages, but the basic system did not change.  However, Foucault is correct in that elite scholars’ interests and perspectives really did change.  The Medieval churchmen were more interested in animals as symbols than in animals as animals (see e.g. Herbert Friedman’s superb account of birds in art, 1980; also Rowland 1978).  The function vs. anatomy tension lies behind the whale trial described above, and did indeed affect how we folk speakers classify whales, but we still talk about the “whale fishery,” as well as “shellfish” and “cuttlefish” and other non-anatomical “fish.”  Darwin profoundly changed human thought, but not folk taxonomical usage.

Consider the European goldfinch (Carduelis carduelis).  In the Middle Ages it was a symbol of Christ, and thus the child Christ is shown holding one in many Renaissance paintings.  In Linnaeus’ taxonomy it got its present name—just its old Latin name, doubled—and was classed with finches.  Anatomists then separated the finches into several groups—they turned out to be more different inside than outside—and the goldfinch got its own family, Carduelidae (which includes a lot of its relatives).  Darwinians have gone on to debate the actual relationships and membership of the Carduelidae.  So Foucault is right.

But not right at the deepest level.  Throughout all of this, the goldfinch remains a goldfinch, and every English speaker who notices birds knows it.  Germans similarly call it a distelfink, “thistle finch,” as they have for centuries, in honor of its regular food (thistle seeds).  Folk classification still makes it a “finch” along with zebra finches and Mexican ground finches, although we now know these birds are not closely related.

This emphasizes a difference between folk and elite understandings.  This is not so much a matter of better or worse education, or of snobbism, but of needs.  We ordinary people, and this includes scholars and scientists on their off days, need to have a quick, convenient, pragmatic label to refer to things we regularly interact with.  Scientists need to have labels based on understanding of deeper, less obvious, but more biologically important processes.

Hence scientists refer to C. carduelis in the lab and in the technical literature, but call it a “goldfinch” when they see it in their thistle patch.  Anywhere in the world, if you ask “what’s that?” as a small yellow finch with a red face flies by, you’ll be told “a goldfinch” (or local equivalent).  You will never be told “that’s the Christ child,” and you would not have been told that in the Italian Renaissance, either.  The medieval symbolic system is very much a special purpose classification, and the medieval artists knew that.

Medieval and Renaissance artists and writers often spoke of four levels of symbolism—traditionally defined as “image, symbol, metaphor, and allegory” or something similar (see e.g. Schneider 1992:17).  This survived in religious music until the present.  A good, and thoroughly modern, example is Mississippi John Hurt’s “Slidin’ Delta Blues,” in which the image–a train nicknamed “Slidin’ Delta”—is a symbol of parting from one’s love, which is a metaphor for death, which is an allegory for transcendence.  Hurt sings:  “Lord, I’m goin’ somewhere / I never been before,” where the “somewhere” is a faraway real place, death, mystical experience, and Heaven, depending on the level at which one is listening.

“Totemism,” in the broad sense, is similar.  Classifying people into Eaglehawk and Crow moieties or into Wildcat and Coyote moieties does not mean that people are animals.  It is not the basic classification of the traditional peoples that use this system, either, contra Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss (1963).  It is simply the use of well-known animals as symbols for social groups (Lévi-Strauss 1962, 1963).  This is a special purpose system, and it depends on the prior existence and widespread knowledge of the basic or general system.  It often depends also on knowing the animals’ habits.  Wildcats were associated in California Native cultures with valleys, coyotes with mountains, and thus valley and lowland animals are in the Wildcat moiety, hill and mountain ones in the Coyote moiety.  People are distributed according to birth rather than residence, however.  One is automatically in one’s father’s moiety, no matter where one lives.  What has happened is that human social divisions are projected onto nature.  “Nature” and human society are not radically separated in Native American cultures, so this is a “natural” thing to do (Durkheim and Mauss 1963).

Such social classifications are universal; consider our school mascots.  Symbol, metaphor, and allegory are amazingly important to humans (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).

An odd kind of “classification” is found in linguistic gender and other grammatical systems.  German, Spanish, and other gender systems are notoriously decoupled from sexual reality; “maiden” is neuter in German.  Several Australian languages have four genders: masculine, feminine, neuter, and useful plants (Lakoff 1990 discusses one such language).  Many languages, including Chinese and Maya, have classifying particles, added to numbers and demonstratives, that identify broadly the type of noun to follow.  Thus Chinese says yi ben shu “one volume book” and yi tiao yu “one length fish.”  This allows one to see that Yucatec Maya has a category for “plants” in general:  there is no actual word for “plants,” but there is a classifier (k’ul) that includes all and only plants.

Maps are, in a sense, another form of classification.  Not all cultures make maps, but all have extremely detailed knowledge of places and paths in their environments (Hunn 1991, 2008).  The idea that small-scale societies are  somehow intuitively aware of the environment without making mental maps or representations of it is wrong (Istomin and Dwyer 2009).

Yet, humans seem compelled to think causally.  This is another inborn habit of thought.  We have to find a motive.  Typically, we first look for an active, thinking agent.  If that fails, we look for a covering law—not usually a formal one, just a rule of thumb that will serve.  Only if that too totally fails do we accept blind chance, or probabilistic factors, as a reason (see e..g Nisbett and Ross 1980).  As Geoffrey Lloyd says, “humans everywhere will will use their imaginations to try to get to grips with what happens and why, exploiting some real or supposed analogy with the schemata that work in otherwise more mundane situations” (Lloyd 2007:130).

Aristotle described four types of cause, or rather of aition (pl. aitia), which has also been translated “factor” (Aristotle 1952:9, 88f).  The first is material cause—what the object we are contemplating is made of.  This would not occur to modern people as a “cause”—the hickory wood does not cause the baseball bat—but Aristotle was thinking partly of the elements of Greek thought.  Earth, air, fire, and water were generally thought to have dynamic qualities that made them evolve into things.  Chlorine purifies water by virtue of its violently oxidizing nature, which destroys bacteria and toxins; this is an example of material cause in action.

Second is formal cause: the definition of the object, its pattern, its essential character.  A baseball bat is a rounded stick made of hickory wood, and is patterned so as to hit balls in a game. Third is efficient cause—the direct, proximal cause, specifically the causing agent, of an action.  The bat is made by a factory to be sold to a player, who then uses it to hit a ball; the chlorine is bubbled through water, where it reacts chemically with toxins and bacterial membranes.  Fourth is the final or ultimate cause, the reason for the action or object:  the water is purified so people can drink it safely; the bat is used in a game for the purpose of entertaining people.  This last can go into infinite regress:  the bat is to hit a ball, so that the game will go on, so that people will be entertained, so that they will enjoy life and buy the sponsors’ products, so that….  And this only scratches the surface of Aristotle’s theory of cause, and he was only one Greek philosopher (see Lloyd 2007:108-130).

The endless debate on cause in philosophy since Aristotle need not concern us, since we are here considering folk and traditional knowledge.  In that realm, our heuristics and biases play out at their most florid.  Aristotle’s efficient cause is stated in agent terms.  This default attribution to intentional action by an agent gives us the universal belief in gods, spirits, and other supernatural beings.